REVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND
INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING IN PACIFIC
FISHERIES:
EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED
FINAL REPORT
MARCH 2008
Report prepared for Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency
under the GEF Oceanic Fisheries Management Project
by Robert Ferraris, RADPAC Pty Ltd
Report prepared for Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency under the GEF
Oceanic Fisheries Management Project by Robert Ferraris, RADPAC Pty Ltd
Disclaimer. While every effort has been made to reflect the views accumulated through the consultative
process undertaken, the contents of this Paper remain the sole responsibility of the author.
Report project managed and edited by Darren Cameron, Fisheries Management Adviser,
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency.
Table of Contents
Abbreviations
2
Executive Summary
4
1.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 11
1.1
Background ....................................................................................................... 11
1.2
Purpose of report............................................................................................... 12
1.3
Methodology ..................................................................................................... 13
2.
DEFINITIONS.......................................................................................................... 13
2.1
Institutions......................................................................................................... 13
2.2
Organisations .................................................................................................... 14
2.3
Institutional Reform = Institutional Development............................................ 14
2.4
Institutional Strengthening = Organisational Development ............................. 14
2.5
Distinction between institutional reform and institutional strengthening or
organisational development .......................................................................................... 15
3.
FISHERIES INSTITUTIONS .................................................................................. 16
3.1
Institutional features essential for effective fisheries management: ................. 16
3.2
Departments ...................................................................................................... 16
3.3
Authorities......................................................................................................... 17
3.4
Engaging stakeholders ...................................................................................... 17
4.
SAMPLE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT MODELS IN THE PACIFIC AND
THEIR STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT .................................................................... 18
4.1
Some Australian Models................................................................................... 26
Commonwealth fisheries institutional model ........................................................... 26
Western Australia...................................................................................................... 27
Queensland................................................................................................................ 28
4.2
Papua New Guinea............................................................................................ 28
4.3
Federated States of Micronesia......................................................................... 29
4.4
Marshall Islands ................................................................................................ 30
4.5
Nauru................................................................................................................. 31
4.6
Cook Islands...................................................................................................... 32
4.7
Fiji ..................................................................................................................... 33
4.8
Tonga ................................................................................................................ 34
4.9
Samoa................................................................................................................ 34
4.10
Vanuatu ............................................................................................................. 35
5.
EXAMINATION OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY COMPARED TO
DEPARTMENTAL MODEL ........................................................................................... 35
5.1
Design principles in model selection ................................................................ 35
5.2 Country reviews of fisheries statutory and departmental models ........................... 37
Australia.................................................................................................................... 37
Papua New Guinea.................................................................................................... 44
6.
ISSUES FOR GOVERNMENT IN CREATION OF A STATUTORY
AUTHORITY ................................................................................................................... 45
1
7.
EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNT FROM INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING ACTIVITIES IN THE PACIFIC........... 48
7.1
General findings................................................................................................ 48
7.2
Key principles underlying Institutional Reform and Organisational
Development (Institutional Strengthening)................................................................... 49
7.3
Marshall Islands experience.............................................................................. 49
7.4
Federated States of Micronesia......................................................................... 51
7.5
Papua New Guinea............................................................................................ 51
7.6
Vanuatu ............................................................................................................. 55
7.7
Fiji ..................................................................................................................... 55
7.8
Cook Islands...................................................................................................... 56
7.9
Tonga ................................................................................................................ 57
7.10
Samoa................................................................................................................ 59
7.11
Some Donor Perspectives ................................................................................. 61
DFID experience with Institutional Reform (DFID 2004) ....................................... 61
NZAID support for Institutional Strengthening........................................................ 64
CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................... 67
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 70
People Consulted .............................................................................................................. 72
2
ABBREVIATIONS
ADB
Asian Development Bank
AFMA
Australian Fisheries Management Authority
AFMC
Australian Fisheries Management Commission
AFS
Australian Fisheries Service
AMA
Aquaculture Management Act (Tonga)
AusAID
Australian Agency for International Development
CBFM
Community based fisheries management
CEO
Chief Executive Officer
CF-MAC
Commercial Fisheries Management Advisory Committee (Samoa)
CPP
Central Pacific Producers Ltd (Kiribati)
DAFF-A
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Australia
DFID
Department for International Development
DFMR, DoFMR
Department of Fisheries and Marine Resources (PNG, Solomon
Islands)
DoF
Department of Fisheries (Tonga)
DoFWA
Department of Fisheries Western Australia
DPI
Department of Primary Industries
DPIE
Department of Primary Industries and Energy
DPM
Department of Personnel Management (PNG)
DWFN
Distant Water Fishing Nations
EEZ
Exclusive Economic Zone
ENGO
Environmental Non-Government Organisation
ESD
Ecologically/environmentally sustainable development
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCC
Fisheries Co-management Council
FFA
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency
FFC
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Committee
FIA
Fisheries Industry Association (PNG)
FMA
Fisheries Management Act (Tonga)
FMAC
Fisheries Management Advisory Committee
FSM
Federated States of Micronesia
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
GEF
Global Environment Fund
HRD
Human Resources Development
IDP
Integrated Development Project or Program
IMF
International Monetary Fund
INGO
Industry Non-Government Organisation
IR
Institutional Reform
IRP
Institutional Reform Project or Program
IS
Institutional Strengthening
ISP
Institutional Strengthening Project or Program
MAC
Management Advisory Committee
MAF
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (Samoa)
MAFF
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests (Fiji)
3
MAFFM
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Meteorology
(Samoa)
MD
Managing Director
M&E
Monitoring and evaluation
MFA
Micronesian Fisheries Authority (FSM)
MIMRA
Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authority
MMR
Ministry of Marine Resources (Cook Islands)
MoF
Ministry of Fisheries (New Zealand, Tonga)
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
NFA
National Fisheries Authority (PNG)
NFC
National Fisheries Corporation (FSM, Nauru)
NFMRA
Nauru Fisheries and Marine Resources Authority
NGO
Non-Government Organisation
NORMA
National Ocean Resource Management Authority (FSM)
NSW
New South Wales
NT
Northern Territory
NZ
New Zealand
NZAID
New Zealand Agency for International Development
OD
Organisational development
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFMP
Oceanic Fisheries Management Project
PARC
Planning and Reporting Cycle (Cook Islands)
PIC
Pacific Island Country
PNG
Papua New Guinea
QDPI
Queensland Department of Primary Industries
QDPIF
Queensland Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries
QFMA
Queensland Fisheries Management Authority
QFS
Queensland Fisheries Service
RAMSI
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RMI
Republic of the Marshall Islands
SARDI
South Australia Research and Development Institute
SMA
Statutory Management Authority
SPC
Secretariat of the Pacific Community
STD
Sexually Transmitted Disease
SWAP
Sector wide approach program
TA
Technical assistance
TEFA
Tonga Export Fishing Association
TFP
Tonga Fisheries Project
TMPAC
Tuna Management Plan Advisory Committee (Vanuatu)
UNCLOS
United Nations Convention on the Law of theSea
UNDP
United Nations Development Program
WCPFC
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
WTO
World Trade Organisation
4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There have been various reform and restructuring activities in fisheries adminstrations in
the Pacific as a consequence of the change of core business direction from production and
development to management and conservation in recent years:
· externally supported interventions through donor loans or grants with Marshall
Islands, PNG and Tonga fisheries administrations as examples;
· opportunistic change in Samoa, Vanuatu and the Cook Islands fisheries
administrations as a consequence of a larger government reform and rightsizing
program supported by the IMF; and
· gradual change internally driven such as that in the Fiji Department of Fisheries.
The important candidates for institutional reform and strengthening are those Pacific
fisheries administrations that have yet to change their business approach. Some of the
questions for these administrations in considering structural change are:
· What model to adopt department, a separate Ministry, or Authority and why?
