71
Chapter 6
Nuclear Safety Initiatives
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ
tection in low dose regimes is the assumption that the
6.1. Introduction
risk of effects on humans is proportional to radiation
This chapter considers nuclear safety initiatives relating
dose without the assumption of any threshold. While
to the eight Arctic countries. However, as many of the
there is ongoing debate on the validity of this assump-
practices that impact upon or present a hazard to the
tion (Koblinger, 2000) and on the approaches to its
Arctic environment are sited in northwest Russia, the em-
practical application in situations of very low level expo-
phasis of this chapter is on that region. Safety initiatives
sure (Clarke, 1999), this is the primary type of risk ad-
mostly relate to safety assessments of nuclear installa-
dressed and is of immediate relevance to existing expo-
tions, particularly nuclear power plants (NPPs); other
sures to radiation from anthropogenic sources and activ-
initiatives address regulatory improvements, arrange-
ities, i.e., practices in International Commission on Ra-
ments for physical protection, and nuclear safeguards.
diological Protection (ICRP) terminology (ICRP, 1991).
Production of weapons-grade nuclear materials, op-
The principles of radiological protection require that
eration of NPPs, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, nuclear-
sources and practices are optimized to reduce doses to the
powered ships, and other activities involving the use of
extent achievable under the prevailing technical, social,
nuclear energy and radioactive materials in the territory
and economic climate. Thus, optimization addresses the
of the Russian Federation have resulted in the accumula-
reduction of risks associated with operational and acci-
tion of significant amounts of radioactive waste and
dental exposures. Risk management involves the assess-
spent nuclear fuel in Arctic Russia. Their management
ment of potential consequences of events at nuclear fa-
presents a major challenge.
cilities that could result in additional exposure to radia-
Nuclear safety support programs are designed to
tion and the probability that any such event occurs.
contribute to the prevention of serious nuclear accidents
Here, the emphasis is on potential risks of exposure as-
at nuclear facilities. Their purpose is to provide assis-
sociated with exceptional events such as accidents at ex-
tance to the operators of nuclear facilities and the na-
isting nuclear facilities within, or near, the Arctic.
tional safety bodies that regulate these facilities. Other
While the risk management approach outlined in Sec-
international programs address risks associated with nu-
tion 6.3 concerns radioactivity from nuclear operations
clear waste, illicit trafficking, and terrorism involving
and activities, this approach can be used for all types of
nuclear materials. While terrorism has always been of
contaminants.
concern to bodies such as the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA), interest in the wider community
6.3. The approach to risk management
has been renewed following the 11 September 2001 at-
tacks (Lubenau and Strom, 2002). The initiatives are not
The first AMAP assessment identified known sources of
specific to the Arctic; however, the break-up of the for-
radioactivity in the Arctic. These range from atmos-
mer Soviet Union has meant that administrative controls
pheric fallout from nuclear weapons tests, past and pres-
and competence require strengthening to prevent terror-
ent nuclear power reactor operations, nuclear-powered
ists obtaining nuclear material (Webb, 2002).
vessels, spent nuclear fuel management, and the Cher-
nobyl accident. The presence of radionuclides in the
Arctic from some of these sources will diminish with
6.2. The purpose of risk management
time. Nevertheless, spent nuclear fuel management and
Risk management is a process designed to assess, priori-
potential nuclear accidents present risks of additional
tize, and control risks with the specific goal of reducing
exposure to Arctic populations and the environment.
risks in a manner that optimizes the use of resources and
In its most basic form, the risk management process
achieves the greatest reductions in risk for a given re-
consists of a sequence of steps. Namely:
source investment. A major fundamental underlying risk
ท identification of hazards (in this case, current or pro-
management is to ensure that planned activities, includ-
posed sources and practices);
ing monitoring and assessment, are formulated within
ท initial assessment of the risks presented by these haz-
the context of comparative risk. Thus, resource invest-
ards;
ments are justified on the basis of their relevance to the
ท identification and analysis of options for risk reduc-
predominant risks or to improving the characterization
tion through the imposition of preventive measures to
of risks. The characterization of absolute and relative
abate risks;
risks should consider both the risks posed by exposures
ท design and application of preparedness and response
from the planned operation of existing sources and prac-
measures to reduce the consequences to society; and
tices and the hazards associated with proposed future
ท refinement of the selection of associated performance
sources and practices.
