Caribbean
Environment
Programme


United Nations Environment Programme





The Transboundary Movement Of Hazardous And Nuclear
Wastes in the Wider Caribbean Region - A Call for a Legal
Instrument within the Cartagena Convention




Prepared by Greenpeace International


GREENPEANCE


CEP Technical Report No. 7
1991

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Note:
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this document do not imply the expression of any
opinion whatsoever on the part of UNEP concerning the legal status of any State, Territory, city or area, or its
authorities, or concerning the delimitation of their frontiers or boundaries. The document contains the views
expressed by the authors acting in their individual capacity and may not necessarily reflect the views of UNEP.


















For bibliographic purposes the printed version of this document may be cited as:
Greenpeace. The Transboundary Movement of Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes in the Wider Caribbean
Region - A Call for a Legal Instrument within the Cartagena Convention. Edited by: Jim Puckett and Sergio
López Ayllon. CEP Technical Report No. 7. UNEP Caribbean Environment Programme, Kingston, 1991.

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CEP Technical Report No. 7
TABLE OF CONTENTS


SOURCE AND SCOPE OF THE WASTE TRADE PROBLEM
WASTE TRADE IN THE WIDER CARIBBEAN REGION
Recent Trends
- Municipal garbage & incinerator ash
- European chemical wastes
- Lead Contaminated Waste
GREENPEACE INVENTORY OF WASTE TRADE IN THE CARIBBEAN
Antigua and Barbuda
Bahamas
Belize
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles
Nicaragua
Panama
Suriname
Turks and Caicos
Venezuela
DUMPING BY ANOTHER NAME -- THE MYTH OF RECYCLING
Toxic Residue
Dirty Industry
Opens Loophole
Absolves Waste Generators
Allows Risky Transportation
A Disincentive for Waste Minimization
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
OCEAN DUMPING AND OCEAN INCINERATION
Ocean Incineration
- A failed technology
- Moves to ban ocean incineration
- An ocean incineration ban in the Cartagena Convention
RADIOACTIVE WASTE IN THE WIDER CARIBBEAN REGION
Overview
Exporting the Radioactive Waste Problem
Sub-Seabed Disposal in the Caribbean Region
The Transit of Radioactive Waste through the Caribbean
POLITICAL INITIATIVES
"Controls" vs. Bans
- The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
- United States legislation
Waste Trade Bans in the Wider Caribbean Region
- National bans
- TABLE I -- Wider Caribbean States which are known to ban waste imports
- TABLE II -- Wider Caribbean States and Territories which remain vulnerable to
legal waste trade
- TABLE III-- Developing countries which have banned waste imports
- The Lomé IV Convention
Other Relevant Fora, Decisions and Policies
- Action Plan for the Environment in Latin America and the Caribbean
- Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
- U.N. General Assembly
- U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean- Caribbean
Development and Co-operation Committee
- Commonwealth Nations
- London Dumping Convention
- The Non-aligned Movement
- World Bank
- European Community
- European Environment Council
- European Parliament
- Positions of E.C. nations
The African Example
- The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
- The Bamako Convention
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
CONCLUSION: A WASTE TRADE BAN WITHIN THE CARTAGENA CONVENTION


ANNEX I:
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, TOXICS IMPORT LAW
ANNEX II: ARTICLE 39, LOME IV CONVENTION
ANNEX III: RESOLUTION NO. 1 OF THE FIFTH INTERGOVERNMENTAL MEETING
ON THE CARIBBEAN ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME AND SECOND
MEETING OF CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE CARTAGENA
CONVENTION
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
SOURCE AND SCOPE OF THE WASTE TRADE PROBLEM
1. Toxic waste follows the path of least resistance. The hazardous by-products of
industrialization tend to move toward those areas with the least political and economic
power to refuse them. The economic "gradient" defined by the contrast in disposal costs in
different locations causes wastes to move. This "gradient" is determined by many factors
including labour costs, land value, etc. But of crucial significance are the costs relative to
the differential in comparative environmental protection legislation, and liability
obligations.
2.
In industrialized countries, poorer neighbourhoods or rural areas have most often been
chosen as sites for toxic waste landfills or incinerators. Residents have been induced to
accept hazardous wastes with the promise of revenue, jobs or electricity.
3.
In recent years the public in Western industrialized countries, have begun to rebel against
having their land, air and water poisoned by toxic wastes. This rising public furore has
forced industrialized countries to adopt increasingly strict and costly regulations for waste
disposal. The legislation has taken the form of absolute bans or phase-outs of certain types
of disposal. Examples include; ocean incineration in the North Sea or landfilling of certain
USA wastes, more requirements for environmental protection resulting in higher costs, or
strict liability upon generators of wastes for future damages from disposal.
4.
In addition, new, more encompassing definitions of hazardous waste are increasingly being
implemented into legislation which require more wastes to be managed. By the United
States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) own admission, there is a lack of
hazardous waste treatment capacity in that goliath waste producing country. Despite this,
the EPA has banned the landfilling of an increasing list of wastes (83 waste streams as of
March 1989). This is also the case in the European Community. Recent decisions by the
Oslo Commission, Barcelona Convention and the North Sea Ministers Conference have all
but banned the use of ocean incineration. In addition, according to the Community Strategy
for Waste Management, Brussels, 18 September 1989, the landfilling of many waste
streams will be phased out within the Community.
5.
This lack of "treatment capacity" combined with legal pressure to "properly dispose" of
wastes has created immense pressures to export. And the pattern of waste dumping within
industrialized countries is repeating itself on a global scale, as waste generators seek to
export wastes to those areas most remote and poor.
6.
The past several years has seen the spectacle of numerous waste brokers sending ships
around the globe in quest of new dumping grounds for their hazardous cargoes. Over 78
less industrialized nations have been asked to accept massive quantities of industrial waste
from the U.S. and Europe. The potential recipients of this waste are essentially asked to
choose between short term economic gains and the long term health of generations of their
population. Between 1986 and 1988, over three million tons of wastes were exported from
the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries to non-
OECD countries.
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
WASTE TRADE IN THE WIDER CARIBBEAN REGION
7.
Bordered to the north by the world's largest hazardous waste producing nation, the United
States, the Wider Caribbean Region lies on the front lines of the international trade in toxic
wastes. Almost every country in the Caribbean region has been targeted as a waste
dumpsite by waste brokers operating from the United States, and these nations are under
increasing pressure to accept the wastes. In fact, during 1990 alone, information became
available on at least 21 deals to import a wide range of waste into the Wider Caribbean
countries. Unfortunately, it appears that the numbers of offers will continue to increase.
RECENT TRENDS
8.
Wastes are often presented by dealers as useful raw materials for landfills, recycling, fuel
substitution, or housing and road construction. In addition to their presentation as
"development projects" that will generate everything from jobs to electricity, these deals
are often accompanied by offers of monetary commissions, technical assistance and
infrastructural support. Waste dealers always try to assure potential buyers that the waste is
totally harmless, or that it can be safely handled. Regarding the deals offered in the region
in 1990, it is possible to detect three major trends.
Municipal garbage & incinerator ash
9.
The first trend is a significant increase in the number of deals being offered to Caribbean
countries to accept garbage or ash generated by municipal garbage incinerators from major
U.S. cities. While governments are assured by waste brokers that municipal incinerator ash
is not hazardous, there are ample laboratory studies of the ash available to document
dangerous levels of heavy metals, including lead, chromium, mercury, cadmium, copper
and zinc contained in these ashes. In addition, the ashes contain consistent amounts of
dioxins, a complex group of extremely toxic and bioaccumulating chemicals, shown to
cause cancers, birth defects and other reproductive problems, and damage the immune
system at levels as low as one part per quadrillion (1 part per 1,000,000,000,000,000).
10. Given that U.S. cities are facing rapidly increasing quantities of garbage, ever-rising local
disposal costs and liability risks for environment damage, they may be increasingly
tempted to offer their waste or incinerator ash "free-of-charge," presenting it as useful raw
material. In northern eastern U.S. cities, average disposal fees for incinerator ash are $70 to
$90 per ton, plus transportation and other transfer costs; for particularly hazardous ash the
fee can reach $140 per ton.
European chemical wastes
11. The second trend is that a number of European chemical industries are trying to export
hazardous wastes to developing countries. Again, this is to escape the high cost of local
disposal which in the United States now can cost up to $2,400 per ton for hazardous waste
incineration, as well as the serious environmental and health risks inherent in the handling
and disposal of these substances. This trend is expected to increase after 1992 when new
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
definitions for waste will at least double the amount of waste requiring special
management.
12. These chemical wastes can be especially hazardous, in particular the halogenated solvents,
since they generate high levels of dioxins and furans, when burnt in disposal operations, or
invariably escape into the groundwater when disposed of in landfills.
13. As persistent, bioaccumulating and extremely toxic substances, dioxins and furans
represent some of the most hazardous contaminants known; they can have long-term
negative impacts on virtually every ecosystem, make it unsafe to consume fish and seafood
from aquatic systems near dioxin-furan emitting installations and provoke significant, long-
term human health problems.
Lead Contaminated Waste
14. The third trend is that, as the United States regulations have tightened and made it
increasingly difficult to dispose of lead slag and other lead-contaminated wastes in this
country, there has been a greater activity recently among waste traders to offer lead wastes.
These wastes are generally presented as useful raw material for recycling, construction or
road-building purposes. In fact, they are highly toxic. Small doses of lead can adversely
affect many human organs and cause behavioural and learning problems in children;
prolonged excessive exposure can cause damage to the peripheral and central nervous
systems.

GREENPEACE INVENTORY OF WASTE TRADE IN THE CARIBBEAN
15. The following is an inventory of some of the proposals that have threatened to turn the
Caribbean region into a dumping ground for hazardous wastes from Europe and North
America. All proposals will be listed by Date, Type of Waste, Source Countries, Exporting
party, Pretext for export (see Dumping By Another Name: The Myth of Recycling, below),
and Current Status.
16. Greenpeace is committed to uncovering, exposing and ending the international waste trade.
This inventory, which is a continuing work, is an attempt to fulfil this commitment.
Greenpeace International Waste Trade Campaigners act as reporters, not only of facts
proven in a court of law, but of accounts and stories that have appeared in journalistic
reportage, government memos and correspondence and conversations with waste traders
and officials. In each case, we cite the primary source of the information. Because
Greenpeace is not always the primary source of the information, we cannot be liable for
any inaccuracies committed by the primary source.
Page 3

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CEP Technical Report No. 7
Antigua and Barbuda
Date:

June
1988
Type of Waste:
Garbage
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Unnamed
Pretext/Fate:
Incineration
Status:

Rejected
The government of Antigua and Barbuda rejected a proposal by an unnamed firm to build an
incinerator for U.S. garbage. The proposed incinerator would have burned over one million tons
of U.S. garbage per year.
Bahamas
Date:
1980
Type of Waste:
Paint, pesticides, metal plating wastes
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Ashvins
Pretext/Fate:
Dumping
Status:
Probably
rejected
In 1980, a U.S. firm called Ashvins S.A. tried to ship wastes from U.S. paint manufacturers,
pesticide companies and metal- plating firms to the Bahamas.
Date:

August
1986
Type of Waste:
Municipal incinerator ash
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

City of Philadelphia
Pretext/Fate:
Fertilizer
Status:

Rejected in Bahamas, dumped in Haiti and at sea.
The Bahamas was the first country to turn back the KHIAN SEA, which visited several islands
in the Caribbean in 1986 and 1987, loaded with incinerator ash from Philadelphia. (See Haiti)
Date:

May
1987
Type of Waste:
Garbage
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

City of Islip, New York
Pretext/Fate:
Methane recovery
Status:

Rejected, returned to New York
In early 1987, the so called New York "garbage barge" tried to unload 3,186 tons of solid waste
from Islip, New York, on Little San Salvador. (See Belize)
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
Date:
1989
Type of Waste:
Liquid hazardous waste
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Finn Moller
Pretext/Fate:
Cement kiln fuel
Status:

Rejected
In 1989, the Bahamian government gave its preliminary approval for burning 88,000 tons per
year of U.S. hazardous wastes in Freeport. This approval was quickly retracted following strong
public opposition and a reminder to the Bahamian government that they were parties to the then
negotiated (now signed) waste trade ban enacted in the Lomé IV Convention.
Finn Moller was instrumental in attempting a similar scheme in Belize and Guyana in 1987 and
1988. (See Guyana)
Belize
Date:

March,
April
1987
Type of Waste:
Garbage
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

City of Islip, New York
Pretext/Fate:
Methane recovery
Status:

Rejected, returned to New York
In April 1987, the government of Belize ordered its security forces to prevent the so called
"garbage barge" from unloading its cargo of 3 186 tons of solid waste from Islip, New York. The
vessel had previously attempted to unload its wastes in the states of North Carolina, Alabama,
Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas, and in the nations of Mexico and the Bahamas. The
operators of the vessel tried to arrange a deal with Belizean investors to purchase the cargo for
use as material for a "methane recovery facility". This led a government spokesperson for Belize
to say, "the idea of buying that garbage is laughable."
Date:

1987
Exporter:

Finn Moller
Type of Waste:
Industrial waste
Source:

U.S.A.
Pretext/Fate:
Incinerator
Status:

Rejected
The Belizean government rejected a proposal by made by Pott Industries and Teixeira Farms to
construct an incinerator for the burning of imported U.S. wastes. (see Guyana)
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
Date:

1987
Type of waste:
Sewage sludge
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Applied Recovery Technology
Pretext/Fate:
Dumping
Status:

Rejected
Belize rejected a scheme to import sewage sludge from several U.S. cities in 1987. (see Turks
and Caicos)
Colombia
Date:

January
1990
Type of Waste:
Municipal incinerator ash
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

International Energy Resources
Pretext/Fate:
Roadbuilding material
Status:

Unknown
San Andres Island of Colombia was targeted as one of the dumpsites for incinerator ash by
International Energy Resources. (See Guatemala)
Costa Rica
Date:

1985
Type of Waste:
Toxic waste gases
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

TRW Corp.
Pretext/Fate:
Transfer to subsidiary
Status:

Rejected
In 1985, a vessel arrived off the Costa Rican coast carrying 197 cylinders filled with toxic waste
gases, generated by TRW Corporation of California. Costa Rican authorities refused to allow the
ship to unload the toxic gases at the port of Caldera, and demanded that the ship return to
California.
Date:

July
1987
Type of Waste:
"Paper waste"
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter: Hancock
Industries
Pretext/Fate:
Recycling, land recovery
Status:

Unclear
In 1987, a U.S. firm named Hancock Industries tried to convince the government of Costa Rica
to construct a paper recycling plant utilizing "paper waste and related products brought from
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
cities on the east coast of the U.S. The waste which is not recyclable would be used as sanitary
landfill in the recovery of areas subject to flooding on the outskirts of the port of Limon.
Date:

1987
Type of Waste:
Municipal incinerator ash
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

City of Philadelphia
Pretext/Fate:
Land recovery
Status:

Rejected
The operators of the KHIAN SEA, loaded with incinerator ash, approached Costa Rica with a
proposal to use the toxic ash as "landfill to rehabilitate and recover lands around the port of
Limon." (See Haiti)
Date:

October
1990
Type of Waste:
Industrial waste
Source:

Europe
Exporter:

World Wide Energy Inc.
Pretext/Fate:
Electricity generation
Status:

Unknown
World Wide Energy Inc. proposed to install a rotary kiln and energy generating facilities, using
mostly European industrial waste as fuel substitute.
Dominican Republic
Date:

1980
Type of Waste:
PCB waste
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Arbuckle Machinery
Pretext/Fate:
Dumping
Status:

Actual

According to one report, a U.S. firm named Arbuckle Machinery shipped PCB wastes to the
Dominican Republic between January and June 1980.
Date:

1983
Type of Waste:
Chemical wastes
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Atlantic Forest Products
Pretext/Fate:
Topsoil
Status:

Rejected
In 1983, the government of the Dominican Republic approved a scheme by a company called
Atlantic Forest Products which would have dumped chemical wastes from U.S. cities in the
barren Oviedo region. Public opposition forced the government to withdraw its approval. The
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
government subsequently implemented one of the world's first national waste import bans in
1983. Yet, this law has not deterred waste traders from continuing their attempts.
Date:

1987
Type of Waste:
Municipal incinerator ash
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

City of Philadelphia
Pretext/Fate:
Fertilizer
Status:

Rejected,
later
dumped in Haiti, and probably at sea
The Dominican Republic rejected KHIAN SEA dump attempts. (See Haiti)
Date:

1988
Type of Waste:
Liquid toxic wastes
Source:

Northern Europe
Exporter:

World Technology
Pretext/Fate:
Water purification (dilution)
Status:

Unclear
Northern European liquid toxic waste was to be shipped by the Italian firm, World Technology
Co. to the Dominican Republic where it would have been dissolved into a 90% water solution.
This material would then have been dumped down the drain. The Dominican Company receiving
the waste was formed with the pretext of building a "water purification" plant for use by
hospitals and clinics.
Date:

February
1988
Type of Waste:
Garbage
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Franklin Energy Resources
Pretext/Fate:
Electricity generation
Status:

Probably
rejected
In February 1988 promoters of a "recycling...plant generating energy based on cardboard refuse,"
travelled to the Dominican Republic on a promotion tour. However this plant was believed to be
designed to take household waste from the U.S. A public outcry followed the announcement.
Date:

1989
Type of Waste:
Antibiotic production waste
Source:

Puerto Rico
Exporter:

Unspecified pharmaceutical company
Pretext/Fate:
Food for cattle
Status:

Actual
An unspecified pharmaceutical company in Puerto Rico has been shipping wastes from the
manufacture of antibiotics to the Dominican Republic. The company mixes the wastes with corn
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
and fishmeal and ships it to a firm in the Dominican Republic where it is "given" to ranchers as
"food for cattle."
Date:

1988
Type of Waste:
Garbage
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

W.T. Associated
Pretext/Fate:
Electricity generation
Status:

Rejected
W. T. Associated proposed to "process" garbage imported from the U.S.A. and dump it in
Santiago de los Caballeros. They stated that it would then be converted, via methane burning,to
electrical power. The city council originally accepted the offer to import 3,650,000 tons of U.S.
garbage each year in exchange for $1.33 per ton. A huge national outcry put a stop to the plan as
the President of the Dominican Republic affirmed that no more such offers would be approved.
Date:

1988
Type of Waste:
Industrial waste
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Global Dynamics Ltd.
Pretext/Fate:
Electricity generation
Status:

Rejected
The government of the Dominican Republic rejected a proposal from the New York City firm,
Global Dynamics Ltd., to ship industrial wastes for the production of electricity.
Date:

January
1990
Type of Waste:
Municipal incinerator ash
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

International Energy Resources
Pretext/Fate:
Roadbuilding material
Status:

Unknown
The Dominican Republic was also targeted by IER as part of their regional roadbuilding scheme.
(See Guatemala)
Date:

1990
Type of waste:
Treated wood products
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Environmental Services Group
Pretext/Fate:
Incineration
Status:

Unknown
Environmental Services Group, a New York City-based firm, is negotiating with the government
of the Dominican Republic for permission to build an incinerator for treated wood and other
wastes to be imported from the U.S.A.
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
Guatemala
Date:

1987
Type of Waste:
Sewage sludge
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Applied Recovery Technologies
Pretext/Fate:
Fertilizer
Status:

Rejected
In 1987, the Guatemalan government initially approved, and then rejected, the import of 125,000
tons of sewage sludge each year from Los Angeles, California. Los Angeles' sewage sludge
contains toxic chemicals from industries which discharge their wastes into the city's sewer
system. The scheme, led by the U.S. firm, Applied Recovery Technologies, would have used the
sludge as a soil fertilizer in Guatemala. In exchange, ART offered the Guatemalan government
US$14 million. ART has tried to ship sewage sludge to several other Central American or
Caribbean countries, including Honduras and the Turks and Caicos Islands.
Date:

1988
Type of Waste:
Asbestos waste
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

NCTB of New Jersey
Pretext/Fate:
Re-use in brake linings
Status:

Unknown
In late 1988, another U.S. firm, NCTB, tried to set up a transfer station in New York which
would have shipped up to 365,000 cubic yards of asbestos wastes to Guatemala each year.
Date:

January
1990
Type of Waste:
Municipal incinerator ash
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

International Energy Resources
Pretext/Fate:
Roadbuilding
material
Status:

Rejected
International Energy Resources offered Guatemala incinerator ash from U.S. municipal
incinerators to be mixed with cement for road building purposes. The five-year plan proposed
would have involved the import of some 5.5 million tons of ash to Guatemala. In early January it
seemed the Guatemalan government had already signed a protocol agreement for building the
first 100 km. of roads. According to IER's presentation, the Guatemalan government was to
provide the road building equipment and its operating personnel, while the company would
underwrite all other costs for the project. The Guatemalan government finally turned down the
deal and presented the case to the Contracting Parties to the Cartagena Convention in Kingston,
Jamaica that same month. IER claims that it is negotiating similar deals with the Dominican
Republic, Jamaica and San Andrés Island (Colombia).
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
Date:

January
1990
Type of Waste:
Liquid chemical waste
Source:

Europe
Exporter:

Terra International Services,Inc./Energy Resources
Pretext/Fate:
Electricity generation
Status:

Rejected
In January of 1990, Guatemala and El Salvador were offered by Terra International Services,
Inc., operating as the agent for Energy Resources, N.V. (incorporated in Aruba), 1.2 million tons
per year of liquid industrial chemical waste. The plan called for mixing the waste with locally
generated municipal garbage and then burning it in a rotary kiln incinerator to generate
electricity. Energy Resources would provide the chemical wastes as "enhancing material,"
provide and install all the necessary equipment for the incinerator-generator plant, supervise the
operation, and provide training to local personnel.
The waste would be provided by European companies such as Bayer or from the European plants
of U.S. firms such as Dow Chemical and others. The proposal claimed that one of the principal
benefits of the project would be the production of cheap electricity for the industries in the Santo
Tomas de Castilla free trade zone. Nonetheless, the chemical waste that would have been
imported included halogenated and benzene-based solvents, all of which, to varying degrees, are
carcinogenic and the causal agents for a wide range of other serious health problems.
In February 1990 the project was rejected for the first time. It was presented to the government
again in May, as the agents for the deal hoped to take advantage of a loophole in the Guatemalan
legislation that bans waste imports, except for "commercial use." The deal was rejected again in
October 1990.
The local agents for the scheme claim that similar projects have already been approved in El
Salvador (May), Honduras (August) and Nicaragua (August); there is no independent
confirmation of these claims.
Date:

May
1990
Type of Waste:
Lead slag
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Bell Medical Corporation
Pretext/Fate:
Rail and road beds
Status:

Rejected
In May 1990, the Guatemalan Ministries of Economy and Mining had already given approval for
a local company to import some 245,000 metic tonnes of lead slag from a U.S. company whose
name is given as "Bell Medical Corporation" in one document and as "Southern Medical and
Surgical, Inc." in another. The slag was to be crushed and used as gravel for rail and road beds or
to be mixed with asphalt for road construction.
The project was detained for a time due to the exporter's difficulties in obtaining export permits
from the U.S. EPA. Later the Guatemalan government rejected the project.
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
Guyana
Date:

1988
Type of Waste:
Hazardous wastes
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Pott and Texeira
Pretext/Fate:
Incineration
Status:

Rejected
In early 1988, the Guyanese government tentatively entered into a joint venture with two
California firms (Pott Industries and Teixeira Farms) to burn over 60,000 tons of U.S. hazardous
wastes in Guyana each year. The wastes would have been burnt in an incinerator along the
Demerara River, at the edge of the rainforest. The plan met heavy opposition from Guyanese
opposition parties, which held numerous protests in Guyana and in the U.S.A. Finally, in
September 1988, Guyanese President Desmond Hoyte declared the project "a non-starter."
Haiti
Date:

1982
Type of Waste:
Unknown
Source:

Unknown
Exporter:

Steward Environmental Systems
Pretext/Fate:
Dump
Status:

Rejected
Steward Environmental Systems offered to buy from the Haitian government 44,460 acres of
land to serve as a landfill for 40,000 metric tons/year of unspecified waste.
Date:

1987
Type of Waste:
Sewage sludge
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Applied Recovery Technology
Pretext/Fate:
Dumping
Status:

Unknown
(See Turks and Caicos)
Date:

January
1988
Type of Waste:
Municipal incinerator ash
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

City of Philadelphia
Pretext/Fate:
Fertilizer
Status:

Dumped
In January 1988, a ship called the KHIAN SEA illegally dumped 4,000 tons of toxic incinerator
residues from the U.S.A. on a beach in Gonaives, Haiti. After dumping 4,000 tons
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
(misrepresented as fertilizer) on a Haitian beach, the ship then embarked on a voyage of 27
months. During the course of the journey, an official of the city of Philadelphia stated, "I'd slit
my wrists if I didn't think there is enough greed in the world to find somebody to take
Philadelphia's trash." The statement was likely an accurate one, for somehow, somewhere, the
hazardous cargo was discharged in, or around the Indian Ocean. The KHIAN SEA journey
includes attempts to dump the toxic ash in the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cape Verde Islands, Chile,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia,
Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia.
Despite demands by government officials and Haitian environmentalists to return the ash to the
U.S.A., the wastes remain piled on the beach. A Grand Jury investigation proceeds in the U.S.A.
Honduras
Date:

November
1990
Type of Waste:
Toxic waste
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:
Energy Resources N.V., Thermal processing Corp, Viking Inc. of Dover,
NJ.
Pretext/Fate:
Disposal
Status:

Imminent
According to independent sources, the Honduran government has granted operating permits to
two toxic waste disposal plants that would burn industrial wastes generated in the U.S.A. The
three companies would be Energy Resources, N.V., Thermal Processing Corp. and Viking Inc. of
Dover, NJ. The Honduran counterparts are Cementos de Honduras and Inversiones la Mosquitia
S.A. The companies involved want to export 35,000 barrels of waste each month and will pay
US $100 per barrel.
Date:

March,
April,
1990
Type of Waste:
Radioactive paper
Source:

Unknown
Exporter:

Morgan Price
Pretext/Fate:
Recycled, roofing, sanitary products etc.
Status:

Dumped
In March and April 1990 more than 1,000 bales (300 tons) of waste cardboard were unloaded in
Puerto Cortes, Honduras on the Atlantic coast. The cardboard, supposedly intended for recycling
and used for roof laminate, sanitary and other products, is alleged to have radioactive
contamination. The waste was shipped by Morgan Price of Hialeah, Florida and received by a
Honduran firm, Maritima y Transporte de Honduras, Intermodal, S.A. Claims appear in several
press clippings to the effect that millions of dollars changed hands in the deal.
Honduran sources reported that the situation had not changed since April. The cardboard was
still being stored at the port, and it had not been possible to determine if the waste is really
contaminated since the equipment needed to test the materials is not available in Honduras.
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
Date:

1988
Type of Waste:
Toxic wastes
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

International Asphalt and Petroleum
Pretext/Fate:
Incineration
Status:

Rejected
In 1988, International Asphalt and Petroleum, proposed burning up to 1,800,000 pounds per year
of U.S. toxic wastes in the rainforest around Gracias a Dios.
Date:

1988
Type of Waste:
Municipal incinerator ash
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

City of Philadelphia
Pretext/Fate:
Fertilizer
Status:

Rejected
(See KHIAN SEA, Haiti)
Date:

1987
Type of Waste:
Sewage sludge
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Applied Recovery Technology
Pretext/Fate:
Dumping
Status:

Rejected
In 1987, Applied Recovery Technology offered to pay Honduras between $30 and $60 million to
dump sewage sludge in coastal swampland in the department of Valle, one of the poorest areas
of Honduras.
Date:

1970s
Type of Waste:
Nuclear Wastes
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Unknown
Pretext/Fate:
Storage
Status:

Rejected
Honduras rejected plans to store U.S. nuclear wastes in Puerto Cortes in the 1970's.
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
Jamaica
Date:

January
1990
Type of Waste:
Municipal incinerator ash
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

International Energy Resources
Pretext/Fate:
Roadbuilding material
Status:

Unknown
Jamaica was also targeted by IER as part of their regional roadbuilding scheme. (See Guatemala)
Date:

1988
Type of Waste:
Solvent wastes
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

A.G. & H Chemicals
Pretext/Fate:
Dumping
Status:

Rejected
In 1988, A.G. & H Chemicals of Delray Beach, Florida, notified the U.S. EPA that it intended to
export 75,000 gallons of flammable liquid and hazardous solvent wastes to Jamaica. The
company hoped to ship these wastes to Solvar Chemicals of Kingston. The Jamaican
government, however, rejected the proposal.
Date:

April
1987
Type of Waste:
Radioactive skim milk
Source:

EEC Countries
Exporter:

EEC
Pretext/Fate:
Human consumption
Status:

Removed,
whereabouts
unknown
In April of 1987 the European Community shipped 20,000 bags of radioactive milk powder to
Jamaica as part of a food aid package. According to the EEC standards this milk was suitable for
human consumption, but the Jamaican authorities discovered the contamination and refused to
accept the donation as it exceeded the allowable levels under Jamaican law. The EEC
subsequently removed all but 4,313 bags to an undisclosed site in Europe.
Date:

1990
Type of waste:
waste
Source:

U.S.A. and local
Exporter:

International Business Development Corporation
Pretext\Fate:
Incineration
Status:

Unknown
IBDC is hoping to build an incinerator in Jamaica to burn local and U.S. wastes. Reportedly, the
Montenay Power Corporation would build the facility.
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
Mexico
In spite of a Presidential Decree which bans imports of waste to Mexico, with the exception of
wastes bound for recycling and bilateral waste agreements between the U.S.A. and Mexico,
much illegal trade is known to occur along the 3,000 kilometer U.S.A./Mexican border. Waste
traders take advantage of chronically weak enforcement of waste trade laws, and illegally ship
toxic wastes to Mexico for disposal.
The legal trade in recyclable waste from the U.S.A. to Mexico is significant but does not enter
into, or transit within, the Wider Caribbean Region. This traffic will thus be omitted from this
inventory. The extent of illegal shipments of wastes to Mexico moving into or within the Wider
Caribbean Region is unquantifiable.
Date:

1989-1990
Type of Waste:
Industrial, garbage
Source:

Europe
Exporter:

Arnold Kuenzler
Pretext/Fate:
Incineration
Status:

Unknown
Notorious ex-soldier of fortune and weapons trader Arnold Andreas Kuenzler has admittedly
been busy convincing various local governments in Mexico and Venezuela of the need to build
numerous incinerators for European industrial and household wastes. In January 1990 he
contacted the Swiss Ambassador in Mexico for his participation in a waste importation contract.
The Ambassador refused to participate.
At the end of 1990 the Mexican press noted that local authorities of the State of Veracruz had
been approached for the construction of various garbage incinerators.
Netherlands Antilles
Date:

1988
Type of Waste:
Garbage
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Waste Central Inc.
Pretext/Fate:
Reef construction
Status:

Rejected
In 1988, this Netherlands dependency rejected a scheme by a firm called Waste Central Inc. to
build a 70 mile long reef made of U.S. garbage off the coast of Saba. In exchange, Waste Central
offered $1.00 per ton of garbage dumped, plus "one ounce of fine gold, one 'yard fowl,' and a
basket of fruit and vegetables."
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
Date:

1987
Type of Waste:
Garbage
Source:

Europe
Exporter:

Power, Water and Waste Ltd.
Pretext/Fate:
Methane gas farm
Status:

Rejected
The Netherlands Antilles also rejected a proposal by a British firm to bury U.S. wastes in
Curaçao in 1987.
Nicaragua
Date:

October
1990
Type:

Liquid
chemical
waste
Source:

Unspecified
Exporter:

INFRA International Ltd.
Pretext/Fate:
Electricity generation
Status:

Rejected
INFRA International Ltd. offered to build a rotary kiln incinerator to burn high BTU waste. This
project will import industrial wastes from unspecified sources, as a fuel substitute to generate
electricity. The wastes are given as "principally acetone, benzene, methanol, alcohol, oils, fats
and other processed materials". This seems to be either the same or a very similar project as the
one proposed to Guatemala by Terra International/Energy Resources, NV.
Date:

September,
1990
Type:

Chemical
and radioactive wastes
Source:

Industrialized countries
Exporter:

Benjamin Thomas Corp.
Pretext/Fate:
Electricity generation
Status:

Rejected
The U.S.-based Benjamin Thomas Corporation, working through its Central American
subsidiary, Casa Phillips S.A., offered to build an electrical generating plant free of charge for
the Nicaraguan government. The company also offered to donate the fuel for the plant, which
was to consist of 500,000 tons annually of chemical and radioactive waste from unspecified
industrialized countries.
If that quantity of material were actually burned each year, the incinerator facility would produce
at least 2500 metric tons of ash with radioactive and or toxic contaminants.
The Nicaraguan press reported that the local agent for this project was Farid Ayales, former
Costa Rican ambassador to Nicaragua during the Oscar Arias government. Ayales later denied
the report.
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
Date:

August,
1990
Type of Waste:
Lead slag
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Bell Medical Corporation
Pretext/Fate:
Roadbuilding material and landfill
Status:

Unknown
The agents for this project in Guatemala claimed to have already received permission from the
Nicaraguan government to move ahead with a similar project in the latter country; the slag would
be used as construction material to repair roads damaged in the war and as land fill. There is no
independent confirmation of this.
Date:

April
1990
Type of Waste:
Municipal incinerator ash
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

ALQUI Distributors
Pretext/Fate:
Roadbuilding material
Status:

Rejected
In April 1990, Roberto Morales, agent for ALQUI Distributors, offered the Nicaraguan
government some 200,000 tons of ash per month from U.S. municipal incinerators (claiming the
ash is from Philadelphia), for the next five years. Each shipment accepted would be accompanied
by payment of some 1.2 million dollars, although the vast majority of the money would be paid
as fees and commissions to agents, shippers, lawyers, etc, and a very small percentage to the
Nicaraguan government. The ash would be delivered to the port of Bluefields and supposedly be
used in roadbuilding projects, first to connect Bluefields and Pto. Cabezas and in a second stage,
Bluefields and Managua.
The Nicaraguan government rejected the scheme. Dr. Jaime Inser, director of the Nicaraguan
Institute of Natural Resources (IRENA, the government agency responsible for environmental
matters) affirmed in press declarations that Nicaragua would not accept this kind of projects.
Morales claims that President Cristiani and the head of the Salvadoran army have both already
signed agreements for a similar deal in El Salvador. It also seems that Morales has been offering
his ash in other Central American countries, in each case asserting that the previous country
visited has already accepted.
Date:

December
1990
Type of waste:
Tire pieces and other waste
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Camus, Granata and Associates, Inc.
Pretext-Fate:
Energy generation
Status:

Under
consideration
The Miami-based, Camus, Granata and Associates, Inc. has presented a proposal to the
Nicaraguan government to build an incinerator and a modular electrical generating plant.
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
Imported tire scraps and pellets would be a principal fuel source for the plant. The initial
proposal also mentioned the possibility of using U.S. solid municipal wastes, but that part of the
project was rejected by the Nicaraguan government. The rest of the project remains under
consideration.
Panama
Date:

August
1990
Type of Waste:
Municipal incinerator ash
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Almany Enterprises Inc.
Pretext/Fate:
Landfill
Status:

Under
consideration
The Miami-based firm Almany Enterprises offered the Panamanian government some 30 million
metric tons of ash from U.S. municipal incinerators, to be imported over the next four years. The
company would pay the government approximately 6.50 USD for every ton received. In addition
the company offered to construct a block factory, a hospital and an incinerator for local wastes.
The ash would be used as land fill material in France Field, an area with both fresh water and
marine wetlands, close to the Colon duty free port.
Date:

1988
Type of Waste:
Garbage
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

International Energy Resources
Pretext/Fate:
Landfill or incinerator
Status:

Rejected
Panama has been a major target of numerous waste traders. In 1988, the government rejected a
deal proposed by the New York firm, International Energy Resources Inc., to dispose one-third
of New York City's garbage in either a landfill or an incinerator near Colón.
Date:

1988
Type of Waste:
Radioactive ash
Source:

Austria
Exporter:

Gebrueder Convalexius
Pretext/Fate:
Dumped
Status:

Prohibited
by
Austria
In 1988, an Austrian company, Gebrueder Convalexius, proposed to ship 4,500 barrels of nuclear
wastes (reportedly radioactive ash) to Panama. However, the Austrian government prohibited all
nuclear waste shipments to Panama.
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
Date:

1987
Type of Waste:
Municipal incinerator ash
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Bulkhandling
Pretext/Fate:
Roadbed material
Status:

Rejected
In 1987, the Panamanian government retracted its earlier approval for a scheme which would
have dumped 250,000 tons of incinerator ash from Philadelphia in coastal wetlands in the
province of Bocas del Toro.
Suriname
Date:

1987
Type of Waste:
PCB waste
Source:

Europe
Exporter:

Mine Tech International
Pretext/Fate:
Dump
Status:

Rejected
This former Netherlands colony in South America rejected plans by the Netherlands firm, Mine
Tech International, to dump two million tons of PCB-contaminated wastes from Europe in
Suriname in exchange for an undisclosed sum of money, in 1988. The rejection followed a
heated debate in Surinam over the proposal.
Turks and Caicos
Date:

1986
Type of Waste:
Sewage sludge
Source:

U.S.A.
Exporter:

Applied Recovery Technology
Pretext/Fate:
Dumping
Status:

Unknown
The broker firm, Applied Recovery Technology of Alexandria, Virginia U.S.A. has been
attempting to ship US sewage sludges to numerous Western Hemisphere countries since 1986.
ART has offered British officials approximately $33 million per year for use of 400 hectares of
land for a dumping ground on West Caicos Island.
The Governments of Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras have all rejected similar ART
proposals.
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
Venezuela
Date:

1987
Type of Waste:
Highly toxic wastes
Source:

Europe
Exporter:

Jelly Wax
Pretext/Fate:
Dumping
Status:

Actual
The Venezuelan coastal city of Puerto Cabello was the unwilling home to 2,000 tons of highly
toxic wastes from Europe in 1987. The waste trading vessel, LYNX, dumped and abandoned the
wastes in Puerto Cabello, where they remained for six months. According to the Venezuelan
government, "while stored in Venezuela, the drums of waste leaked, were in constant danger of
explosion and presented serious health hazards to the local population." The government ordered
the wastes removed and returned to Italy. The wastes finally returned to Italy in the summer of
1988, but only after they were dumped first in Syria.
Date:

1987
Type of Waste:
Toxic wastes
Source:

Europe
Exporter:

Jelly Wax
Pretext/Fate:
Dumping
Status:

Rejected
Another European waste trading ship, the RADHOST, was prevented from dumping toxic wastes
in Venezuela in 1987; the RADHOST eventually dumped these same wastes in Lebanon.