· If part of a public sector rationalization, whether to merge or demerge Ministries?
· What management mode functional (eg, resource management, compliance,
licensing, corporate services) or by fisheries sub-sector (eg, offshore, coastal,
aquaculture)?
· Retention of services (research, extension, supplies) versus core business?
The review methodology involved an examination of literature and consultation through
workshops and at meetings with personnel from fisheries administrations, regional
agencies, donors, and consultants that had experienced reform or were involved in
executing, implementing or reviewing institutional reform and strengthening activities.
The review draws on experiences of Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and Australian and
New Zealand fisheries administrations.
Institutional reform can be defined as changes to the rules of the game and improving
the capabilities of the players of the game. Reform usually involves strengthening.
The essential functions of effective fisheries administrations are:
· collection of detailed information on fisheries and on social and economic
characteristics of each fishery;
· analysis of relevant information to identify trends to allow appropriate
adjustments to management strategies;
· consideration of all relevant information in a decision making process that
includes participation by key stakeholders (developing the rules);
· monitoring, control and surveillance (implementing the rules)
Departments exist to support a Minister in pursuing Government objectives and
delivering services. Activities include policy development, coordination, implementation
and regulation. There is a direct reporting relationship between the Head of a
Department and the responsible Minister. Departments usually have minimal financial
autonomy. Governments closely control priorities and resources of departments.
5
Statutory authorities are established by statute. They:
· are usually constituted as a body corporate;
· have a responsible Minister;
· usually have a Board of Management;
· have functions and powers defined by statute.
The CEO of an Authority usually reports to a Board, and the Chairman of the Board to
the Minister. For accountability reasons, appointment of the CEO (and other staffs)
should be made by the Board, though governments may choose to have the CEO
appointed by the Minister.
Fisheries management models in the Pacific region cover a continuum between the
autonomous authority model and the merged department. Authorities such as PNG NFA
and Australia AFMA are autonomous; MIMRA, NORMA and NFMRA have lost
financial autonomy. AFMA and NORMA have responsibility for one fishery sector
(commercial and oceanic respectively); the NFA, MIMRA and NFMRA mandates cover
all fisheries. The NZ Ministry of Fisheries and Cook Islands MMR are stand alone
Ministries; the Western Australia Department of Fisheries is a stand alone department.
Most of the administrations reviewed are departments within ministries. All have strong
stakeholder engagement or are moving to strengthening the role of stakeholders in
fisheries co-management.
The following principles in choice of organisational design from NZ are presented to
guide model choice of fisheries administrations:
Effectiveness and efficiency organisational design choice should best achieve
government's outcomes (effectiveness) and lowest cost production of outputs
(efficiency).
· commercial activities should be assigned to organisations with commercial
objectives;
· non-commercial activities should be assigned to a commercial organisation only if the
net cost of these activities is explicitly funded by the Government;
· there is a presumption in favour of making contestable the activities of commercial
organisations and non-commercial service delivery activities that do involve the
exercise of significant statutory powers;
· functions which conflict for constitutional or commercial reasons should be assigned
to separate organization. In other cases, the costs and benefits of functional
separation should be considered, and a decision to co-locate or separate the functions
made on the specifics of each case; and
· where an agency is to be asked to undertake potentially conflicting functions, there is
a presumption in favour of the departmental form.
Risk management organisational design choices should be made to best manage the
risks posed for government by the activities to be undertaken by a public sector
organisation:
· if an activity represents a high level of strategic risk, then the departmental form may
be preferred;
6
· if an activity poses significant risks associated with poor contestability, there is a
presumption in favour of the departmental form;
· if the choice between a departmental form and a non-departmental form is not clear
cut, there is a presumption in favour of the departmental form.
Constitutional conventions organisational design choices should be made to best protect
established constitutional arrangement and conventions:
· where constitutional considerations indicate a need for close Ministerial oversight, or
for direct Ministerial responsibility, there is a presumption in favour of the
departmental form; and
· if an activity must be, and must be seen to be, undertaken free of political
interference, and there are no compelling reasons for close Ministerial oversight, the
non-departmental form may be preferred.
An Australian inquiry concluded that statutory authorities appear to have been most
successful where their responsibility is for single-sector fisheries and where there is a
clear client group that can be targeted for cost recovery and least successful where
required to manage waters subject to multi-sector fisheries and of high value for non-
fishing uses.
In PNG the Authority model was retained because of its flexibility and selective
independence from public service regulations and control that allowed substantial
rightsizing and restructure to better focus on management of fisheries and facilitate
private sector development with greater accountability and transparency. In Vanuatu the
departmental model was retained to better service all fisheries stakeholders.
Issues for governments in creation of a statutory authority include:
· determining the role, function and structure of the authority;
· determining the role of and relationship with the Minister;
· legislative arrangements;
· Board structure and membership;
· funding arrangements and
· accountability processes
Experiences and lessons learned from institutional reform and strengthening
activities in the Pacific are detailed by country in the text; some donor perspectives are
also presented.
Among the more notable findings are:
· Institutional change is long term; it requires commitment from leaders and political
support to commence the process and to be maintained during implementation so that
resistance to change is managed. Getting real participation is necessary. Reform
lends itself to a process approach where outputs are defined more clearly as
development proceeds.
· Reform and restructuring should be preceded by proper analysis of context in which
the sector and its institutions operate nationally, regionally and internationally.
Institutional development must start from and be constantly informed by current
7
social, political and cultural realities. This involves understanding different groups'
incentives, whether for change or for retaining the status quo. Changing incentives of
powerful groups may be the most effective mechanism of institutional change.
· Obtaining participation of stakeholders to counter opposition from vested interests
and from those who do not understand the rationale is a desirable strategy.
Widespread stakeholder participation should develop a shared understanding of what
needs to be changed and why, how to bring change about, and acceptance of new
"rules", which need to be widely disseminated and well understood. The process
should be inclusive and enabling to ensure long-term sustainability of the change.
· Co-management of fisheries resources is an accepted strategy for all fishers and
fisheries; cost recovery is applied to varying degree by departments, and usually
according to ability to pay. Regardless of administrative model, increased
stakeholder input into management of fisheries is a prime consideration
· There is a need to ensure that the reform process is meeting its objectives; whether
institutional change is facilitating achievement of desired outcomes. Accountability
will be heavily dependent on a regular flow of information. Monitoring and
evaluation is important.
· Early PNG NFA experience indicates the need for careful crafting of legislation to
ensure accountability of the Authority to Parliament and stakeholders, whatever the
level of Ministerial or Board control. This does not protect the Authority if
governance as a whole becomes a national problem.
· PNG experience shows that unforeseen externalities affect implementation of
institutional reform. These externalities include political change, coordinating and
reaching agreement with central agencies for autonomy in financial and personnel
management, and timely release of funds.
· The authority model was considered by most Pacific fisheries ministries or
departments undertaking recent reform, but the departmental models were retained
(though restructured) in all cases to better deliver their mandate to service, manage
and develop subsistence, artisanal and semi-commercial coastal and inland fisheries
as well as the commercial sector. The Authority model was seen as specific to
commercial fisheries and interests.
· Should ministries or departments be merged or demerged? The Cook Islands MMR
is the only stand alone ministry or department among the PICs reviewed. Tonga's
Ministry of Fisheries has recently merged into a department within a larger natural
resources ministry. The response of commercial stakeholders to Tonga's merger was
that the sector had lost representation and the ability to influence decision makers.
Government rationale for merger is on grounds of efficiency in administration and
facilitation of integrated management of natural resources.
· There has been rationalization of services towards core functions in strengthened and
restructured departments to varying degrees, depending on availability of alternative
service providers.
· Accountability is a major consideration:
· The relevant Act setting up the institution should delegate power for effective
decision making and include engagement of stakeholders in decision making on
fisheries management.