evaluation measures and the corresponding risk as-
Owing to the stochastic nature of effects associated
sessment.
with low-level exposures, risk management within the
context of radiological protection must deal with a num-
Initial estimates of risk can be based on simple assump-
ber of categories of risk. The basis for radiological pro-
tions and relatively simple analyses. These warrant fur-

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72
AMAP Assessment 2002: Radioactivity in the Arctic
ther refinement through more detailed assessments
6.3.2. Identification of hazards
if the scoping approach ranks a given risk as a major
one among the various risks considered in relation to
The potential sources of radionuclides in the Arctic were
existing and potential sources and practices. Thus,
identified in the first AMAP assessment. The following
substantial risks (from the various sources and prac-
hazard prioritization is a ranking based on the magni-
tices) may require improved assessments, especially if
tude of the potential consequences that could ensue
the outstanding uncertainties are large or the scoping
from accidents at nuclear facilities. Namely, accidents
assessment suggests that a specific source or practice
resulting from the operation of:
exceeds risk targets and/or regulatory protection ob-
jectives. More importantly, they may warrant inter-
ท NPPs in the Arctic;
vention, or direct action, to reduce risks (either the
ท NPPs within 1000 km of the Arctic;
probability of accidents or the magnitude of conse-
ท nuclear-powered vessels in the Arctic; and
quences), or other measures, such as monitoring, to
ท interim storage of spent nuclear fuel including improp-
erly stored fuel elements and decommissioned vessels
provide early warning or detection of unplanned re-
containing spent fuel.
leases.
Estimation of overall risk is a convenient way of
For context, it should be noted that global fallout from
identifying those sources and activities deserving prior-
atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, fallout from the
ity consideration from the perspective of risk reduc-
Chernobyl accident, and previous underground nuclear
tion. However, risk reduction measures can never ob-
device detonations continue to pose minor risks to man,
viate the entire risk associated with a given source or
plants, and animals in the Arctic through continuing ex-
practice. Commonly available options merely reduce
posure to radiation but that these risks are diminishing.
the risk rather than removing it entirely. Accordingly,
Risks related to storage and handling of nuclear weap-
a more appropriate measure of the benefit of risk re-
ons have not been assessed, as no information on these
duction measures is not the overall risk but the pro-
issues has been made available.
portion of risk that is potentially averted by the ac-
Measurable, but in practice insignificant, releases of
tion (i.e., the averted risk). It follows that, in setting
radionuclides to the environment occur during normal
priorities among risk reduction options, it is necessary
operation of NPPs, nuclear-fuel reprocessing plants, and
to consider the degree to which they avert or reduce
nuclear-powered vessels.
risk.
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is also an
6.3.3. Need for closer links between risk assessment
important tool for evaluating the options for reducing
risk. EIAs of the `no action' scenario as well as options
and risk reduction activities
for risk reduction should be conducted prior to any deci-
Risk management can only be effective when risk reduc-
sion to implement risk reduction measures. This pro-
tion measures are based on risk assessments. Prevention,
vides a means of determining that there is an overall net
preparedness, emergency response, and contingency
benefit associated with any measure adopted and also of
strategies and plans, when based on a well-developed
determining that the measure, when implemented, has
and well-considered risk management program, provide
the desired consequences by helping to identify and se-
a basis for the optimization of risk reduction measures
lect measures of performance. EIA within the context of
and options for intervention, if these are deemed neces-
nuclear facilities in Norway and Russia is discussed by
sary. Furthermore, risk management ensures that the
JNREG (2001).
consequences of contemplated actions are fully assessed
and validated independently and against other impact
assessments to provide the most appropriate measures of
6.3.1. Risk analysis
benefit and options for averting risk (see Figure 6ท1).