DUMPING BY ANOTHER NAME -- THE MYTH OF RECYCLING
17. A major trend in the waste trade is to package waste trade deals as recycling or reuse
proposals. Of the 55 regional waste trade schemes reported in the inventory above, a full
64% masquerade as, or claim to involve, some form of recycling or "development" pretext.
Many waste traders try to tailor their schemes to the particular needs of the area where they
would like to dump their wastes.
18. For example, many countries in the Caribbean region suffer from acute shortages of
electricity and roads. Consequently, a host of waste traders have tried to persuade them to
build toxic waste incinerators which would presumably produce electricity (along with
toxic air emissions and ash), or use existing incinerator ash, (along with its heavy metals
and dioxin), to make roads.
19. Even if the proposed "recycling" schemes involve some form of legitimate recycling, this
type of trade, if condoned, represents a grave loophole through which huge volumes of
poisons can be allowed to move across boundaries and endanger the health and
environment of the receiving country. Unless there are provisions for repatriation of the
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
residual waste following reprocessing, which there very seldom are, the transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes for recycling or recovery must always be recognized as
including transboundary movement for final disposal. This is due to the fact that nothing
can ever be recycled to 100% and thus the residual material will be dumped on the
receiving territory.
20. The problems inherent to the transboundary movement of hazardous waste for recycling
are outlined below:
Toxic Residue
21. Nothing can be recycled to 100%. Very often the residual material constitutes the greater
and more hazardous part of the original material following the reprocessing. Most
recovered products in the recycling industry are not the toxic elements of the waste stream.
For example steel wastes which are recycled to recover non-ferrous metals often contain
dangerous quantities of toxic heavy metals and dioxins which remain on the receiving
territory.
Dirty Industry
22.
Waste moves primarily for economic reasons. The movement from North to South is
often caused by cheaper labour, capital costs, liability, insurance costs, etc. These price
differentials are often indicative of much less stringent labour or environmental
protection laws. In other words, wastes are often recycled in poorer countries because
industry is allowed to be dirtier there. Thus dirty industries are allowed to exploit workers
and the environment because of an obvious shortage and need for foreign exchange.
Opens Loophole
23. By permitting any opportunity to ship wastes that are designated for recycling or deemed a
secondary raw material, an enormous loophole is allowed, through which waste traders can
ship a wide variety of dangerous substances misrepresented as "fertilizer, road oil, building
materials", etc. This presents an important problem for enforcement and places the burden
of proof of toxicity on the enforcing government.
Absolves Waste Generators
24. The transboundary movement of wastes for the purposes of recycling can be used as an
excuse by generators to absolve themselves of responsibility for the later effects of the
hazardous materials. When legally viewed as "secondary raw materials" or "for recycling
or recovery industries", toxic wastes are too often exempted (as in the Basel Convention)
from the requirements for ensuring the availability of "adequate technical capacity or
suitability." Even if strict liability is imposed on the generator, from a practical perspective
there is little to ensure that a judgement can be enforced against a foreign generator.
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
Allows Risky Transportation
25. The transportation of such materials involves hazards to dock and ship workers, processing
plant workers, and the environments of the transit areas and ultimate disposal site of the
residues. In a recent case in Brazil involving metal waste, 20 ship workers were
hospitalized after shifting a cargo of hazardous waste on its ship.
A Disincentive for Waste Minimization
26. The Basel Convention recognized, and it is widely accepted, that we must "ensure that the
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other wastes is reduced to a minimum
consistent with the environmentally sound and efficient management of such wastes." In
addition,
27. Basel obliged its parties to "ensure that the generation of hazardous wastes and other
wastes within it is reduced to a minimum..."
28. Shipping wastes for recycling is often another way to avoid the responsibility to minimize
the waste at the source of generation. By avoiding this responsibility in order to enhance
profits, such movement creates a disincentive to introduce non-polluting, or less wasteful
technologies.

OCEAN DUMPING AND OCEAN INCINERATION
29. It is crucial to note that the international trade in hazardous, including nuclear wastes, not
only subjects land territories to the risks of dumping, but the territorial waters and the
global commons of the high seas are threatened as well. The allure of ocean dumping by
waste traders is obvious. It is extremely easy and virtually liability free to throw wastes in
barrels or bulk into the sea even though the environmental implications can be severe.
30. Today, as the marine environment has become increasingly degraded, there has been a shift
in thinking away from the principle of assuming a harmless "assimilative capacity", toward
the view that all contamination of the marine environment, especially by synthetic and
persistent substances, should be significantly reduced or eliminated even where there is
inadequate or inconclusive evidence to prove a causal link between emission and effects.
This "precautionary principle" has been adopted by many fora.
31. The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matters (London Dumping Convention, LDC) seeks to control pollution of the sea by
dumping, and to encourage regional agreements supplementary to the Convention. During
the Thirteenth Consultative Meeting of this Convention (London, October-November
1990), the Contracting Parties agreed that the dumping of industrial wastes shall cease by
31 December 1995, and encouraged the adoption of individual or regional commitments to
cease dumping of industrial wastes before 31 December 1995. The LDC however will still
allow the dumping of many types of hazardous wastes, and not all the Contracting Parties
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
to the Cartagena Convention are Contracting Parties to this Convention. Furthermore, there
is no mechanism to this day to monitor, let alone enforce law against any illegal form of
ocean dumping.
32. It is crucial that within the sensitive marine environment of the Wider Caribbean region,
ocean dumping is banned and a method is provided by which illegal ocean dumping can be
discovered and made punishable.
OCEAN INCINERATION
A Failed Technology
33. Ocean incineration is the burning of toxic, persistent, industrial wastes in shipboard
incinerators and dispersing the residual matter into the atmosphere. The system is designed
to burn liquid, organic chemicals with a high caloric content, most notably organochlorides
and other halogenated hydrocarbons. Wastes from the pesticide, plastic, pharmaceutical
and wood preservatives industries, and used chlorinated solvents are among those wastes
that have been incinerated at sea.
34. This method of ocean dumping has served as one escape route for extremely hazardous
byproducts of inefficient production processes for nearly twenty years. Ocean
incineration's only real "advantage" over other dangerous disposal methods such as
landfilling or land-based incineration is that it is an activity out of public view and control.
Furthermore, it is attractive to generators of wastes as it is virtually impossible to
substantiate a liability case for airborne toxins.
35. The major problems of ocean incineration are:
i. No incineration process can operate with an efficiency of 100%. Therefore, some
portions of the original chemicals fed into the system are always released into the
marine environment.
ii. Many new compounds known as "products of incomplete combustion" are produced
in the incineration process and are themselves extremely hazardous. Chemicals
routinely identified as "products of incomplete combustion" include dioxins and
furans, two of the most toxic manmade compounds known.
iii. The types of waste burned at sea are known to adversely affect living organisms,
especially the organohalogens.
iv. Ocean incineration frequently requires the long distance transport of hazardous
waste, on land and at sea, creating the potential for chemicals spills.
36. Today's science cannot easily measure to what extent ocean incineration emissions have
affected the marine environment. It is known that the type of chemicals burned at sea are
some of the most toxic, persistent, bioaccumulative substances on earth. One chemical, a
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
fungicide called hexachlorobenzene, has been recently detected in elevated concentrations
in the sediment of the North Sea burn zone. Scientists suspect that ocean incineration is a
significant contributor to the build-up.
Moves to Ban Ocean Incineration
37. As of January 1991 with a final voyage of the Vulcanus II, ocean incineration has ceased.
It remains to be seen if others will seek to reinvent this practise in other parts of the world.
While practiced in Europe, ocean incineration never gained acceptance as an
environmentally sound method of toxic waste disposal. The Contracting Parties to the
Convention on the Protection of the Environment of the Baltic Sea Area banned all ocean
incineration in the Baltic Sea. The Eleventh Consultative Meeting of the London Dumping
Convention, 6 October 1988, agreed to terminate ocean incineration by 31 December 1994.
On 3-6 October 1989, the Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean
Sea Against Pollution (Barcelona Convention) banned ocean incineration in the
Mediterranean. Since then the North Sea Ministers Conference in March 1990 agreed on a
phase out of all ocean incineration operations by 31 December 1991. The Contracting
Parties to the Oslo Convention (International Agreement on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircrafts) decided at their sixteenth meeting to
terminate incineration at sea by 31 December 1991.
38. In 1984 and 1986, the U.S. EPA formally refused to grant permits for any ocean
incineration using U.S. ports or waters, citing scientific, technical and legal problems as
well as public opposition. In 1986, over 15,000 signatures were gathered and over 6,000
people attended hearings in Texas alone in protest of plans to conduct test burns in the Gulf
of Mexico. Finally in 1988 the EPA cancelled its entire ocean incineration programme,
based upon recommendation of Congress.
An Ocean Incineration Ban in the Cartagena Convention
39. The recent decision by the Mediterranean countries to ban ocean incineration within the
United Nations Environment Programmme's Regional Sea Convention, the Barcelona
Convention, was taken due to the real fear that the ocean incineration industry, once
banned in the North Sea, would seek to establish this obsolete technology elsewhere.
Today the regions especially vulnerable to this industry include the South Pacific, South-
East Asia and the Wider Caribbean.
40. At the First Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Cartagena Convention October 1987,
participants expressed concern about the possibility of waste being imported into the region
from countries outside the Convention area. Venezuela and other countries introduced a
resolution prohibiting ocean incineration. However, in the spirit of compromise during this
initial official gathering, Contracting Parties agreed to weaker language. The resolution that
was finally adopted, simply urged States to "refrain from authorizing the disposal [of
wastes] at sea" except "in accordance with global rules and standards established by the
London Dumping Convention."
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
41. If ocean incineration is not acceptable for European seas, then it is certainly not acceptable
for other seas where the ocean environments may consist of yet more fragile ecosystems,
and where the people are perhaps even more dependent upon them for a source of protein
and livelihood. It would be very prudent of the Cartagena Contracting Parties to the
Convention to take action now as was done within the Barcelona Convention to prohibit
the transfer of ocean incineration to its own Convention Area.