8
· The regulatory framework should consider which entity should have the power to
issue licenses. A public register of license holders is recommended.
· Regional and national norms for transparency and providing information should
be established, eg, annual reports.
· Good institutional reform requires good legislation. Some desired characteristics of
good legislation are:
· Should be based on ESD principles;
· Must identify consultative structures and processes to support co-management;
· Must provide a strong framework for issues of or refusal of licenses;
· Must provide prescribed penalties;
· Must provide for flexible delegation of fisheries management arrangements;
· Must provide power to enter into institutional arrangements.
Drafting good legislation does not necessarily resolve problems; legislation and
regulations have to be implemented. The need is to get all sector institutions to
implement regulations.
· Projects or defined program elements operating at the authority or department level
can only be effective if critical elements are in place, eg, government ownership of
the process, donor coordination, capacity enhanced, institutional accountability and a
clear coherent strategic plan endorsed by all major stakeholders.
Conclusions.
Any model can be satisfactory. Considerations are national priorities in fisheries, funding
and how best to resource the institution. Pacific fisheries statutory authorities and
fisheries departments cover a continuum in terms of governance, functions, fisheries
managed, structure and stakeholders. The distinction between an Authority and a
Department in Pacific fisheries is often blurred since there is similarity and overlap in
stakeholders and service delivery. In a number of authorities there is no longer autonomy
of financial and personnel resources that was a feature of the Authority model. In some
departments with performance based management, remuneration may be above the public
service scale.
In some PICs the institutions extend to state or province fisheries administration. The
authority or departmental model services these institutions in the Pacific to varying
degrees with the exception of NORMA in FSM whose focus is solely oceanic fisheries.
An Authority model in the Pacific context provides greater flexibility and may facilitate
securing funds, decision making, focusing on core business and accessing services.
Conversely, examples show that the Authority model can lose financial autonomy, and
lose its focus on core business in attempting to meet its mandate to service multiple
stakeholders and government development priorities.
Scale and complexities of governance arrangements will differ according to the model
selected.
Management mode can vary. Organisations may be structured according to functions
(resource management, compliance etc) or to fisheries (oceanic, coastal etc) or elements
9
of each. Where one fishery is involved, a functional management mode is suited.
Management mode may be determined by priorities or mandate set when developing
strategic and corporate plans.
Institutions should include all fisheries in their mandate. If capacity is limited, the focus
should be on the fisheries with highest economic returns.
Core functions should include compliance and enforcement based on ESD principles,
policy and planning, research and monitoring capability. Access to legal expertise is
required and an industry development section for assessing viability of and facilitating
new initiatives is desirable.
Service delivery can be done by private sector including NGOs if capacity exists in
country. The determinant for whether services are delivered by public or private sector
should be cost effectiveness.
10
REVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND INSTITUTIONAL
STRENGTHENING IN PACIFIC FISHERIES:
EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
There has been a shift in fisheries laws and policies from a focus on fisheries
development to a focus on fisheries management and conservation. UNCLOS 1982
Article 61 requires that states manage their marine resources in a sustainable way:
`The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it,
shall ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not
endangered by overexploitation'.
The institutional implications of this duty are explicitly stated in the voluntary FAO Code
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (para 7.1.1) that requires:
`States and all those engaged in fisheries management should, through an
appropriate policy, legal and institutional framework, adopt measures for the long
term conservation and sustainable use of fisheries resources' (FAO 2006).
This focus on management and conservation is reinforced for Pacific oceanic fisheries by
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention (UNDP FFA 2004).
Reform and strengthening of fisheries programs and institutions is an essential element in
the development of sustainable fisheries to meet obligations under the WCPFC and
increasing the contribution of fisheries towards achievement of broader development
goals (UNDP FFA 2004; OECD 2006).
There have been various reform and restructuring activities in the Pacific as a
consequence of this imperative to change core business direction. Clark (FFA 2007a)
noted:
· externally supported interventions through donor loans or grants with Marshall
Islands, PNG and Tonga fisheries administrations as examples;
· opportunistic change in Samoa, Vanuatu and the Cook Islands fisheries
administrations as a consequence of a larger government reform and rightsizing
program supported by the IMF; and
· gradual change internally driven such as that in the Fiji Department of Fisheries.
The important candidates for institutional reform and strengthening are those Pacific
fisheries administrations that have yet to change their business approach. Some of the
questions for these administrations in considering structural change are:
· What model to adopt department, a separate Ministry, or Authority and why?
· If part of a public sector rationalization, whether to merge or demerge Ministries?
· What management mode functional (eg, resource management, compliance,
licensing, corporate services) or by fisheries sub-sector (eg, offshore, coastal,
aquaculture)?
11
· Retention of services (research, extension, supplies) versus core business?
The Institutional Reform sub-component of the overall Oceanic Fisheries Management
Project (OFMP) sets out to provide support to South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency
(FFA) member countries to reform and realign their fisheries administrations and
arrangements for inter-departmental liaison relating to oceanic fisheries, and to establish
or strengthen consultative processes with stakeholders. Priorities identified by the
national missions for this sub-component included institutional restructuring and
strengthening reviews, typically responding to new policy directions set out in national
management plans.
The intended outcome of the Institutional Reform sub-component of the OFMP is:
· Public sector fisheries administrations reformed, realigned and strengthened;
· Capacities of national non-governmental organisations to participate in oceanic
fisheries management enhanced; and
· Consultative processes enhanced to promote a more integrated approach to
fisheries management and administration that encourages coordination and
participation between diverse government and non-government stakeholders.
1.2 Purpose of report
As part of the GEF funded Pacific Islands Oceanic Fisheries Management Project
(OFMP), the FFA is implementing the project activity reviewing experiences in reform
and strengthening of fisheries management agencies of FFA members; viz.,
Activity 2.3.1.1 Prepare a review of experiences and best practices in institutional
reform (UNDP FFA 2004).
The aims of the review of institutional reform and institutional strengthening in Pacific
Islands Fisheries Management are to:
1. Evaluate rationale and strategies for the reform, realignment and strengthening of
institutions and their administrations for enhanced management of aquatic
resources, and protection of aquatic biodiversity;
2. Assess the lessons and achievements of sectoral institutional reform and
strengthening activities outcomes as defined during design and modified during
implementation (including consideration of achievement in oceanic fisheries
management key results for institutional reform and of aligning with country
development priorities); and
3. Assess the impact of the activities on the people, sector(s) and areas designed in
the activity design.
This document presents the findings of a desk study reviewing literature (published and
unpublished) and from consultations on institutional reform and institutional
strengthening activities undertaken in the Pacific region. While there is reference to the
status of fisheries administrations of all FFA member states (see Table 1), the review
focused on those administrations that had undertaken reform and strengthening.
12
1.3 Methodology
A review of literature in the public domain or documentation accessed from donors was
undertaken. Most of the literature dealt with institutional reform and institutional
strengthening experiences in Pacific (including Australia and New Zealand) fisheries,
though experiences with organisational change in other sectors or regions was not
excluded if considered to add value.
FFA facilitated a two-day workshop on experiences and lessons learned in institutional
reform and institutional strengthening in Honiara in May 2007 (FFA 2007a). Participants
included people from FFA, SPC, fisheries administrations, a donor and consultancy
companies experienced in design, implementation, execution or review of reform and
strengthening activities.
Information from various Pacific fisheries administrations and donors was collected from
informal interviews and conversations with participants at the Officials Forum Fisheries
Committee Sixty-Fourth Meeting in Wellington, New Zealand held in late May 2007.
The Review Report does not include the experiences of industry, community and other
non-government stakeholders. This wider scope of experiences would have involved
consultations in a number of countries. The information already provided on industry
and community perspectives of reform through the consultations in Honiara and
Wellington and from the reviewed literature was substantial and satisfied objectives.