The risk management process represents an analysis of
Communication and interaction between existing risk
the probability and consequences of events associated
and impact assessment programs and programs leading
with sources and practices. The elements of a risk analy-
sis are:
Risk
ท defining the facility and operation;
ท identifying the hazards and determining the associated
levels of risk (screening);
ท characterizing the hazards that present the greatest
No action
risks;
ท postulating and analyzing possible event scenarios;
and
ท estimating the consequences of the postulated scen-
Various actions
arios.
A risk analysis leads to a plan for the development of
risk management programs that are commensurate with
each specific activity. The results of the risk analysis
process are used to consider and analyze options for pre-
2000
2002
2004
2006
2030
vention, preparedness, and response strategies to mini-
Figure 6ท1. Potential risks and benefits connected with risk reduc-
mize the consequences of releases of radionuclides.
tion actions.

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Chapter 6 ท Nuclear Safety Initiatives
73
to the formulation of actions and/or interventions to
erations. This has been achieved through specific train-
prevent accidental releases and/or to minimize their con-
ing events such as a workshop for plant engineers on the
sequences is essential for decision makers in scoping and
unique aspects of corrosion in cold weather environ-
implementing risk reduction measures. This is vital to
ments; a training course on testing and repairing circuit
ensuring that risk reduction actions and/or interventions
boards; training on the use of ultrasonic, x-ray, and
provide overall net benefits in terms of protection of the
eddy-current equipment; training on the software pack-
health and safety of workers, the public and the environ-
ages SCALE and MCNP/Visual Editor (the former being
ment.
a suite of criticality, neutronics, and heat-transfer codes
used by the nuclear industry to support licensing submit-
tals and the latter involving codes for criticality and
6.4. Nuclear power plants
shielding calculations); and provision of safety mainte-
Although challenges remain, especially related to the age
nance equipment, including thermography, vibration
and basic construction principles of some of the reac-
analysis, and alignment equipment.
tors, considerable progress has been made since the first
AMAP assessment was completed in 1997 in improving
6.4.2. Kola
safety assessments and introducing additional safety
measures for nuclear power reactors, especially those in
The Kola NPP, in Murmansk, consists of four VVER-
Russia and other eastern countries such as Lithuania (Ig-
440 pressurized water reactors that produce 411 MW(e)
nalina NPP). This progress is, in large part, due to coop-
each. Efforts at the Kola plant are directed primarily to-
eration between the Russian Federation and the other
ward improving the safety of day-to-day operations in
Arctic countries (particularly Finland, Sweden, and the
addition to upgrading critical plant safety systems. Pro-
United States). This section reports progress in safety as-
jects focus on developing emergency operating instruc-
sessments and additional safety measures for NPP oper-
tions, upgrading the confinement system and improving
ations relevant to the Arctic; with links made to section
other engineered safety systems. Projects are also in
7.2 dealing with accident scenarios at land-based NPPs.
place to perform safety assessments, transfer capabilities
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present an overview of the train-
for performing plant safety analyses, and provide a full-
ing and equipment improvements that have been made
scope simulator to enhance staff training. There have
at the Bilibino, Kola, and Leningrad NPPs since the first
also been a number of engineering upgrades specific to
AMAP assessment.
the plant, their purpose being to limit the spread of ra-
dioactive material in the event of an accident in Unit 2,
to reduce leaks in the Unit 2 confinement system, and
6.4.1. Bilibino
the installation of post-accident confinement radiation
Bilibino NPP is located in the Chukotka region of Rus-
monitors. Plant safety evaluations were also carried out
sia, and consists of four small (12 MW) light-water
for internal events as well as probabilistic risk assess-
cooled, graphite-moderated reactors. Efforts at Bilibino
ments and design basis accident analysis (NRPA, 2002).
have focused on improving the safety of day-to-day op-
Safety improvements are planned until 2005.