RADIOACTIVE WASTE IN THE WIDER CARIBBEAN REGION
OVERVIEW
42. For almost fifty years, a number of countries have been developing nuclear technology,
both in the civil and weapons' industries. Large-scale national nuclear construction
programmess did not truly flourish until the early 1960s, and for the most part came to an
end by the 1980s. Despite the short tenure of this "nuclear golden age" the industry has left
a long term lethal legacy -- massive quantities of radioactive waste representing a threat for
the environment and health of present and future generations.
43. The European Commission has estimated that seven nuclear nations in the European
Community will have produced the following amounts of radioactive waste by the
year 2,000:

Low and medium radioactive wastes:
Arisings prior to 1986, now stored: 59,000 cubic meters
Projected quantity, 1986-2000: 1,150,000 cubic meters

Alpha and high level radioactive wastes:
Arisings prior to 1986, now stored: 62,000 cubic meters
Projected quantity: 62,000 cubic meters
44. In the U:.S.A., and only considering civil nuclear sources, the total accumulated amount of
low level radioactive wastes is 21,300 metric tonnes, and of irradiated spent fuel, 700,100
cubic meters.
45. These figures fail to include the waste expected from the decommissioning of nuclear
reactors. In fact, and despite a cessation in the expansion of the nuclear industry, the
demand for radioactive waste disposal options has increased due to the waste from the
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The Transboundary Movement of Wastes...
decommissioning of a growing number of reactors. In the early planning stages of nuclear
programmes, very little attention was given to the problem of decommissioning, and there
is a serious lack of technology and resources to deal with the vast quantities of wastes that
will be produced.
46. The option of dumping radioactive wastes in shallow land- fills has now been rejected for
national sites by many States on environmental and health grounds, and at present, there
exists no operating facility anywhere in the world for the disposal of high level radioactive
wastes. Wherever attempts have been made to conduct development work for such
facilities, those countries have discovered that their own citizens have rejected them. In
countries as diverse as the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden,
France and the U.S.S.R., local communities have vigorously resisted the siting of high-
level radioactive waste disposal facilities in their region.
47. The dumping of radioactive wastes at sea was carried out for many years by the U.S.A. and
some European countries. In 1983 the contracting parties to the Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters (London
Dumping Convention or LDC) agreed, after long debate and controversy, on a moratorium
on the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea. Since then, no ocean dumping operation of
nuclear waste is known to have occurred.
48. The LDC's moratorium was adopted out of grave concern for the state of the ocean
environment, and for the health and economic well-being of the communities whose
livelihoods depend upon marine produce. A cheap and effective means to off-load
domestic problems onto the global community was thereby denied to those countries
producing large quantities of radioactive wastes.
49. The report of the LDC 's Inter-governmental Panel on Radio Active Disposal (IGPRAD) is
likely to be released in 1992. In light of this report, the LDC Contracting Parties will have
to decide whether to allow sea dumping of radioactive wastes to resume, to continue
moratorium, or to ban permanently the practice by amending the Annexes to the
Convention. Because of existing scientific uncertainties, and differing management
philosophies, no consensus is expected, despite of over ten years of active debate. Very
strong pressure is to be expected from some countries and from the nuclear industry itself,
to re-open the sea dumping option. In the 1990s and beyond, the nuclear industry will be
faced with ever increasing amounts of radioactive wastes, both in volume and in terms of
the radioactivity involved, as a result of the massive decommissioning programmes of the
old and now contaminated nuclear plants, and with waste management problems of
unprecedented magnitude, for which there is no true solution to date.
50. The central theme of all radioactive waste issues is that, no matter how sophisticated the
technology employed, the risk presented to health and environment cannot be reduced to
zero. And in fact the risks are considerable. The countries who have "benefited" from
nuclear energy must not attempt to pass the huge environmental, social and political cost of
these wastes to the global commons or to other States. It is perfectly legitimate for all
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people in all countries to reject exposure to the long-term risk presented by radioactive
wastes.
EXPORTING THE RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROBLEM
51. The two favoured options for dealing with radioactive wastes, dumping on national
territory, or dumping in the "global commons" of the oceans, present technical, political
and legal problems. Faced with an imminent increase in the quantities of radioactive waste
that must be managed, the "nuclear countries" and industry are now seeking another option
for the disposal of this extremely hazardous waste: export for disposal in other countries.
52. Despite strenuous efforts, attempts to codify concerns over the transboundary movements
of radioactive wastes within global fora have met with little success. The recently
concluded Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes (Basel 1989) actually sought to exclude radioactive wastes.
53. From the preparatory documentation of the Basel Convention, it is clear that the decision to
exclude radioactive wastes was taken on the mistaken assumption that "control systems"
had already been established for the regulation of trade in radioactive wastes, and that these
"control systems" fall under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). However, and contrary to information provided by the IAEA to UNEP during the
Basel negotiations, legally binding "control systems" for the regulation of transboundary
movements of radioactive waste did not exist at that time, nor to this day.
54. The frequently cited "Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of
Radioactive Waste", which was only recently adopted by the IAEA General Conference of
September 1990, does not in any way prohibit the transboundary movement of radioactive
wastes, nor is it binding in its "control" as the Basel Convention will be once it is in force.
Rather, this non-binding code only provides the guidelines to States for the development of
policies and law on the international transboundary movement of radioactive waste, based
mainly in the "prior notification and consent of the sending, receiving and transit States".
55. The same code recognizes that "it is the sovereign right of every state to prohibit the
movement of radioactive wastes into, from, or through its territory". Greenpeace believes
that only a complete ban on radioactive waste import into the Caribbean region will
prevent the dangers inherent to radioactive wastes.
56. The recent signatories to the Lomé IV Convention recognized the futility of attempting to
"control" or manage such transport and called for a complete ban on the import of
radioactive wastes into the 68 ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific) group of States as
part of its waste trade ban (Article 39). (See Section on Lomé IV Convention below).
SUB-SEABED DISPOSAL IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION
57. One of the options that has been considered to deal with radioactive wastes is sub-seabed
disposal--the implantation of wastes into the ocean floor. Member-nations of the Nuclear
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Energy Agency (NEA) of the OECD have devoted resources estimated to several hundreds
of millions of dollars to research and development of the sub-seabed disposal option for
high-level radioactive wastes. This research effort has been coordinated by the NEA's so-
called Seabed Working Group (SWG) formed in 1975 by the U.S.A., U.K., EEC, France,
Netherlands, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Federal Republic of Germany, and observers
from Belgium and Italy.
58. Separately, the US has also carried out its own research programme, through the U.S. Sub-
seabed Disposal Programme, a facet of the U.S. National Waste Terminal Storage
Programme, started in 1973. U.S. funding was pared in 1984/85, but was later resurrected
with the formation in 1987 of a "US Sub-seabed Consortium" formed by the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution and six other academic institutions, with a budget of 250
millions of US dollars. The present status of the Consortium and US sub-seabed research is
unclear at present, but sub-seabed disposal is still considered an option for HLW by the
Department of Energy in the USA.
59. The NEA Seabed Working Group (SWG) published its report in December 1988. Although
it points out many scientific and technical uncertainties, the report concludes that sub-
seabed disposal is a feasible option for the disposal of high-level waste, and advocates a
continuation of the research program. It is important to stress that one of the areas of
reference considered to implement this disposal method is located within the Wider
Caribbean region: the Southern Nares Abyssal Plain at 22.0-24.0 degrees N & 62.0-67.0
degrees W. See Figure 1.
60. Because of the objections to sub-seabed disposal raised within the London Dumping
Convention, and the moratorium on radioactive waste dumping, the NEA has officially
reduced its sub-seabed research effort, and is dedicating more effort to deep geological
disposal on land. However recent developments demonstrate that sub-seabed disposal for
radioactive wastes remains an option seriously considered:
i.
In 1989 at least two countries, France and Japan, undertook research cruises in the
Atlantic;
ii. There is still a strong academic and industrial lobby in the U.S.A. and Europe to
intensify sub-seabed disposal research. In Europe some industrial concerns are
lobbying so that sub-seabed research enters its next phase, with emplacement tests
utilizing torpedo-shaped canisters containing heat-generating (non-radioactive)
simulators;
61. As land-based radioactive waste disposal is fraught with difficulties and political turmoil, it
is feared that after having been refused from all or most of the possible land-based disposal
sites, the nuclear industry will renew its effort to re-open the sea dumping and sub-seabed
emplacement options.
62. The impact of sub-seabed disposal of radioactive wastes for the Caribbean region is
obvious. There is no evidence whatsoever that this technology would isolate the radioactive
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wastes from the biosphere. It would damage the tourist and fishing industries among
others, as the contamination of the environment, as well as the dangers inherent in the sea
transport of radioactive wastes would represent an unacceptable threat against the
livelihood and well-being of the region's inhabitants.
63. Attention must be given to the fact that in 1989, the five member States of the Permanent
Commission of the South Pacific (CPPS) adopted a Protocol against Radioactive Pollution
which bans the dumping and sub-seabed burial of radioactive wastes in their respective
Exclusive Economic Zones. Other regional agreements in other parts of the world, such as
the Rarotonga Treaty (1985) in the South Pacific, also ban the dumping at sea of
radioactive wastes. It is nowadays more and more recognized that - whenever possible and
appropriate - regional treaties should go beyond any existing global mechanism, in order to
reflect adequately the necessarily higher number of common denominators amongst the
Parties to a regional agreement, and - at the same time - encourage the improvement of
global treaties. Within this context, and in light of the specific relevance of the issue for the
Wider Caribbean region - it is desirable that the Parties to the Cartagena Convention take
the appropriate steps to prevent and ban the dumping and sub-seabed disposal of
radioactive wastes in the region. By doing so, not only would they eliminate an
environmental and social threat to the region, they also would send to the world a strong
message in favour of more stringent ocean protection regimes.
THE TRANSIT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
64. Spent fuel from commercial Japanese nuclear power reactors is transported through the
Panama canal, in order to reach the Sellafield (U.K.) and La Hague (France) reprocessing
plants. Once through the Panama canal the ships are likely to take the Mona Passage which
lies between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. The alternative course through the
Caribbean would be the Windward Passage which lies between Cuba and Haiti. See Figure
2.
65. There are currently five especially designed ships involved in the transport of irradiated
fuel. The registered owner of those ships is Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited (PNTL) of
the United Kingdom. Each of the ships is capable of transporting some 90,000 kg. of
nuclear spent fuel distributed in 20-24 casks. In 1989, PNTL ships carried ten loads of
spent fuel through the Panama canal.
66. There are considerable risks involved in the sea transport of this radioactive material.
Shipping fires, grounding, foundering and subsequent sinking are a fact of life in maritime
transport and nuclear shipments will inevitably fall victim to these same odds. The nuclear
industry suggests that the chances of a major disaster are decreased by building strong
casks, and by using special ships for the carriage of nuclear spent fuel. But ultimately these
measures are recognized as limiting rather than prohibiting accidents. The question is not
whether accidents may happen but what would be the consequences of such accidents.
67. Primarily the nuclear industry says that its casks will protect radioactive cargoes in case of
accidents. The International Atomic Energy Agency has promulgated a series of guidelines
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for the development and production of casks. Unfortunately, these guidelines are neither
stringent enough nor do they take into account the real dynamics of shipping accidents.
68. For instance, studies indicate that these containers can lose their integrity after a fire of
only 1 hour. This figure is based on a fire generating a temperature of 800 degrees Celsius,
or 1,475 degrees Fahrenheit. On the other hand, shipboard fires, on average, burn for over
20 hours, and can generate temperatures of 2,400 degrees Fahrenheit.
69. The industry is of course aware of such shortcomings and has even secretly built their ships
in such a way that radioactivity can be vented from the ship and its containers to the local
environment in case of an accident. In fact, the shipping company that carries nuclear spent
fuel through the Caribbean has suggested that despite all precautions, venting of
radioactivity will take place at least once every 15 years per ship. This means that one of
Pacific Nuclear Transport's five ships could dump radioactivity into the marine
environment every 3 years! This catastrophe is not even considered an accident but is
regarded as a fact, a given result of ongoing operations.
70. A number of additional nuclear transports through the Caribbean and Panama Canal are
scheduled to take place starting in the next few years. While nuclear spent fuel from Japan
has transitted the Caribbean on its way to the UK and France since 1968, both high level
nuclear waste and plutonium will be returned back through the Caribbean on its return
from Europe to Japan as part of these same nuclear reprocessing contracts.
71. Plutonium, extracted from Japanese spent fuel, is scheduled for transport from Europe to
Japan via the Caribbean beginning as early as 1992/93. Plutonium is an extremely toxic
element: a single microgram quantity of plutonium (smaller than a grain of sand) if inhaled
into the human lung is sufficient to induce lung cancer. The dispersion of this material in
an accident would be a disaster. At the same time, plutonium is the most highly prized fuel
for nuclear weapons. As such, these shipments could be of particular interest to countries
or organizations wishing to seize plutonium or sabotage the shipments for political or
personal reasons.
72. During a thirty year period, Japan is destined to receive between 150,000 and 400,000
kilograms of plutonium. Each shipment through the Caribbean will contain between 50-
1,000 kilograms of plutonium. It is worth noting that a simple nuclear bomb can be made
with 7 kg of plutonium or less. If shipments were made containing the largest amounts of
plutonium per shipment, some 4 to 5 shipments would be required per year for a ten year
period.
73. By 1995, high-level nuclear waste is scheduled to be sent from Europe to Japan on board
ships which will transit the Caribbean and the Panama Canal. As part of its reprocessing
contracts with the U.K. and France, Japan has agreed to receive high level nuclear waste
which arises out of this process. This waste, which will be transported in a glasseous form,
is twice as radioactive as nuclear spent fuel. A single shipment of this waste could contain
material emitting 15 times as much radiation as was vented during the Chernobyl disaster.
From 1995 through 2005, some 60 casks containing a total of 1,200 glass rods are
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scheduled to be transported by sea via the Caribbean and Panama Canal on the return
journey to Japan.
74. At the same time, the U.S.A. has signed an agreement with the West German government
to ship this same kind of high level nuclear waste to the Federal Republic of Germany. In
all, the U.S.A. plans on sending 32 canisters of glassified waste, with a total gross weight
of 31,500 lbs, from a nuclear weapons production facility in Washington state. According
to U.S. officials, the shipments could leave the U.S.A. as early as 1991. These shipments
are most likely to be shipped from a port or ports on the West Coast of the U.S.A. If this
were the case, these nuclear waste shipments would go through the Panama Canal.
75. Return shipments of HEU spent fuel have been returned to the U.S.A. since the late 1960s--
sometimes through the Caribbean and Panama Canal. As of 1 January 1989, the U.S.A. has
had a self-imposed moratorium on these return shipments due to public concern and protest
over the potential danger of the transports. The U.S. government is conducting an
environmental assessment of these shipments after which it hopes to resume its receipt of
the HEU spent fuel. Accordingly, shipments of this dangerous material could resume
during 1991. As of 1984, the U.S.A. had exported about 16,700 kg of HEU to other
countries and had received only some 1,500 kg of HEU spent fuel in return.
76. Concern about the catastrophic cost of nuclear transport accidents has spurred protests
around the world and has in fact lead to the closure of a number of major ports to such
cargoes. Greenpeace urges the Contracting Parties to the Cartagena Convention to
seriously consider closing the Wider Caribbean Region to shipments of high-level nuclear
material.