Further research would involve diminished benefit: cost. Aim 3 of the Review given in
section 1.2 above has therefore not been fully covered.
2.
DEFINITIONS
2.1 Institutions
Institutions can be defined as the "rules of the game". Institutions govern individual and
collective behaviour. They may be formal - legal systems, property rights, enforcement
mechanisms; or informal customs, traditions. They may operate at different levels
international (eg.WTO rules), national (eg. laws, constitutions), social (eg. norms of
conduct, status of women), family (eg. inheritance rules). They may nest within larger
institutions eg. village-based collective institutions nested within the policy institutions
of government. A widely used definition of Institutions is that used by North (1990 cited
in DFID 2003). They "...consist of formal rules, informal constraints - norms of
behaviour, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct - and their enforcement
characteristics". The constraints provide a structure for political, economic and social
interactions (Reddy, M. and Duncan, R. 2005).
or,
"Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They
are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms
of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement
characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically
economies" (North 1993 cited in AusAID and Government of Samoa 2003).
13
The rules of the game shape the incentives that drive behaviour and performance, and
expectations about rights and obligations. They have a major influence on economic
development, and on the success and sustainability (or lack of it) of specific projects and
programmes (DFID 2003).
An OECD (1997 cited in FAO 2006) definition of an institution is:
`simply the set of rules actually used by a set of individuals to organise repetitive
activities that produce outcomes affecting those individuals and potentially
affecting others'
or, better for a fisheries context:
`An institution is not only the rules themselves, it includes the process and
organisations (public and private, formal and informal) that develop and
implement the rules (management measures) affecting use of the fishery
resources'.
As pointed out in FFA (2007a), institutional issues do not always occur at national level.
In countries such as PNG and FSM there is provincial or state government administration
of fisheries as well as national. Together with the private sector and other stakeholders,
these make up the institutions in the sector.
2.2 Organisations
Organisations are groups of players who come together for a common purpose or to
achieve specific objectives. They adapt their tactics and organisation according to
externally defined rules and regulations - the `rules of the game'. They play to, but are
not the same as, those rules. For example, it is a rule of the game that football teams
comprise a goal-keeper and ten outfield players; but the configuration, position and
tactics of the outfield players are decided by the team as an organisation. Organisations
encompass political bodies, such as political parties or parliaments; economic bodies,
such as firms or businesses; and social bodies, such as churches and schools. They
usually have discrete boundaries, a budget, and a structure (DFID 2003).
2.3 Institutional Reform = Institutional Development
Institutional reform includes rules, incentives and enforcement mechanisms.
Institutional reform (reforming the rules of the game) promotes enforcement of formal
and informal roles. Experience with organisational development suggests that with many
government departments the rules of the game will have to be changed for there to be a
meaningful shift in the way they fulfill their mandates. Reform basically means a set of
policy shifts and the development and deployment of an integrated range of policy
instruments to give this effect.
2.4 Institutional Strengthening = Organisational Development
Institutional strengthening (or OD) involves change in the structure, people and/or
processes of an organisation.
14
Organisational development (players of the game) includes capacity building eg skills
development, structures, processes, resources; and relates to improvement of the four
inter connected forms of capital:
i) Tangible capital land, research stations, libraries, laboratories, offices,
equipment and financial assets;
ii) Human/Intellectual capital the skills, professionalism, motivation, creativity
and degree of problem orientation of the staff;
iii) Organisational capital the appropriateness of the institution's mandate, the
quality of its internal management procedures, and its policies and decision
making procedures assessed in terms of their contribution to the creation and
improvement of outputs;
iv) Social or Political capital the political and economic support the institution
is able to muster, which in turn is largely a function of its reputation and prestige
in the eyes of the stakeholders (DFID 2004).
2.5 Distinction between institutional reform and institutional
strengthening or organisational development
The terms "institution" and "organisation" are often used interchangeably, for example,
by talking about "institutional weaknesses" when organisational ones are meant, ie,
weaknesses in the structure, people and/or processes of an organisation. Understanding
organisational reform is of course important, but the bigger institutional picture, which
includes rules, incentives and enforcement mechanisms, is important too (DFID 2003).
This aspect of organisational development was picked up in a review of institutional
strengthening projects in Samoa (AusAID and Government of Samoa 2003). In the
conceptualisation of Institutional Strengthening Projects (ISPs) in Samoa, the term
`institutions' was used synonymously with `organisations' and, more specifically, with
`public sector organisations'. There is however another perspective on `institutions' that
is particularly relevant to strengthening Samoa's capacity to lead and manage the
Australian bilateral aid program. This is North's definition of institutions not as
organisations but as the formal and informal `rules of the game.' Re-conceiving
"institutional strengthening" beyond organisational strengthening to encompass changing
the `rules of the game' that govern Australia's bilateral aid program in Samoa would be
an important step towards greater Samoan self-reliance and would help build capacity in
every significant sense of the word.
Both types of development are of course concerned with the process and content of
change. Dolman (K.Dolman pers. comm. 2002) noted that institutional reform may
involve incremental or transitional change. The literature shows disagreement regarding
the best approach. Transitional change is questioned by those who prefer emergent
change through a continuous process of experiment and adaptation aimed at matching an
organisation's capabilities to a changing or uncertain environment. Transitional change
generally involves moving a department out of the civil service to a semi-independent
government agency to manage its own finances and its own employment conditions, with
accountability to a board of directors.
15
Development interventions are more likely to succeed if they promote improvements in
wider institutional competencies as well as in technical competencies. There are real
limits to the extent to which sustainable reform can be advanced without advances in
both. Improvements in technical competence need the institutional changes to allow
technical improvements to work.
Capacity development at whatever level needs to take account of both the institutional
and organisational context.
3.
FISHERIES INSTITUTIONS
Fisheries institutions in the Pacific have adopted either the Department or Authority
model. However, there is no hard and fast delineation between a statutory authority (or
authorities) and a Department. Agencies will lie somewhere along a continuum (DoFWA
2006).
3.1 Institutional features essential for effective fisheries
management:
A fisheries management authority is the legal entity which has the mandate within the
State to perform specified fisheries management functions. Commonly a national
fisheries management authority would be in the form of a Ministry, a Department within
a Ministry or an agency. While many fisheries management agencies are government
bodies, they could be government, parastatal or private.
The fisheries management authority should have the capacity for or recourse to services
which provide the following functions:
· the collection of detailed information on the fishery, including: data on catches such
as total landings and discards and the species composition of these and the size or age
structure of catches; data on the nature, timing and distribution of fishing effort; and
information on the social and economic characteristics of each fishery and its sub-
units;
· the analysis of the relevant information to identify trends in the resources and
ecosystem, and in the performance of the fishery to allow for the appropriate
modification of the management measures to ensure that the objectives for the fishery
are being achieved;
· consideration of all relevant information in a decision making process, which must
include appropriate participation by the key stakeholders, in order to select
appropriate management measures and ensure effective sustainable management
(developing the rules);
· monitoring, control and surveillance, designed to ensure compliance with the
management measures and, where necessary to enforce the regulations (implementing
the rules) (FAO 2006).
3.2 Departments
Departments essentially exist to support a Minister in pursuing Government objectives
and delivering services. They are typically responsible for a range of activities, including
16
policy development, coordination, implementation and regulation. Any commercial
activities are normally incidental to the Department's primary function.
There is a direct reporting relationship between the head of the Department and the
responsible Minister. Departments are generally responsible to only one Minister, but
may provide support or advice to other Ministers.
Departments usually have minimal financial autonomy and are normally dependent on
the Consolidated Fund for their operation and viability. This enables the Government to
closely control the priorities of and resources allocated to organisations.
In addition, departments of State are normally characterised by a need or desire for their
staff to be employed principally under equivalents of a Public Sector Management Act
(DoFWA 2006).