Table 6ท1. Training improvements.
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ
Bilibino
Kola
Leningrad
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ
Completion of operator exchanges to train plant personnel
to develop improved operating safety procedures and practices.
Plant instructors now trained in the `systematic approach to
training methodology' and in instructor skills.
A full set of emergency operating instructions that promote
safety through improved accident mitigation strategies now available.
Transfer of the systematic approach to training methodology
and training material developed at the Balakovo Training center to the NPPs.
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ
Table 6ท2. Equipment improvements.
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ
Bilibino
Kola
Leningrad
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ
Analytical simulator.
Inmarsat satellite phones.
Safety maintenance equipment.
Non-destructive examination equipment for evaluating pipes.
Basic equipment such as computers, video and overhead projector facilities.
Valve-seat resurfacing equipment, a pipe lathe/welding preparation machine,
and a vibration monitoring and shaft alignment system for improving
safety maintenance activities
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ

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74
AMAP Assessment 2002: Radioactivity in the Arctic
of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federa-
6.4.3. Leningrad
tion; and
The Leningrad NPP is located just outside St. Petersburg
ท improving state radiation monitoring in the territory
and consists of four RBMK-1000 reactors of 925 MW
of the Russian Federation.
output. At the Leningrad NPP, the focus is on improv-
The program comprises 20 sub-programs, and includes
ing the safety of day-to-day operations and upgrading
protection of the public and the environment from the
critical plant safety systems. Specific projects include de-
consequences of potential radiation accidents. The pro-
veloping emergency operating instructions, providing
gram will be implemented through the following activi-
modern safety maintenance tools and techniques, and
ties:
performing in-depth safety assessments. In addition, pro-
jects are underway to provide fire detection and alarm
ท development and application of state-of-the-art tech-
systems in Units 1 and 2 (NRPA, 2002). Plant safety
nology for the safe handling of radioactive waste and
evaluations have been carried out to support the proba-
spent nuclear fuel, their storage, and disposal;
bilistic safety assessment and full-scope in-depth safety
ท development and adoption of nuclear, radiation, ex-
assessment with a view to meeting Russian regulatory
plosion, and fire safety technology;
requirements.
ท preparation of design documentation and procedures
to ensure nuclear and radiation safety during the dis-
mantling of reactor compartments of submarines and
6.5. Regulatory cooperation
ships, as well as in the handling of spent nuclear fuel
and radioactive wastes at ship-building facilities; and
Responsibility for nuclear safety in the Russian Federa-
ท design and establishment of a state-of-the-art and au-
tion is with the Russian regulators and operators. How-
tomated national system for radiation monitoring.
ever, support from other Arctic countries is welcome to
ensure application of best international practice and the
Social and economic benefits from the implementation
continuous development of safety culture, as well as to
of this program will arise from the improved radiation
satisfy international obligations, such as those resulting
and environmental situation in and around nuclear facil-
from the London Convention 1972 (Smith and Amund-
ities, minimization of direct and indirect economic losses
sen, 2002). Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the United
caused by severe radiation accidents, and the prevention
States are the main contributors to regulatory improve-
and minimization of economic losses from environmen-
ment projects initiated by Russia.
tal and human exposures to radiation by taking prompt
Each of these countries has framework agreements
action to contain and mitigate contamination and its
with the Russian Federation concerning the develop-
consequence.