POLITICAL INITIATIVES
"CONTROLS" vs. BANS
77. The debate over how best to prevent the environmental, political, social and moral ills
presented by the international waste trade has manifested itself in two types of actions:
control mechanisms and bans. The former are characterized by the fact that they are
generally supported by major industrialized powers and consist of a notification and
consent regimen known commonly as "prior informed consent" or PIC. The bans however,
are more generally supported by less-industrialized countries--the potential victims of
waste trade.
78. The relevant U.S. and European Community legislation as well as the Basel Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, all rely on various forms
of the PIC as the basis for its "control system". Greenpeace firmly believes that instruments
which rely on PIC cannot possibly combat waste trade or mitigate the political, ecological,
moral or social ills created by it.
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79. PIC cannot pretend to be a just system when we live in a world of such disproportional
economic and political levels; in a world where the wastes of the rich can be offered as
short term remedies for the poverty of the poor. PIC cannot pretend to redress the
disincentive for both waste minimization and the implementation of clean production
methodology that is served when industrial interests, with a minimum of paperwork can
cheaply export their waste problems rather than take responsibility for them at home.
80. Thus, rather than accepting "control systems" based on some form of "prior informed
consent", Greenpeace and much of the less-industrialized world insist on complete import
or export bans as the only means to adequately remedy the problems associated with the
international trade in hazardous wastes.
81. The following paragraphs elaborate the primary "control" legislation impacting the Wider
Caribbean region -- The Basel Convention and U.S. law; and will point out their respective
shortcomings. Then the existing policies and legal mechanisms which are helping to bring
about real solutions will be reviewed --waste trade prohibitions or bans.
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal
82. In March 1989, the United Nations Environment Programme's attempt to deal with the
waste trade problem culminated in the signing of the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. The Convention
negotiations were marked from the start by a division between a minority of powerful
industrialized nations that wished to retain the possibility to sweep their waste problems
out the "back door", and a majority of developing countries that came to Basel with hopes
of closing that door. Due to the consensus decision making process used in the creation of
international law, the lowest common denominator (U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., Japan etc.)
prevailed.
83. The Basel Convention's primary achievement is a requirement that waste exporters receive
the written consent (PIC) of importing nations before any shipment takes place. However,
this notification regimen is largely a duplication of existing laws in the U.S.A. and the
European Community, and will do little to curtail existing or expected transboundary waste
movements.
84. As of February 1991, the Basel Convention had only been ratified by 6 countries. Entry
into force will occur on the ninetieth day after the deposit of the twentieth ratification
instrument and the first meeting of the Contracting Parties will be convened not later than
one year after entry into force. Thus it will be some time before even this weak instrument
will come into force.
85. By 11 February 1991, seven countries in the Wider Caribbean region had signed or
acceded to the Basel Convention: USA, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama,
U.S.A. and Venezuela. None of these countries has yet ratified the Convention nor
implemented its provisions into national law.
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86. The primary flaws of the Basel Convention are summarized as follows:
i.
There exist no general provisions to ban any sort of waste trade (except to Antarctica)
including trade to developing countries (Article 4).
ii.
By providing a legal framework within which to trade waste (PIC), the Convention
legitimizes a practice which should be considered a criminal activity (Article 6).
iii. PIC is not an equitable contract in a world with the actual disproportional economic
and technological levels.
iv. The PIC system does not assure that the national competent authority will have all
the necessary information on the planned waste shipment.
v.
With PIC there is no guarantee that the state of import, once the national competent
authority gives the written authorization to receive the wastes, has the adequate
facilities or the real possibility to manage the wastes in a environmentally sound
manner (Articles 4 and 6).
vi. The Convention allows that the notification of a planned shipment could be delegated
from the export government to the generator or exporter (Article 6). This represents a
clear conflict of interest.
vii. Radioactive waste can be interpreted as being excluded from the scope of the
Convention (Article 1).
viii. There are no liability provisions developed to this day (Article 12).
87. However, the Basel Convention recognizes that any State has the sovereign right to ban the
entry or disposal of foreign hazardous wastes and other wastes in its territory (preamble
and Article 4), and allows that Parties and Non-Parties enter into bilateral, multilateral or
regional agreements regarding the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. These
agreements "shall stipulate provisions which are not less environmentally sound that those
provided for by this Convention" (Article 11).
United States Legislation
88. An overwhelming majority of the waste transported legally or illegally to the Wider
Caribbean region comes from the U.S.A. It is therefore important to consider the legislative
effort that this country is making to control its own borders in respect to hazardous waste.
89. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) as amended by the Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments (1984), effective since November 1986, requires that exporters
of hazardous waste notify the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which in turn
will notify the importing country. The importing country must then send the EPA its
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consent to import. If consent is not granted or the notification is ignored, the EPA cannot
grant a permit to export the waste.
90. The U.S. Government has no authority to prohibit any attempt to export waste as long as
notification procedures for such export are observed and consent is received from the
importing country.
91. Four years of experience with the 1984 RCRA amendments, for which the EPA
promulgated revised export regulations which became effective in November 1986, have
revealed a set of weaknesses and loopholes. The major problems are as follows:
i.
Above all, EPA's authority is too limited. Currently, the EPA has no authority to stop
(and thus cannot stop) an export if there has been proper notification, and if the
importing government has given its consent. Even if the EPA believes that the
particular export is dangerous and may cause harm, it is bound to allow the export.
ii.
The notification and consent procedures do not cover wastes that are not considered
"hazardous" in the U.S.A., but which are legally defined as hazardous abroad. As a
result, "the tendency to export solid waste classified as non-hazardous under RCRA
is increasing and beginning to pose environmental, health and diplomatic
problems..." as noted by Subcommittee Chairman Mike Synar (D-OK.) at a
congressional hearing.
iii. Hazardous waste exports have not been adequately controlled. The EPA Inspector
General "found instances where hundreds of tons of hazardous wastes were exported
without notifications". Furthermore, "enormous quantities of hazardous wastes were
exported without exporters filing the required annual reports". By 1986, less than 20
annual reports were filed with the EPA, despite the receipt of "hundreds" of
notifications each year. As a result, the EPA "did not know the amount of hazardous
wastes actually exported to other countries.
iv. The EPA did not have an enforcement strategy and failed to coordinate its efforts
with those of Customs. Out of 274 manifests that the EPA National Enforcement
Investigation Center (NEIC) received up to December of 1987, 143 manifests did not
specify the port of exit. The EPA Audit report concludes that "consequently,
hazardous waste exporters could disregard EPA regulations with little chance of
detection". As a result, if exporters did not provide required notification, the EPA
could not identify and prosecute violators. This practice had the consequence that
importing countries were denied the right and opportunity to reject the wastes. In
addition, "the receiving country's consent, which EPA forwards to the exporter for
attachment to the manifest, did not always contain the data that Customs need to
ensure the shipment is proper".
v.
EPA's hazardous waste export regulations are unclear or ambiguous and resulted in
the misclassification of hazardous wastes as materials for "recycling" and
"reclamation". This practice led to "sham recycling" and "illegal" exports. Another
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problem stems from the fact that exporters claimed that their shipments did not
contain hazardous wastes, but contained economic goods or "products".
vi. The system of Prior Informed Consent (PIC) did not always work. A waste export
scheme to the Congo reveals that the country first consented the export, but withdrew
its consent 10 days later. The Congolese government claimed that the information
provided was insufficient to make an informed and sound decision, and if they had
known all the information, they would have rejected it at first. The EPA's National
Enforcement Investigation Office supports this claim by stating that hazardous waste
manifests show "serious problems with proper completion of these documents and
classification of wastes." At the congressional hearing Rep. Synar concluded that
current application of prior informed consent "may not be as informed as it should
be".
vii. It appears that there are no insurance requirements covering improper disposal and
accidents abroad.
92. Besides these problems, there are a variety of other issues which effected the program's
success. The entire EPA programme on hazardous waste exports is not adequately funded
or staffed. For instance, a single person in the EPA is assigned to handle the programme.
Moreover, the assignment of three agencies, the EPA, the Customs Service and the State
Department, resulted in a bureaucratic burden with lack of coordination and final failure of
effective control.
WASTE TRADE BANS IN THE WIDER CARIBBEAN REGION
National Bans
93. It is fortunate that many Caribbean countries have resolved to prevent hazardous waste
shipments. However, others remain vulnerable. By the end of 1989, at least 19 States or
Territories in the region had banned waste imports from industrialized countries, see Table
I, while a number of others remain vulnerable, see Table II. Globally, at least 76 countries
have banned all foreign waste imports, see Table III.
94. An excellent example of national legislation (Dominican Republic) banning waste imports
can be found in Annex I.
95. The Caribbean region can be protected from the dangers inherent to waste trade through
the implementation of waste import and export bans at the national, regional and
international levels. Only through a complete ban can it be ensured that waste will not be
transported under any pretext and end up endangering the lives and environments of these
countries.
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TABLE I
WIDER CARIBBEAN STATES WHICH ARE KNOWN TO BAN WASTE IMPORTS

National Ban
Lomé IV Ban
Antigua & Barbuda

Full
Bahamas

Full
Barbados

Full
Belize

Full
Dominica

Full
Dominican Republic
Full
Full
Grenada

Full
Guatemala Partial


Guyana

Full
Haiti Full
Full
Jamaica

Full
Mexico Partial


Panama Full


St. Kitts & Nevis

Full
St. Lucia

Full
St. Vincent & Grenadines

Full
Suriname

Full
Trinidad & Tobago

Full
Venezuela Full


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Note: Mexico allows waste imports for "recycling" operations. Guatemala allows waste imports
for "commercial" activities.
TABLE II
WIDER CARIBBEAN STATES AND TERRITORIES WHICH REMAIN

VULNERABLE TO LEGAL WASTE TRADE. (NO FULL BAN IN PLACE).
Anguilla (U.K.)
Honduras
Aruba (Netherlands)
Martinique (France)
British Virgin Islands (U.K.)
Mexico
Cayman Islands (U.K.)
Montserrat (U.K.)
Colombia
Netherlands Antilles (Neth.)
Costa Rica
Nicaragua
Cuba
Puerto Rico (U.S.A.)
French Guiana (France)
Turks & Caicos (U.K.)
Guatemala
U.S. Virgin Islands (U.S.A.)
Guadeloupe (France)
U.S.A. (Gulf States)