3.3 Authorities
Every state sets up agencies which are competent in dealing with one particular matter.
This is set up within the agency's charter. Authorities are usually created by special
legislation and are run by a board of directors and exercise autonomy in certain matters.
They are also usually required to be self-supporting through property taxes or other forms
of collection of fees for services (Wikipedia 2007).
Statutory authorities are established by statute and have the following general features:
· Usually constituted as a body corporate.
· Have a responsible Minister.
· Usually have a board of management.
· Have functions and powers defined by its statute (DoFWA 2006).
Whereas the CEO of a Department reports direct to the Minister, the CEO of a statutory
authority reports to a Board. The Chairman of the Board reports to the Minister.
However there may be instances where the CEO is employed by the Minister and
therefore also has a reporting relationship with the Minister (DoFWA 2006).
Clear lines of accountability suggest that appointment of the CEO of a statutory authority
be made by the Board with other staff also appointed by the Board. However, there are
many instances where governments have chosen to have the CEO appointed by the
Minister as an added measure to maintain Ministerial control of the authority and
responsiveness to the Government of the day.
A statutory authority may also comprise a single statutory officer, or the Portfolio
Minister. If a single officer only, then the authority may have an advisory board
(DoFWA 2006).
3.4 Engaging stakeholders
The move in regional administrations from policies aimed at production and development
to management and conservation for sustainability of aquatic resources means greater
17
reliance on collaboration and cooperation by stakeholders including industry,
communities and the non-government organisations, that is, co-management. The
engagement of stakeholders when developing `the rules' requires their input into decision
making if implementing `the rules' is to be successful.
According to preliminary findings of the FFA commissioned governance review in
fisheries, political stakeholder engagement is low in the sector (FFA 2007a and b) and
there is a need to raise awareness and the profile of fisheries administrations and issues
within government circles (FFA 2007a).
Clark (AusAID 2006b) points out that actions that improve policymaking and strengthen
the role and capacities of the private sector are priorities in accelerating the development
of sustainable domestic commercial fisheries. Ensuring government fishery agencies
engage with stakeholders, particularly from the private sector, is a key element in
enhancing such development.
4.
SAMPLE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT MODELS IN
THE PACIFIC AND THEIR STAKEHOLDER
ENGAGEMENT
This section includes stakeholder engagement under the different institutional models
examined because stakeholder participation by diverse groups of government and non-
government stakeholders is emphasised by FAO (2006) and the GEF Oceanic Fisheries
Management Project (UNDP FFA 2004). Government, in its stewardship role, must
engage with stakeholders and encourage community involvement in fisheries
management. Stakeholders must be assured that their views were sought and considered
fully. Government then has the responsibility to make decisions. This model is essential
in natural resource management - whether through a Department or a statutory authority.
It is best practice (DoFWA 2003).
The fisheries sector is complex, and interacts and has significant linkages with a number
of cross-Agency or whole-of-Government issues including biodiversity, food safety,
tenure systems. Fisheries administrations deal with a complex environment:
· internal, coastal, sovereign and EEZ waters;
· international agreements; and
· state, federal, economic and joint authorities.
The Pacific fisheries administrations cover a continuum of institutional models.
Examples are:
18
Table 1. Fisheries management models in the Pacific region (FFA member states and territories).
Authorities models
Country
Name
Mandate
Governance
Autonomy
Reports to
Prior to reform
Australia
Australian Fisheries
Oceanic
Expertise-based
Autonomous
Parliament
Australian
Management Authority
(commercial)
Board
decision
Fisheries Service
(AFMA)
fisheries but
making on
Reports to
(AFS), a
States manage
management
Department of Division of the
nearly all
of fisheries
Environment
Department of
fisheries in the
under AFMA
and Water
Primary Industry
EEZ under the
jurisdiction.
Resources on
and Energy
Offshore
Funded by
ESD aspects
(DPIE).
Constitutional
government.
Settlement.
Expected change
Policy,
to Commission
international
in 2008 to better
negotiations and
implement
strategic issues
government
administered by
policy
DAFF-A.
Research
outsourced
Federated
National Ocean Resource
Commercial
5-member
Autonomous
President and
Formerly
States of
Management Authority
oceanic
"Board" with
Agency but in
Congress
Micronesian
Micronesia (NORMA)
fisheries;
representatives
practice weak
Fisheries
Responsible only for
States manage
from national and
financial
Authority.
oceanic fisheries
coastal and
4 states appointed
autonomy.
Restructured
management in the EEZ.
inland fisheries
by the President
Budget by
with revision of
Branches: statistics,
to 12 nm limit.
Congress.
MR Act to
licensing and information; Technical
Board appoints
include
research and data analysis; services and
CEO and
conservation and
management,
support for
approves licenses
management.
19
administration and
development
finance.
and
Capacity
management
development and
through
review of
Department of
functions and
Economic
structure
Affairs
proposed
Nauru
National Fisheries and
All fisheries.
Board appointed
Partial
Minister to
Formerly
Marine Resources
Mandate
by Cabinet,
Autonomy (no Parliament
Department of
Authority (NFMRA)
includes
Board appoints
financial
Act mandates
Fisheries and
Statutory Corporation.
commercial
CEO.
autonomy)
NFMRA on
Marine
Operational departments:
activities (NFC) CEO approves
marine
Resources.
oceanic; coastal;
licenses and
conservation.
Proposed
finance/administration;
reports to Board
Cooperation
institutional
and operations and
with
strengthening
infrastructure
Environment
awaiting donor
funding.
PNG
National Fisheries
Act mandates
Board
Autonomous
Board reports
Department of
Authority (NFA)
all fisheries, but
representing
including
to Cabinet
Fisheries and
Non-commercial statutory coastal and
various
financial
Marine
authority.
inland fisheries
stakeholders.
autonomy
Resources until
Groups: Fisheries
managed by
CEO appointed
1998.
management; control and
provinces under
by National
surveillance; provincial
New Organic
Executive
NFA further
and industry liaison;
Law.
Council, reports
reformed after
licensing and information; Minister is
to Board.
1998.
finance; corporate services responsible for
Board approves
policy direction. licenses on
recommendation
of CEO via
Licensing
Committee
20
Republic
Marshall Islands Marine
All fisheries
Board (5
Partial
Board reports
MIMRA
of the
Resources Authority
members).
autonomy
to Parliament
established under
Marshall
(MIMRA)
Board approves
Minister chairs
US
Islands
2 operational divisions:
licenses
Board; weak
Conservation
administration.
oceanic fisheries and
financial
function under Reform of
industrial affairs, and
autonomy.
MIMRA Act
Authority
coastal fisheries and
followed 1988
community affairs
independence.
Department models
Country
Name
Mandate
Reports
Licensing
Limits to
Reform
to
mandate
activities
New
Ministry of Fisheries
Stand alone
Minister
Yes
Marine conservation
Zealand
(MoF)
Ministry.
is managed through a
All fisheries
different agency
Cook
Ministry of Marine
Stand alone
Minister
Yes
Conservation through
Current external
Islands
Resources (MMR). 5
Ministry
Department of
assistance for
Divisions: Offshore
All fisheries
Environment
Institutional
Fisheries
Strengthening
Development; Pearl
Industry Support;
Inshore Fisheries and
Aquaculture; Policy
and Legal, and
Corporate Services.
Western
Department of
Stand alone
Minister
Yes, limited entry
Marine conservation
Internal
Australia
Fisheries (DoF). 4
Department
for mature fisheries
is managed through a
restructuring to
outputs: commercial
All fisheries
different agency
meet ESD and
fisheries; recreational
except those
integrated
fisheries; pearling and
under AFMA
fisheries
aquaculture; and fish
management
21
and fish habitat
policies.
protection
Fiji
Department of
Department
Minister
Yes. Licensing
Conservation through
Internal
Fisheries (DoF). 5
within Ministry.