ment of protocols for regulatory and industrial proj-
ects. These help to reduce the time taken for projects to
6.6. Emergency preparedness
gain approval. The Joint RussianญNorwegian Working
Group on Environmental Impact Assessment, the Mur-
A national Emergency Response Center has been devel-
mansk Initiative trilateral agreement between Russia,
oped in St. Petersburg in addition to the Situation and
the United States, and Norway, and the Collaboration
Crisis Center at the headquarters of Minatom (the Min-
Agreement between the Norwegian Radiation Protec-
istry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation). All
tion Authority and Gosatomnadzor, have all been par-
Russian NPPs, with the exception of Bilibino NPP, have
ticularly prolific. Such regulatory cooperation encour-
direct emergency communication links to these crisis
ages interaction between different regulatory bodies,
centers (see section 6.8).
and between the regulatory bodies and the operators;
NRPA has reported on the emergency response pro-
both Russian and western European (Sneve et al.,
cedures in place in the Nordic and Baltic countries
2001).
(NRPA, 1996). An updated report is currently in prepa-
A major step forward occurred with the adoption of
ration. Several of the Arctic countries have well-devel-
the program `Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Russia'
oped regulations and emergency preparedness proce-
for the period 2000 to 2006 (Government of the Russian
dures that can be implemented should an accident or in-
Federation, 2000). This was commissioned and is coor-
cident occur. These include methods to disseminate in-
dinated by the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian
formation, monitoring systems, and training exercises.
Federation.
The program aims at ensuring nuclear and radiation
safety in an integrated manner. The primary objectives
6.7. Waste management
of the program include:
and risk reduction measures
ท dealing with the management of radioactive waste and
There are a large number of risk reduction measures cur-
spent nuclear material in an integrated manner;
rently in place, or due to be implemented, in relation to
ท ensuring nuclear and radiation safety of nuclear fuel
sources of radioactive material in the Arctic. They have all
cycle facilities;
been justified or supported, to a greater or lesser degree,
ท ensuring safety in the operation and decommissioning
by the type of risk analyses referred to in Section 6.3.
of NPPs;
As a consequence of monitoring and assessments on
ท ensuring nuclear and radiation safety during the con-
the state of the environment in northwest Russia in 1995,
struction, repair, and dismantling of nuclear-powered
five major projects relating to the prevention of radioac-
naval vessels, as well as nuclear-powered vessels and
tive contamination and a number of actions to address
ships of the nuclear technical servicing infrastructure
existing problems have been identified (NEFCO, 1996).

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Chapter 6 ท Nuclear Safety Initiatives
75
Since 1996, several sub-projects have resulted in signifi-
transportable by sea. Particular emphasis is placed on
cant risk reductions to the population and the environ-
the processing of liquid wastes from the decommission-
ment. Some have been undertaken through the Nordic
ing of nuclear-powered submarines.
Environment Finance Corporation, while others have
been addressed and funded by other international bodies
6.7.5. Atomflot
and collaborations. The Contact Expert Group, set up
under sponsorship by the IAEA, has facilitated interna-
There are three consortium projects with Atomflot and
tional collaboration (CEG, 2002). The remainder of sec-
the Russian Northern Fleet for the treatment of liquid
tion 6.7 details some of the major projects that involve
radioactive waste with permanently-sited and moveable
facilities other than NPPs.
equipment. Trilateral collaboration between Norway,
the United States, and Russia has been particularly suc-
cessful in the expansion and upgrading of facilities at
6.7.1. Rehabilitation
Atomflot. A notable success is the inclusion of quality
of the Murmansk RADON center
assurance procedures in Russian methods and the use of
The Russian RADON interim storage for low and inter-
environmentally friendly technology during implemen-
mediate level radioactive waste located in the Mur-
tation. The start of operation of the purification plant,
mansk area ceased operation in 1993 because it did not
however, has been seriously delayed, and in 2003 it was
meet Russian quality requirements. Decommissioning of
still not operational.
this facility with European Union assistance is now be-
In addition, the Finnish NURES system for purifying
ing considered. Recently, a proposal for a regional in-
liquid radioactive wastes has been successfully used at
terim storage facility sited at the NERPA dockyard with
Atomflot. It has been proposed for use in a Norwe-
the capacity to store all conditioned low and intermedi-
gianญU.S.ญRussian project to deal with military wastes
ate level waste from the Murmansk region, including
in Murmansk although progress has been delayed by ac-
that from the RADON facility, has been completed.
cess restrictions.