TABLE III
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE BANNED WASTE IMPORTS
Underlined names indicate non-ACP states that have banned imports by their own policies or
legislation. The ACP states make up the remainder of the list although many of these had
instituted national bans prior to the signing of Lomé IV.
Algeria
Madagascar
Angola
Malawi
Antigua and Barbuda
Mali
Bahamas
Mauritania
Barbados
Mauritius
Belize
Mozambique
Benin
Niger
Botswana
Nigeria
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Burkina Faso
Panama
Burundi
Papua New Guinea
Cameroon
Peru
Cape Verde
Philippines
Central African Republic Rwanda
Chad
Sao Tome and Principe
Comoros
Senegal
Congo
Sierra Leone
Cote D'Ivoire
Solomon Islands
Djibouti
Somalia
Dominica
St. Kitts and Nevis
Dominican Republic
St. Lucia
Equatorial Guinea
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Ethiopia
Sudan
Fiji
Suriname
Gabon
Swaziland
The Gambia
Tanzania
Ghana
Togo
Grenada
Tonga
Guinea
Trinidad and Tobago
Guinea Bissau
Turkey
Guyana
Tuvalu
Haiti
Uganda
Indonesia
Vanuatu
Jamaica
Venezuela
Kenya
Western Samoa
Kiribati
Yugoslavia
Lesotho
Zaire
Liberia
Zambia
Libya
Zimbabwe
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The Lomé IV Convention
96. Many of the Caribbean countries in the Cartagena Convention area have succeeded in
helping establish a waste trade ban within the Lomé IV Convention. Fifteen countries in
the region are now protected from foreign dumping of hazardous and nuclear waste under a
trade and aid agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of States
and the European Economic Community (EEC) signed on 15 December 1989.
97. Article 39, see Annex II to this report, of the Lomé IV treaty represents the world's most
comprehensive hazardous waste trade ban. When this 10-year pact enters into force, the EC
will not be allowed to ship any hazardous (including nuclear) wastes to the 69 ACP
countries. Also, under this agreement, the ACP countries agreed to prohibit hazardous,
including radioactive waste imports from any country.
98. Under the terms of the Single European Act, the Convention first had to be approved at the
EEC level by at least 260 of the 518 Members of the European Parliament. This occurred
on 16 May 1990. Now the 80 contracting parties have a maximum period of 12 months
within which to notify the competent EEC and ACP authorities that the Convention has
been ratified according to the constitutional procedures operating in each State. The
Convention comes into force on the first day of the second month after all of the EEC
member states and two-thirds or more of the ACP States have deposited their ratification
instruments.
99. Caribbean nations protected under the Lomé IV treaty are Antigua & Barbuda, The
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti,
Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname and
Trinidad & Tobago.
OTHER RELEVANT FORA, DECISIONS AND POLICIES
Action Plan for the Environment in Latin America and the Caribbean
100. At the Seventh Meeting of Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Ministers (Port-
of-Spain 22-23 October 1990), the Ministers adopted the Action Plan for the Environment.
In chapter V "The Strategic Component of the Plan" all the parties agreed to:

"protect the region by prohibiting, under any circumstances, the entry from outside the
region of all types of hazardous, toxic and radioactive wastes and implement monitoring
and control mechanisms for the safe transport, treatment and disposal of wastes generated
from within the region...."
101. In this meeting participated ministers and/or delegates from the following Wider Caribbean
countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Lucia, St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.
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Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
102. At the Caribbean Community summit held in Grenada in late July 1989, leaders of 13
Caribbean States endorsed the Port-of-Spain Accord, an important regional document
regarding conservation of the Caribbean environment. The accord condemns the dumping
of hazardous and toxic wastes in the region from areas outside the region.
UN General Assembly
103. On 20 December 1988, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution 43/212, which
among other things, urged all States, bearing in mind their respective responsibilities, to
take the necessary legal and technical measures to halt and prevent the illegal international
traffic in, and the dumping and resulting accumulation of, toxic and dangerous products
and wastes; urged all States generating toxic and dangerous wastes to make every effort to
treat and dispose of them in the country of origin to the maximum extent possible
consistent with environmentally sound disposal."
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean-Caribbean Development
and Co-operation Committee
104. The 11th session of the Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee was held in
the U.S. Virgin Islands on 18-22 November. The report of the meeting included a statement
on international waste trade calling on the governments of developed countries to refrain
from exporting wastes and to co-operate with affected countries to eliminate damages from
foreign wastes.
Commonwealth Nations
105. In the October 1989 summit meeting in Langkawi, Malaysia, between heads of state of the
then 48 and now 50 Commonwealth nations, a strong environmental declaration known as
the Langkawi Declaration on the Environment was adopted. This declaration included a
commitment to "strengthen international action to ensure the safe management and
disposal of hazardous wastes and to reduce transboundary movements, particularly to
prevent dumping in developing countries."
London Dumping Convention
106. At the Thirteenth Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters, (London, 29
October -2 November 1990) contracting parties agreed on a resolution "to prohibit or not to
permit the export of wastes for dumping at sea, particularly those containing substances
referred to in Annexes I and II of the London Dumping Convention to States not Party to
the Convention."
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107. Regional parties to the London Dumping Convention include: Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Saint Lucia,
Suriname, and the U.S.A.
The Non-aligned Movement
108. The 9th Non-Aligned Movement summit meeting in September 1989 produced a statement
on the environment which, inter alia, "called for the adoption of effective international
measures, including conventions and other relevant legal instruments, to prohibit the
dumping of toxic and other hazardous wastes in the territories of other countries. They also
proposed that the developed countries should, in the meantime, adopt rigorous
administrative measures and legislation to ban the export of toxic and other hazardous
wastes to the territories of other, especially developing countries."
World Bank
109. World Bank President, Barber Conable on 16th February 1990 stated that "Industrial states
have the capacity to dispose of these poisons. They must not be permitted simply to dump
them on developing nations that lack even the means to handle their own pollution."
European Community
European Environment Council
110. As noted above the European Environment Council agreed on a policy on 7 June 1990
calling for member states "to take appropriate measures...to enable the Community as a
whole to become self- sufficient in waste disposal and the Member States to move towards
that aim individually..."
European Parliament
111. The European Parliament voted on May 26, 1989 for a total ban on hazardous waste
exports to all developing countries.
Positions of EC Nations
112. During the Environment Council's Permanent Representatives Meeting of 31 May 1990 the
delegations of Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Netherlands, and the U.K.
are on record as feeling that in principle there must be national self-sufficiency in waste
disposal as well as Community-wide self sufficiency.
FRANCE:
113. France has announced its intention to ban all waste trade nationally. The French Minister of
Environment, Brice Lalonde, stated in September 1989 that he expected that an EC accord
"will soon be reached requiring each nation to treat its own wastes."
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:
114. In a German government press release of October 1989, Minister of Environment Topfer
announced pending legislation "banning all (waste) exports to developing countries."
UNITED KINGDOM:
115. Chris Patten, the Secretary of the Environment urged all European partner governments
to adopt a policy of insisting that richer nations dispose of all their own hazardous waste
and to stop sending it abroad for treatment.
ITALY:
116. Europe's most prohibitive waste export law went into effect in Italy in June 1989. This
export ban prohibits municipal, special, toxic, and hazardous wastes from being exported
from Italy to any non-OECD country.
OTHER:
117. In addition, in a resolution attached to the Basel Convention, Belgium, Denmark, Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom as
well as the Commission of the European Communities all committed themselves to "call
upon the countries who will sign the Convention to join in making every effort to phase-
out exports and imports of wastes for reasons other than for disposal in facilities
established within a framework of regional cooperation."
THE AFRICAN EXAMPLE
118. Politically, Africa has been the first to respond to the threat of waste colonialism. In
unprecedented numbers, African nations sent delegates to the pre-negotiations of the Basel
Convention, only to have their concerns largely ignored by a small but powerful group of
industrialized nations.
119. Following the outcome of the Basel Convention, which the African States regarded as a
failure, the African States agreed to refrain from signing pending a joint position and
response on that Convention and the continuing threat of waste trade. This responsibility
was taken up under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which
currently includes all African States with the exception of Morocco and South Africa. They
are currently in the final stages of drafting an African Convention which among other
things would ban all waste imports into the African continent.
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
120. The Resolution on the Dumping of Nuclear and Industrial Wastes in Africa declares, inter
alia, that "the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa is a crime against Africa
and the African people."
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121. The Resolution on the Global Convention for the Control of Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Wastes, expressed concern that the Basel Convention is "merely aimed at the
regulation or control, rather than the prohibition of transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes."
122. The Resolution on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal in Africa, "commended Member States which have promulgated laws
prohibiting all forms of illegal transboundary movements of hazardous wastes into their
countries and calls upon those who have not already done so to enact similar laws."
123. This resolution refers to the fact that following the Conference of Plenipotentiaries for
Basel Convention, the African Group at the Conference in their disappointment over the
outcome of the final Basel text, made a decision not to sign the Convention. The resolution
"mandates the Secretary General of the OAU to undertake consultations with the view to
adopting a common position on the Basel Convention" and "decides to set up a Working
Group composed of legal and environmental experts to draw up a Draft African
Convention on the Control of the Transboundary Movement of all forms of Hazardous
Wastes in the Continent."
The Bamako Convention
124. This convention, entitled "The Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa
and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
within Africa" was adopted on 29 January 1991 in Bamako, Mali. Among other things, the
Convention strictly bans the importation of all forms of hazardous and nuclear wastes into
the African continent. This prohibition includes a ban on the import of products that have
been banned for use in the country of manufacture.