Committee
Department of
restructuring and
Divisions: Resource
Mandate covers
recommends on
Environment
strengthening
Assessment including
all fisheries
licenses
especially of
Research; Technical
oceanic fisheries.
Services; Fisheries
Development;
Aquaculture; and
Oceanic Fisheries
Management Services.
Kiribati
Division of Fisheries
Division within
Minister
Yes through
Conservation through
No recent
(DoF). Fisheries
Ministry.
President and
Dept Environment
activity.
Division deals with
All fisheries
Cabinet.
and Conservation
Institutional
marine resource
Strengthening
development and
assessment
management
planned.
Mooted capacity
development
mainly for
oceanic
management.
Niue
Department of
Department
Minister
Control of vessels in
Environmental
No recent
Agriculture, Forests
within Ministry
Niue waters is
management
activity.
and Fisheries (DAFF). All fisheries
managed under
conducted by
Capacity
Fisheries Division
access agreements. In
Department of the
development
deals with inshore
future, Niue needs to
Environment
mainly for
move towards direct
fishery and the tuna
oceanic
control of fishing
and billfish fishery
management is a
vessels through
appropriate
recognised need.
Regulations and
22
licence conditions.
Palau
Bureau of Marine
Department
Minister
Yes.
Conservation
Palau Maritime
Resources (BMR)
within Ministry
Licenses issued to
oversight by Office of Authority (or
within Ministry of
of Resources
foreign vessels only Environmental
Agency) recently
Resources
Development
in accordance with
Response and
abolished.
Development is
specific fishing
Coordination and the
Identified need
mandated to manage
agreements.
Environmental
for institutional
pelagic resources
Fisheries
Quality Protection
strengthening
within the EEZ.
regulations
Board.
and capacity
Includes Fisheries
enforced by
The Palau Fisheries
building
Development Branch,
Division of Marine
Advisory Committee
Fisheries Management
Law Enforcement
is government driven
Branch, Aquaculture
of Ministry of
and recommends to
and Mariculture
Justice.
Minister and
Branch, and Marine
President on national
Conservation and
fisheries policies and
Protected Areas
implementation.
Program
Inshore resources
management system is
partitioned between
national government
and states.
Samoa
Department of
Department
Minister
Yes
Conservation function Externally
Fisheries (DoF):
within Ministry.
through the
assisted
Fisheries assessment;
All fisheries
Department of
strengthening
and management,
Environment.
and capacity
community fisheries;
development
commercial fisheries
projects in
Department and
23
Ministry
Solomon
Department of
Department
Minister
Director of
Conservation through
Externally
Islands
Fisheries and Marine
within Ministry.
Fisheries approves
Environment
assisted
Resources (DoFMR).
All fisheries.
institutional
Research and resource Fisheries
strengthening
management;
Advisory
project has
Licensing,
Council advises
commenced
surveillance and
Minister
enforcement;
Provincial
Departments and
extension services;
Aquaculture; Statistics
and information
Tonga
Department of
Department
Minister
Yes, Secretary
Conservation through
Externally
Fisheries (DoF).
within Ministry
approves
Department of
assisted
Policy advice and
of Agriculture,
Environment.
institutional
planning, fisheries
Food, Forests
strengthening
management, applied
and Fisheries.
project
research, extension
All fisheries
completed.
services, compliance
Recent
and enforcement
government
initiated merging
of the Ministry
as a Department
into `super-
ministry'
Tuvalu
Fisheries Department
Department
Minister
Yes
The Department of
No recent
is responsible for the
within Ministry
Environment is
activity.
control, management
of Natural
responsible for
Identification of
and development of
Resources and
broader aspects of
strengthening
fisheries.
Lands
environmental
and capacity
24
The National Fishing
management,
development
Corporation
including marine
needs
(NAFICOT) is
pollution
responsible for
commercial fisheries
development
Vanuatu
Department of
Department
Minister
Yes, Director
Conservation through
Restructuring
Fisheries (DoF)
within Ministry.
issues; TFMAC
Environment
and reform as
Resource assessment,
All fisheries
oversights
part of whole of
management and
government
information; Rural
reform program
fisheries development;
Administration and
finance
Tokelau
Department of
Department
Minister
Yes
NZ Ministry of
No recent
(NZ
Economic
within Ministry
(Council
Fisheries
activity.
Territory) Development &
for Economic
of
collaboration
Identification of
Environment &
Development,
Faipule =
strengthening
Planning & Monitoring Natural
Cabinet)
and capacity
has the primary
Resources and
development
responsibility for
Environment
needs
oceanic fisheries
management and the
sustainable
development of fishery
resources
25
4.1 Some Australian Models
Descriptions of the Australian fisheries institutions are mostly taken from DoFWA
(2006).
The key points of Australian fisheries institutional models are:
· A majority of State fisheries agencies are incorporated into other, larger
Government Departments
· Currently one State, Western Australia, has a stand-alone Department.
· The Australian Fisheries Management Authority is the only fisheries statutory
management authority in Australia.
· The Queensland Fisheries Management Authority (QFMA) was disbanded in July
2000 and the functions previously undertaken by QFMA and the fisheries policy
group in Queensland Department of Primary Industries (QDPI) were merged into
the Queensland Fisheries Service, now the Queensland Department of Primary
Industries and Fisheries.
· Two States (Queensland and Tasmania) have created Fisheries Authorities within
the last two decades and subsequently disbanded them.
Additionally, all state jurisdictions have a Director responsible for administering and
managing programs; all agencies are within economic development departments; marine
conservation is managed through different agencies; formal consultative bodies exist in
all jurisdictions to support co-management; single stock management is an objective;
constitutional agreements exist between State and Federal governments; there are limited
entry policies for commercial fishing licenses in mature fisheries; full or part cost
recovery is a feature of commercial fish management; and non-commercial fisheries are
regulated.
Research may be done by some jurisdictions but all outsource research to achieve
required outcomes of
· Evidence based decision making;
· Management plans for each fishery
· Regular communication of scientific data and information in an understandable
form as an essential for good governance
· An adequate level of compliance based on risk assessment (FFA 2007a).
Commonwealth fisheries institutional model
Since 1992, day to day management of fisheries under the jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth has been the responsibility of the Australian Fisheries Management
Authority (AFMA) the only fisheries statutory authority in Australia. Broader fisheries
policy, international negotiations and strategic issues are administered by a smaller group
within the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and ForestryAustralia (DAFF-A).
Research and most compliance activities are outsourced to a variety of agencies. AFMA
principal responsibility relates to commercial fisheries. Commonwealth fisheries
legislation does not extend specifically to recreational fisheries management or to
26
aquaculture. In 2008 AFMA will become the AFM Commission with a reduced number
of Board members (Commissioners). The change will allow AFMC to implement aspects
of government policy that were outside the brief of AFMA (FFA 2007b).
The 2000-2001 AFMA Annual Report summarises the AFMA model as follows:
"AFMA was created as a professional statutory body, at arm's length from government,
that could undertake the government's responsibilities for fisheries management in an
open and accountable manner, and provide sound long-term natural resource
management. This is a significant departure from fisheries management under a
minister/government department framework. The main elements of the AFMA model
include the organisation's day-to-day independence from the Minister, a strong
partnership approach with key stakeholders, specific accountability requirements and
rights-based management arrangements. Together these elements provide effective,
transparent and publicly defendable management of Commonwealth fisheries".
Stakeholder engagement. AFMA cooperates with community, industry, government
agencies, fisheries managers and scientists. Partnerships include Management Advisory
Committees, Resource Assessment Groups, and close working relationships with other
agencies. AFMA purchases research services from external providers.