6.7.2. Submarine spent fuel management
6.7.6. Repository at Novaya Zemlya
in northwest Russia
A Russian-lead project developed designs for a low to
Under a bilateral assistance program to help tackle nu-
medium level waste repository in the permafrost of No-
clear related clean-up in northwest Russia announced by
vaya Zemlya. The technical designs were peer reviewed
the United Kingdom in February 1999, assistance is
by several international organizations, under the coordi-
being provided for the management and interim storage
nation of the European Commission. There was wide-
on land of spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned nu-
spread support for the facility although more detailed
clear submarines. This involves the creation of an in-
safety assessments were required. Early in 2002, Russian
terim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel comprising a
designs for the repository were approved by the Ecolog-
storage pad for up to 50 casks and a number of certified
ical Expert Commission and are currently awaiting ap-
Russian 40 t dual-purpose casks at either NERPA or
proval from the State Committee for Environmental
Polyarnyi, two Russian shipyards.
Protection (Goscomecology). Following approval, de-
tailed design and construction plans can be made. Large-
scale international finance is required to implement the
6.7.3. Improved reprocessing facilities at Mayak
project as the estimated cost of such a facility is US$ 70
All reprocessable naval spent fuel should be sent to the
to 90 million.
Mayak reprocessing facility. However, current storage
facilities are full and the lack of interim facilities has cre-
6.7.7. Andreyeva Bay
ated a bottleneck in the decommissioning program. The
European Commission, France, Norway, Sweden, Rus-
At Andreyeva Bay there are 21000 spent fuel elements
sia, and the United Kingdom collaborated in a study to
from the Northern Fleet's decommissioned submarines
investigate three possible interim storage options. The
stored in three concrete tanks. These tanks are in very
chosen option was a new dry store and additional in-
poor condition and the spent fuel elements need to be re-
terim storage for the spent nuclear fuel casks on-site. The
covered. In 2001, a NorwegianญRussian bilateral agree-
project is due to be funded solely by the United States as
ment resulted in the initiation of several projects. Engi-
part of the Co-operative Threat Reduction program.
neering infrastructure improvements and feasibility
Other projects relating to improvements at Mayak are
studies have been established and the main tasks
being funded by European countries and the European
planned involve the stabilization of current spent nu-
Commission.
clear fuel storage units, treatment or removal of liquid
radioactive waste, conditioning of solid wastes and their
removal to a regional store, and decontamination and
6.7.4. Treatment of liquid radioactive waste
final remediation of the site.
This project involves the construction and deployment
of mobile processing facilities to decontaminate and re-
6.7.8. The Lepse
duce the volume of liquid radioactive wastes. The inten-
tion is to site treatment plants at Severodvinsk and in
The Lepse is a decommissioned service vessel of the Rus-
Snezhnogorsk (NERPA). These plants are based on a ce-
sian icebreaker fleet that is docked in Murmansk and
mentation process and are intended to be mobile and
used as a storage facility for spent nuclear fuel and other

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76
AMAP Assessment 2002: Radioactivity in the Arctic
radioactive wastes. The ship is in a very poor state of re-
The working group also noted that, in the planning
pair and there has long been a desire to offload and
phase of projects having potential radiation hazards,
transfer the radioactive wastes and damaged spent fuel
close contact between the developer and the government
to land-based storage.
bodies responsible for health protection, environmental
Since the first AMAP assessment, there has been little
protection, and nuclear safety is essential. It is important
progress in the work to decommission the Lepse. How-
that those undertaking EIAs are well informed about the
ever, the Murmansk 80 t Cask Project, which will pro-
information required and the system for approving plan-
vide transport and interim storage for spent nuclear fuel
ning activities. This ensures the overall aims of EIAs are
from Russian nuclear submarines and icebreakers cur-
met; namely selection of the optimum location, appro-
rently stored on barges and service vessels, and in a low-
priate technology, and methods for the protection of
level radioactive waste treatment facility in Murmansk,
human health and the environment.
is addressing the transfer to storage of the spent fuel that
is not suitable for processing owing to its damaged state.