CONCLUSION: A WASTE TRADE BAN WITHIN THE CARTAGENA CONVENTION
125. Notwithstanding the efforts of the EC, Basel Convention, Lomé IV, the United States of
America, and other national legislations, the threat posed by the international trade in
hazardous, including nuclear wastes in the Wider Caribbean region is very real. As is
clearly demonstrated in the inventory of waste trade schemes in this report and despite
widespread political support for a Wider Caribbean waste trade ban, the region still
remains highly vulnerable to foreign waste traders. As can be seen from Table II above,
many countries in the region do not have national legal instruments prohibiting waste
imports. Strong, region-wide legal accords are thus necessary to protect the Wider
Caribbean area from the deadly businesses of hazardous, including nuclear waste trade and
the threat of ocean dumping and ocean incineration.
126. The increasing waste treatment capacity shortfall in the U.S.A. and Europe combined with
a lax legal regimen to control the exports of waste from these regions, create a huge
impetus to export.
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127. The Cartagena Convention, as the only convention dealing exclusively with the issue of
pollution problems affecting the Wider Caribbean region, is better positioned than any
other international convention to protect the countries of the Caribbean region from
becoming victims of waste importation and dumping.
128. Earlier meetings of the parties to the Cartagena Convention have demonstrated wide
support for a waste trade ban within the Convention. At the First Meeting of the
Contracting Parties to the Convention, Guadeloupe, October 1987, numerous delegations
supported the concept of a regional waste import ban. In August 1988, at an informal
meeting of governmental and non-governmental experts in Boquete, Panama, experts from
nine countries resolved to urge all parties to the Cartagena Convention "to prohibit the
importation and transit of hazardous waste in the Wider Caribbean region." Experts
represented there included those from Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela.
129. At the Fifth Intergovernmental Meeting on the Action Plan for the Caribbean Environment
Programme and Second Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region,
held in Kingston on 17-18 January, 1990, a resolution was adopted, see Annex III to this
report, which called for, inter alia, the preparation of:
"an assessment of the nature of such movements (hazardous wastes) in the Wider
Caribbean Region...and to suggest a mechanism to assist Contracting Parties...in
monitoring the movement of all forms of hazardous wastes...and urges the Monitoring
Committee and the Bureau at their next meeting to decide on the steps deemed appropriate
in order to mitigate and avoid the negative environmental implications of the
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes into the Wider Caribbean Region".
130. And finally the goal of a waste trade ban was adopted at the Ministerial level at the Seventh
Meeting of Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Ministers (Port-of-Spain 22-23
October 1990), the Ministers adopted the Action Plan for the Environment of Latin
America and the Caribbean. In chapter V, "The Strategic Component of the Plan," all the
parties agreed to:
"protect the region by prohibiting, under any circumstances, the entry from outside the
region of all types of hazardous, toxic and radioactive wastes and implement monitoring
and control mechanisms for the safe transport, treatment and disposal of wastes generated
from within the region...."
131. Given the decisions made above, and especially bearing in mind the regional agreement
adopted by the African States (The Bamako Convention) which is seen as a valuable
model, Greenpeace urges the Monitoring Committee and the Bureau to draft a legal
instrument to specifically ban hazardous, including nuclear waste trade and ocean
incineration within the region as a logical development of the Cartagena Convention
consistent with other national, regional and global initiatives.
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
132. The priorities for the Cartagena Convention in halting the international trade in hazardous,
including nuclear wastes should consist of the following principles:
i. To prevent wastes from moving for economic reasons, for example to avoid
environmental costs at the expense of poorer economies or regulatory structures. Such
economically motivated movement of hazardous wastes works in direct contravention
to the goal of waste minimization at source, clearly stated in the Basel Convention.
"Each party shall take the appropriate measures to ensure that the generation of
hazardous and other wastes within it is reduced to a minimum..."
ii. To prevent, abate and combat the pollution related to transboundary movement and
disposal of hazardous and nuclear wastes, including from deliberate dumping or
incineration at sea.
133. It is Greenpeace's contention that the above two goals will best be served by a prohibition
rather than a regimen of notification and consent such as "prior informed consent" (PIC).
Within such a system wastes can still move with facility for purely economic reasons while
being disastrous to the marine environment.
134. Thus Greenpeace strongly recommends taking the steps taken already by the Lomé IV
Convention and the Bamako Convention, in choosing the route of strict waste import and
export prohibition.
135. Such a move would be entirely consistent and in keeping with the global Basel Convention.
That Convention foresaw the need for certain regional bodies or other groups of States to
take stronger measures than the Basel obligations, to ensure greater protection by allowing
bilateral or multilateral agreements "which are not less environmentally sound than those
provided for in this Convention in particular taking into account the interests of developing
countries."
136. It is important to recognize however, that for the near future, a complete and absolute ban
on waste trade, although an appropriate goal, is not feasible due to the lack of any sort of
waste management infrastructure in many developing countries to deal with such things as
monitoring, storage or minimization of domestically produced wastes. Many developing
countries, in the desire to become more industrialized, have been unwittingly victimized by
technology transfer without the transfer of such a management infrastructure or the
necessary funding to maintain such an infrastructure. For this reason, wastes may need to
be exported, for an interim period and for environmental reasons, from developing to
developed countries, until such time as such infrastructure (clean production
methodologies) are in place.
137. Greenpeace recommends that any legal instrument to combat waste trade in the region,
consist of the following three obligations:
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i. An immediate suspension of the import from developed countries of all
hazardous, including nuclear wastes into the territories of Contracting Parties
which are developing countries.
ii. An immediate suspension of the export of all hazardous, including nuclear wastes
from Contracting Parties which are developed countries, to any developing
countries.
iii. An immediate suspension of the ocean dumping of all contaminants which may
cause harm to human health or the marine environment, including the dumping
activities from ships, airplanes, platforms at sea, sub-sea bed disposal as well as
ocean incineration.
Note: Developed countries should be defined as members of the organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. Likewise developing countries should be defined as non-OECD,
for the purposes of this issue.
138. Not only would such a legal instrument serve to protect the political and environmental
interests of the Caribbean States, but it would also serve as a vital precedent for other
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) regional seas conventions. Already, the
coastal states participating in several other equivalent conventions, including the Abidjan
Convention, the Lima Convention, the Barcelona Convention and the South Pacific
Regional Environment Programme have indicated to UNEP their interest in developing
mechanisms to control the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. The Cartagena
Convention could lead the way in protecting coastal nations by developing an instrument
which bans waste imports into the region.
139. Greenpeace accordingly urges the Monitoring Committee and the Bureau of the
Contracting Parties to Cartagena Convention to make a formal decision to begin
negotiations towards a regional agreement to create a legally binding instrument
within the Cartagena Convention, which would take account of the special situation
in the Wider Caribbean region and prohibit all shipments of hazardous including
nuclear wastes into the region

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ANNEX I -- DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, TOXICS IMPORT LAW
Law Number 218
The National Congress
In the Name of the Republic
Considering: That it is necessary to protect the country from the introduction to its
territory of substances that threaten the life and health of its inhabitants, as well as of its flora and
fauna;
Considering: That in the country pharmaceuticals and pesticides are being used freely
that, due to their high level of danger, have been banned, not permitted, or have been taken out of
the use for which they had been originally patented;
Considering: That many of these products and substances can cause to the population
grave or incurable illness, epidemics, permanent lesions in the vital systems and genetic defects.
In view of: paragraph 17 of article 8 of the Constitution of the Republic;
In view of: law number 4471 of 29 May 1956, that institutes the Code of Public Health;
In view of: law number 311, of 22 May 1968, that regulates the management of
pesticides,
Has Given the Following Law:
Article 1.- It is forbidden to bring into the country by any means, human or animal
excrement, domestic or municipal wastes and their derivatives, muds or sewage sludges, treated
or not, as well as toxic wastes derived from industrial processes, that contain substances that
could infect, contaminate and/or degrade the environment and put in danger the lives and health
of the inhabitants, including chemical compounds and combinations, traces of heavy metals,
residuals of radioactive materials, undetermined acids and alkalis, bacteria, viruses, eggs, larvae,
spores, fungus and phytopathogens.
Article 2.- It is prohibited to produce, import or market pharmacological products and
pesticides whose use is banned, severely restricted or discontinued, because of their danger, by
the health authorities and the environmental protection authorities in the country where the
original patent has been registered.
Article 3.- Pharmaceuticals and pesticides the use and selling of which are restricted in
their countries of origin, due to their potential danger, may only be marketed under the strict
control of the Secretaries of State, of Public Health and Social Assistance, and of Agriculture.
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CEP Technical Report No. 7
Paragraph: - It is prohibited to import pharmaceuticals developed with human blood coming
from countries that are affected by sicknesses that can be transmitted to a recipient patient as in
the case of the use of Gammaglobulin.
Article 4.- The Executive Power will be entrusted with developing the corresponding
regulations to duly implement that which this law requires.
Delivered in the Meeting Room of the Chamber of Deputies, Palace of the National
Congress in Santo Domingo de Guzmán, National District, Capital of the Dominican Republic,
on the 13th day of the month of March in the year 1984: 141 years after the Independence and
121 years after the Restoration.
Hugo Tolentino Dipp
President
Tony Raful Tejada
Secretary
Carlos B. Lalane Martinez
Secretary
Delivered in the meeting room of the Senate, Palace of the National Congress, in Santo
Domingo de Guzmán, National District, Capital of the Dominican Republic, on the 22nd day of
the month of May in the year 1984, 141 years after the Independence and 121 years after the
Restoration.
Jacabo Majluta Azar
Presidente
Rafael Fernando Correa Rogers
Secretario
Jose Antonio Constanzo Santana
Secretario
SALVADOR JORGE BLANCO
President of the Dominican Republic
In exercise of the rights bestowed upon me in Article 55 of the Constitution of the
Republic.
I proclaim the present law and mandate that it is published in the Official Gazette for its
acknowledgement and completion.
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Given in Santo Domingo de Guzmán, National District, Capital of the Dominican
Republic, on the 28th day of the month of May in 1984; 141st year after the Independence and
the 121st year after the Restoration.
SALVADOR JORGE BLANCO

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CEP Technical Report No. 7
ANNEX II -- ARTICLE 39, LOME IV CONVENTION
1. The Contracting Parties undertake, for their part, to make every effort to ensure that
international movements of hazardous waste and radioactive waste are generally controlled, and
they emphasize the importance of efficient international co-operation. in this area.
2. With this in view, the Community shall prohibit all direct or indirect export of such waste to
the ACP States while at the same time the ACP States shall prohibit the direct or indirect import
into their territory of such waste from the Community or from any other country, without
prejudice to specific international undertakings to which the Contracting Parties have subscribed
or may subscribe in the future in these two areas within the competent international fora.
These provisions do not prevent a Member State to which an ACP State has chosen to export
waste for processing from returning the processed waste to the ACP State of origin.
The Contracting Parties shall expedite adoption of the necessary internal legislation and
administrative regulations to implement this undertaking. At the request of one of the Parties,
consultations may be held if delays are encountered. At the conclusion of such consultations
each Party may take appropriate steps in the light of the situation.
2. The Parties undertake to monitor strictly the implementation of the prohibition measures
referred to in the second pargraph of paragraph 1. Should difficulties arise in this respect,
consultations may be held subject to the same conditions as those provided for in the second
paragraph of paragraph 1 and with the same effect.
3. The term "hazardous waste" within the meaning of this Article shall cover categories of
products listed in Annexes 1 and 2 to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.
As regards radioactive waste, the applicable definitions and thresholds shall be those which will
be ladi down in the framework of the IAEA. In the meantime, the said definitions and thresholds
shall be those specified in the declaration in Annex VIII to this Convention.

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ANNEX III -- RESOLUTION NO. 1 OF THE FIFTH INTERGOVERNMENTAL
MEETING ON THE CARIBBEAN ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME AND SECOND
MEETING OF CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE CARTAGENA CONVENTION



TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT OF ALL FORMS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES



The meeting:

NOTING with great concern the problems created in the Wider Caribbean Region by the
transboundary movement of all forms of hazardous wastes,


RECALLING the Basel Convention on the Control of Transbounary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter,


AUTHORIZES the Secretariat to address an appeal to the Contracting Parties and to the
other States and territories of the Wider Caribbean Region urging them to adopt strong national
and international measures to control the transboundary movement of all forms of hazardous
wastes in the region,


INVITES Governments to provide the Secretariat with information about movements of
hazardous wastes in the Wider Caribbean Region,


REQUESTS the Secretariat to prepare within six months as assessment of the nature of
such movements in the Wider Caribbean Region, including the carriage of all forms of hazardous
wastes by ships transiting the Wier Careibbean Region, and to submit it to the next meeting of
the Monitoring Committee,


FURTHER REQUESTS the Secretariat to suggest a mechanism to assist Contracting
Parties and the other states and territories of the Wider Caribbean Region in monitoring the
movement of all forms of hazardous wastes in and through the Wider Caribbean Region, and, in
the light of this assessment,


INSTRUCTS the next Meeting of the Monitoring Committee and of the Bureau to
examine the information provided by the States and Territories on the problems they have
encountered by the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, examine similar protocols,
and take into account the comments of the governments,

The
meeting
FURTHER URGES the Monitoring Committee and the Bureau at their
next meeting to decide on the steps deemed appropriate in order to mitigate and avoid the
negative environmental implications of the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes into
the Wider Caribbean Region.

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ANNEX IV -- RELEVANT GREENPEACE PUBLICATIONS
1. Jim Vallette, The International Trade in Wastes: A Greenpeace Inventory, Fifth Edition.
(Greenpeace USA, Washington D.C.) December 1990.
2. Greenpeace Waste Trade Updates, published quarterly, Volumes 1-3, 1988-1990.
3. "Critique of the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Supervision and Control of
Shipments of Waste Within, Into and Out of the European Community", Greenpeace
International, 14 January 1991.
4. "Briefing On Radioactive Waste Dumping At Sea. The Controversy Over Ocean Dumping of
Radioactive Wastes: The London Dumping Convention", Stichting Greenpeace Council, 1989
5. Lisa J. Bunin, Ocean Incineration: The Case for a Global Ban, 2nd Edition, Stichting
Greenpeace Council, October 1988.
6. "Let the Earth Breathe...Stop Incineration", Greenpeace International, Fact Sheet, December
1990.
7. Leo Baas, et al., Protection of the North Sea: Time for Clean Production, Erasmus Centre for
Environmental Studies, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, February 1990.
8. "Clean Production Contact and Reference List", Greenpeace International, March 1990.
9. "The Saga of the Philadelphia Ash Flotilla, Including the KHIAN SEA, the BARK and the
BANYA (A Chronological review through newspaper clippings 1984-1988)", Greenpeace USA,
1988.
10. "Burnt Offerings: Greenpeace's Report on Philadelphia's Planned Ash Shipments to
Panama", Greenpeace USA, 8 September 1987.
11. Judy Christup, "Return to Sender: Clamping Down on the International Waste Trade,"
Greenpeace Magazine, Vol. 13, No. 6, November/December 1988, P. 8 - 11.
12. "A Critical Analysis of the Assimilative Capacity Approach, Greenpeace submission to the
Thirteenth Meeting of the London Dumping Convention's Scientific Group on Dumping", 23-27
April 1990.
13. "Precaution; a Scientifically Rigorous Approach", Greenpeace submission to the Thirteenth
Meeting of the London Dumping Convention's Scientific Group on Dumping, 23-27 April 1990.
Note: All documents are available from Greenpeace International Waste Trade Campaign.
Greenpeace International, Keizersgracht 176, 1016 DW Amsterdam, Netherlands, or Greenpeace
U.S.A., 1436 U Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009, U.S.A.
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