Western Australia
Fisheries management currently rests with a stand-alone Department of Fisheries. This
arrangement has been in place since 1985. The State fulfils its statutory responsibilities
through the identification, provision and integration of necessary research, management,
compliance and administrative services towards one outcome conservation and
sustainable development of the State's fish resources. This is achieved through four
outputs: commercial fisheries; recreational fisheries; pearling and aquaculture; and fish
and fish habitat protection.
Stakeholder engagement. Stakeholder groups are diverse and include those who do not
fish and their involvement is essential to meet the State's fisheries management
objectives. The indigenous sector is an emerging stakeholder and must be incorporated
into management processes.
Management of the State's fisheries resource is currently based on the premise that
Government is the ultimate custodian of essentially a community based natural resource
and through `co-management' or `participatory decision making' resource users need to
become directly and formally involved in management decision-making processes. The
WA Government has specifically recognised the importance of the Management
Advisory Committees (MACs) as a source of advice to the Minister for Fisheries and an
effective consultative mechanism for fisheries management. The Department currently
supports 30 committees established under fisheries and pearling legislation. A number of
structural changes to MACs may be required as a result of current initiatives in the area
of integrated fisheries management.
27
Queensland
After July 2000, fisheries and aquaculture in Queensland's marine and inland waters was
managed by the Queensland Fisheries Service (QFS), a division of the Queensland
Department of Primary Industries (QDPI), and formed by the merger of the functions of
the previous Queensland Fisheries Management Authority (QFMA) and the QDPI
Fisheries.
Now, fisheries and compliance are managed by the Fisheries Business Group of the
Queensland Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries (QDPI&F) through Fisheries
Resource Management, Policy and Sustainability, Fisheries and Aquaculture
Development, and Resource Protection units and the Queensland Boating and Fisheries
Patrol (responsible for compliance).
Stakeholder engagement. Fisheries research and development is handled by QDPI&F
and involves extensive collaboration with other agencies through cooperative agreements
and partnerships that extend research capabilities. Seven Management Advisory
Committees have been formed. QDPI&F cooperators include the Fishing Industry
Development Council, the Queensland Seafood Industry Association, Australian Seafood
Industry Council, seven aquaculture industry organisations, recreational and sport fishing
groups, and conservation through the Australian Marine Conservation Society and the
Queensland Conservation Council.
4.2 Papua New Guinea
During the late 1990s and early 2000s there was substantial restructuring of PNG
fisheries administration under an ADB loan (ADB 2003). The old Department of
Fisheries and Marine Resources (DFMR) was downsized and reoriented from fisheries
research and extension work, particularly in the provinces, to providing services for
large-scale commercial fisheries. It became a self-funding (through access and license
fees), non-commercial statutory authority, the National Fisheries Authority (NFA)
established and operating under the Fisheries Management Act 1998. The Minister of
Fisheries has responsibility for policy direction. A Board representing stakeholders
(relative government departments, industry representatives and a representative of NGO
and of resource owners) governs the NFA and approves licenses on recommendation
from the Managing Director. A Licensing Committee appraises applications. The
Managing Director is appointed by the National Executive Council and reports to and
receives policy and strategic direction from the Board. The Board reports to Cabinet
(FFA 2007a, b).
NFA provides advisory services and financial support to Provincial Governments that
manage the inshore fisheries, inland fisheries, and aquaculture fisheries. About 40 staff
were employed in work related to Provincial fisheries prior to reform and NFA (1999)
pointed out that "the lessons of NFA's rural development experience are that it cannot
operate cost-effectively at that level" and further "Recent changes to the law and current
moves to improve the administration of provincial and local-level government have now
helpfully clarified what NFA should do in this area. Provincial and local-level
government will be responsible for field activities, including fisheries development and
28
extension work. The role of NFA will be to provide high-level professional support in
identifying issues and opportunities, helping to design projects and programmes and
mobilise financial and technical services." This support is provided by a team that is
based in Port Moresby through Regional managers also based in Port Moresby.
In the PNG situation, where the responsibility for tuna fisheries lies with the national
government, but the concomitant effects in related areas include health, welfare and the
environment fall to provincial authorities, coordination between levels of government is
extremely important. While some responsibilities related to tuna fisheries, for example,
compliance and the inspection of tuna vessels, has been devolved to provinces, capacity
has been a problem. Provincial government fisheries departments have been starved of
resources for some years, and have not been reoriented from extension services to deal
with industry in the same way as NFA staff. General improvements to government
administration at the provincial level and better coordination between provincial
governments and the national government are also necessary (Barclay and Cartwright
2006). Recognising the capacity constraint of provinces, NFA initiated an operational
framework where maritime provinces receive budgetary support from NFA in areas of
service delivery, and maintenance of assets, locally-based fisheries management,
observers and enforcement as an effort to participate in decision-making and policies
development at the provincial level (Manieva 2003).
The research function is to recommence in NFA with the commissioning of a new
aquaculture research facility.
Stakeholder engagement. The Department of Environment and Conservation is
responsible for environmental management. Industry, NGO and resource-owner
representation was secured on the Board of the NFA. Surveillance is coordinated and
funded with Defence. Consultation between NFA, government departments, industry and
NGOs on tuna policy matters is dealt with through the Tuna Consultative Committee and
Tuna Stakeholders Group (FFA 2007b). Since 1991, PNG has had an active Fisheries
Industry Association (FIA), which has participated as a stakeholder in policy forums.
PNG has correspondingly had fewer of the problems other PICs have in terms of
misunderstanding private-sector needs and priorities by the government (Gillett 2003
cited in Barclay and Cartwright 2006). Nevertheless, the relationship between industry
and government is not as healthy as it could be. For example, managers of some fisheries
companies said they felt unable to complain about inadequate government services for
fear of being targeted by people in positions of power (Barclay and Cartwright 2006).
NGOs are mainly involved with inshore fisheries and community based management and
policy. NFA does support NGO projects with technical assistance (FFA 2007b).
4.3 Federated States of Micronesia
The main legislation dealing with fisheries in FSM is Title 24 of the Code of the
Federated States of Micronesia (www.thegef.org). FSM oceanic fisheries administration
has been restructured with the revision of the Marine Resources Act (2004) and renaming
of the Micronesian Fisheries Authority (MFA) as National Ocean Resource Management
Authority (NORMA). FSM's main fisheries bodies are:
29
· NORMA, the primary agency responsible for oceanic fisheries management in the
EEZ, with activities directed by a Board. The five `Board' members comprise a
representative of the national and four state governments (note: there is no provision
for a Board in legislation) and appoint the CEO. There is no Minister and NORMA
reports to the President and Congress. Revenue from fees reverts to Treasury. The
Marine Resources Division has a coordinating role, provides training and foreign
assistance to state entities. NORMA has no commercial activities;
· the National Fisheries Corporation (NFC) was established in 1984 and is responsible
for promoting the development of pelagic fisheries and industries;
· the Sustainable Development Unit of the National Government Department of
Economic Affairs which provides national and state governments with technical
services and support for development and management of marine resources. The
Section also administers the National Aquaculture Centre;
· the Maritime Surveillance Wing of the Department of Justice, which is responsible
for surveillance and enforcement (FFA 2007b; www.fao.org Apr 2007).
FSM has focused mainly on fisheries access fees as the means of securing benefits from
the EEZ.
Various government and semi-government departments at the state level are involved in
marine resource use and management of territorial sea and inland waters:
Pohnpei State: Office of Marine Resources Conservation and Management; Economic
Development Authority; Department of Resource Management and Development;
Economic Planning Commission; Conservation Society of Pohnpei (NGO);
Kosrae State: Marine Resources Division; Fisheries Development Division; Fisheries
Management Division; Kosrae Island Resource Management Program;
Chuuk State: Department of Marine Resources; Environmental Protection Authority;
Yap State: Marine Resources Development Division; Yap Fishing Authority; Yap
Institute of Natural Science.