6.8. Alarm, notification, and
A cooperative venture between Norway, Sweden, and
radiation measurement systems
Gosatomnadzor (Russia's State Committee for Supervi-
in northwest Russia
sion of the Safety of Work in Nuclear Power Engineer-
ing) is tasked with identifying means of dealing with the
Radiation monitoring in the Arctic is of great impor-
wastes stored on the Lepse.
tance because Russia is the largest country in the re-
The results of Phase 1 of the Lepse Regulatory Pro-
gion and operates many relevant sources and practices.
ject were published in April 2001 (Sneve et al., 2001).
A major area of work for AMAP involves risk and im-
The main results were a set of three regulatory guidance
pact assessment, including monitoring systems. Much of
documents and increased mutual understanding of the
this occurs within the context of a general Barents
differences in the regulatory systems and processes for li-
region environmental and human health monitoring
censing nuclear activities in the Russian Federation com-
system. There are also plans for a risk and impact as-
pared to other western countries, notably Sweden, Nor-
sessment for workers and members of the public that
way, and the United Kingdom. The guidance documents
may be affected by military and civilian sources; devel-
provide specifications for:
opment of a monitoring system for environmental re-
leases of radioactivity from such sources; provision of an
ท documentation to substantiate nuclear and radiation
emergency and monitoring system in the Archangelsk
safety assurance measures for submission by operators
Oblast; and construction of a regional laboratory for
when applying for a license from Gosatomnadzor to
surveillance and early warning systems. The first AMAP
implement the Lepse Project, as described by the
assessment provided useful input to these developments.
NRPA (2001);
In 1992, the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety
ท the quality assurance program for unloading spent fuel
Authority (STUK), in cooperation with Gosatomnadzor,
assemblies from the Lepse; and
installed push button alarm panels and satellite commu-
ท the safety analysis report required to support a license
nication systems in the site offices of Gosatomnadzor at
application for unloading spent fuel assemblies from
the Leningrad and Kola NPPs and at the Atomflot Re-
the Lepse.
pair Technical Plant near Murmansk. These facilitate the
This regulatory guidance is intended to help focus on
prompt transmission by Gosatomnadzor local safety in-
safe implementation. In addition, considerable emphasis
spectors of a selected pre-programmed emergency or in-
is being given to EIAs and their role in determining the
cident telex message. These can be transmitted to the 24-
suitability of specific mechanisms for unloading spent
hour emergency response systems of STUK, other
fuel from the Lepse. Phase 2 of the Lepse Regulatory
Nordic countries, and the Emergency Response Center
Project will comprise the review of license application
in Moscow operated by the Federal Nuclear and Radia-
documents submitted to the appropriate Russian au-
tion Safety Authority of Russia. The notification system
thorities, primarily the Gosatomnadzor.
is independent of local ground communications and has
battery back-up to ensure continuous operation. It is
also tested automatically each week and manually each
6.7.9. Environmental impact assessments
month to all Nordic receivers and to Moscow. There has
of other hazardous Russian facilities
been no actual emergency use of this system since its in-
A working group under the Joint NorwegianญRussian
stallation.
Expert Group for the Investigation of Radioactive Con-
In 1994, eight environmental monitoring stations of
tamination of Northern Areas compared EIA systems
Finnish origin were installed on the Kola Peninsula.
in Russia with those in Norway and other western coun-
These operate under local supervision and without auto-
tries (JNREG, 2001) and concluded that the principles
matic connections to the central system at Roshydromet
and methods used in Norway and Russia are broadly
in Murmansk for their data acquisition and alarm sys-
similar. They are based on the common principles of
tems. Data collection is manual and the data are trans-
prevention, openness, and obligation to conduct EIAs
mitted by telephone and telex. Reliable automatic oper-
for all projects likely to significantly influence the en-
ation of these stations would be difficult as the local
vironment. Concerns have been expressed however
telecommunications environment is prone to interfer-
about the degree to which transboundary impacts are
ence and other disturbances. In 1998, STUK and the
considered under Russian procedures and the lack of at-
NRPA signed a joint agreement on the development of
tention to the effects of ionizing radiation on fauna and
the Roshydromet environmental radiation measuring
flora.
system. Radiation monitoring stations would be up-

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Chapter 6 ท Nuclear Safety Initiatives
77
graded and the telecommunication connections en-
A bilateral RussianญNorwegian project was started
hanced. Progress on this project is conditional upon the
in 1998 to replace the radioisotopic power sources at
conclusion and implementation of a general agreement
four Russian lighthouses in Varanger Fjord by solar
on this work between Norway and Russia.
powered technology. The aim is to reduce the likelihood
In 2000, the nuclear and radiation safety authorities
of radioactive contamination of the northern marine en-
in the Nordic countries signed a framework agreement
vironment. When the project is complete, all radioiso-
concerning joint Nordic financing for upgrading alarm
topic power sources in the Russian parts of Varanger
and notification systems.
Fjord will have been replaced by solar panels. A Russian
information video has been made in connection with
this project. The radioisotope thermoelectric generators
6.9. Security (including physical security)
will be stored at Atomflot before transport to the Mi-
Safety and security of radiation sources has acquired a
natom Institute for Technical and Atomic Physics and
new significance since the terrorist attacks in the United
then to Mayak for final treatment and storage.
States on 11 September 2001. Special security measures
to protect against terrorism should be part of safety as-
6.10. Conclusions
sessments (Lubenau and Strom, 2002). There are a num-
ber of orphaned sources (i.e., sources that are no longer
The main criterion of success for a nuclear safety project
under regular institutional control) in the Russian Feder-
is its net contribution to the improvement of nuclear
ation that should be located and brought back under in-
safety (NRPA, 2002). Owing to the difficult economic
stitutional control. The European Commission and the
situation in Russia, improvement initiatives in the region
United States are funding programs to do this.
are often only possible through international collabora-
A `safeguard' is generally understood to be a method
tion. Lack of funds and/or difficulties in developing bi-
for controlling fissile/fissionable material. Six of the eight
lateral/multilateral agreements can delay the start of nu-
Arctic countries have signed IAEA safeguard agreements
clear safety initiatives; nevertheless, the Arctic countries
to contribute to non-proliferation obligations. Safeguard
are committed to further improvements. Priorities for
support programs have constituted the primary means
risk reduction are being identified through a process of
of bilateral Finnish assistance to the Ukraine, the Baltic
risk analysis. In addition, projects are being supported
States, and the Russian Federation. Their objectives are
only within the context of demonstrated compliance
to assist in establishing and improving national systems
with Russian regulatory requirements. That context in-
for accounting and control of nuclear material. The rele-
cludes safety assessments and EIAs incorporating a vari-
vant regulatory bodies are assisted in the development of
ety of risk analyses to demonstrate compliance with risk
regulations, guides, and inspection procedures. Training
objectives relating to environmental and human health
has also been extended to border-control authorities in
protection. Risk assessments and EIAs should also be
the detection and control of radioactive and nuclear ma-
used to select and/or prioritize risk reduction projects, to
terials. Training courses were organized for the Russian
optimize the use of resources. Resources and effort will
border controls using experts from the Finnish Radia-
continue to be focused on the areas of greatest risk and
tion and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and from other
on the operations and facilities that pose the greatest po-
institutes within the European Union (STUK, 2000).
tential threats.

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