The four states have management strategies that range from centrally-administered open-
access regimes to traditionally controlled reef tenure systems. Coastal resource
management issues are dealt with differently by the states. Each state has agencies that
do some coastal fisheries research.
Stakeholder engagement. The national government provides management assistance to
the states on request, but there is little contact other than through the coordinating Marine
Resources Division. Major stakeholders in FSM tuna fisheries comprise domestic parties
and foreign fleet operators. Preparation of the FSM tuna management plan involved
stakeholders through a national Steering Committee. The University of Micronesia
conducts research in coastal fisheries (www.fao.org).
4.4 Marshall Islands
Fisheries in Marshall Islands are governed by the Marshall Islands Marine Resources
Authority (MIMRA), which was established in 1988 under the MIMRA Act (1986,
revised 1997). The powers and functions of the Authority are vested in and exercised by
a Board of Directors, chaired by the Minister. The Board approves licenses. The
Authority manages fisheries resources to ensure their conservation and long term
30
sustainability (FAO 2007). It has the responsibility to collect license fees and disburse
surplus to government but the government allocates fisheries revenues according to
priorities. As an Authority it follows the Public Service Act and government financial
regulations and independent audit requirements but can hire and fire staff. There are two
operational sections in MIMRA: oceanic fisheries and industrial affairs, and coastal
fisheries and community affairs. There was an extensive review of Marshall Islands
fisheries policy and institutions under an ADB loan in the mid to late 1990s. As part of
this, a national fisheries policy was drafted and adopted by the Cabinet in 1997, and was
followed closely by MIMRA. The development of Majuro as a service centre for
transshipment fleets was one of the more significant outcomes from this reform effort.
Due to the government policy to focus on gaining wealth from distant water fishing via
transshipment supply and servicing and processing rather than a domestic fishing
industry, no industrial-scale domestic fishing industry has existed in the Marshall Islands
since the 1990s (FFA 2007b; Barclay and Cartwright 2006). A recent review (FFA 2004)
recommended strengthening of oceanic fisheries management.
MIMRA's Tuna Management Plan promotes development of a domestic industry and
external investment. The Coastal Fisheries Management Plan promotes community
based resource management and identification of marine protected areas. Other plans
cover turtle mitigation, shark management, and national observers.
Stakeholder engagement. The MIMRA interacts with the Attorney-General's Office,
Police Sea Patrol, Foreign Affairs and Environmental Protection Agency. It supports a
training centre for the local industry. There is no commercial fisheries industry association
in Marshall Islands. Larger companies such as PM&O Processing and the Marshall Islands
Fishing Venture were members of the Chamber of Commerce, and there was an association
for tourism-related charter boats (Gillett 2003 cited in Barclay and Cartwright 2006).
Coastal fishers are serviced by MIMRA through a Coastal Management Advisory Council
comprising government, NGOs and the College of the Marshall Islands. MIMRA trains
extension officers for local governments.
4.5 Nauru
In 1997 the Nauru Fisheries and Marine Resources Authority Act established an
Authority (NFMRA) as an entity with the powers and functions to regulate and develop
activities relating to Nauru's fisheries and marine resources. Formerly the Department of
Fisheries and Marine Resources, the government of the day established an Authority to
better manage and conserve resources and to negotiate their sustainable exploitation. The
Authority is responsible for the management of offshore fisheries, coastal fisheries and
aquaculture; as well as owning the Nauru Fisheries Corporation (NFC) which acts as the
commercial arm of the Authority. The Authority has four operational departments:
oceanic; coastal; finance/administration; and operations and infrastructure. NFMRA is
governed by a Board of Directors whose duties are set out in the Act. Directors carry out
the functions, manage the affairs and exercise the powers of the Authority. From 2006,
Treasury determines the Authority budget allocation and application of funds, where
previously NFMRA received license fees, developed its budget and paid surplus to the
Government of Nauru (FFA 2007c).
31
Stakeholder engagement. The Nauru Tuna Fishermen's Association was re-established
in 2005 to assist with food security. NFMRA helped develop the Association's
Constitution but Association input into decision making is not developed. Finalisation of
the Tuna Management Plan will require the participation of the Association as a
stakeholder (FFA 2007c). The Nauru Island Association of Non-Government
Organisations membership includes the Tuna Fishermen's Association and the Buada
Aquaculture Association. There is no active relationship between NFMRA and the NGO.
The Coastal Fisheries Department of NFMRA is consulting with Department of
Environment and communities and developing draft community fisheries legislation with
external expertise as the basis for community based resource management planning. The
Department of Commerce, Industry and Resources manages the food security program
and NFMRA conducts research and extension for community aquaculture. NFMRA
interacts with the Department of Women's Affairs programs through the Coastal
Fisheries' community programs (FFA 2007c).
Apprehension and prosecution of non-complying fishing vessels is the responsibility of
the NFMRA with cooperation of Police and Justice, but to date Police have not been
involved with boardings; nor is there a collaborative mechanism with search and rescue.
NFMRA provides fisheries awareness raising and training to Department of Education
schools and supports the Ministry of Youth Affairs' Work Skills Development Program
for Youth.
4.6 Cook Islands
The Ministry of Marine Resources (MMR) was established in 1984 under the Ministry of
Marine Resources Act (1984) and is the government department responsible for most
aspects of fisheries management. In 2005, a new marine Resources Act was
promulgated, repealing the previous Marine Resources Act 1989. The MMR's duties
include: data collection; monitoring control and surveillance; observer programs;
infrastructure development; extension services and training programs; disseminating
information; and liaising with industry and other stakeholders including investment
agencies and government departments (Chapman 2001 cited in Barclay and Cartwright
2006; FFA. 2007). MMR is structured into 5 Divisions: Offshore Fisheries
Development; Pearl Industry Support; Inshore Fisheries and Aquaculture; Policy and
Legal, and Corporate Services. The MMR together with the Maritime Division of the
Police Department conducts maritime surface surveillance. Aerial surveillance is
conducted by the RNZAF and France.
Stakeholder engagement. MMR has played an important role in liaison and information
dissemination between industry, government agencies and the general public.
Government consultation across agencies seems to work better in Cook Islands than in
some other PICs. MMR works with the Cook Islands Environment Service and other
related departments such as Transport. A cross agency task force was created to manage
the International Waters project in the Cook Islands (Barclay and Cartwright 2006; FFA
2007).
32
The Cook Islands Tuna Industry Association was formed in 2005. There are
organisations representing small scale fishers and sports fishing interests. The on-going
Cook Islands Marine Resources Institutional Strengthening Project is assisting MMR to
further improve relationships with other organisations (eg, the Ministry of Health, the
Police Department, the Cook Islands Environmental Service, the Cook Islands Ministry
of Transport and Cook Islands Maritime Limited Shipping registry). Close working
relationships will be fostered with NGOs involved in land and water management under
the ISP (NZAID 2004).
4.7 Fiji
From being a Division of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests (MAFF) over
the last forty years, Fisheries became a Department in October 2001 in the new Ministry
of Fisheries and Forests (www.fisheries.gov.fj). The ministry title has reverted to MAFF.
The Fisheries Department is responsible for aspects of fisheries management. The
existing structure was based on the initial role of the Fisheries Division, which was
specifically conservation and management of marine resources, as outlined in the
Fisheries Act 1942 (with revisions) and Marine Spaces Act Cap 158A, 1978. Additional
responsibilities over the years such as applied research; aquaculture and development
were funded by donor agencies at the initial stages. When donor support was withdrawn,
most of these activities were picked up by the Department and added on to the existing
staff tasks under three Divisions. The structure changed in 2005 to 5 Divisions: Resource
Assessment including research; Technical Services; Fisheries Development; Aquaculture;
and Oceanic Fisheries Management Services. Management Services include the Tuna
Management Unit which deals with national, regional and international matters, has
licensing and enforcement responsibilities, with accountability overseen by a Licensing
Committee that recommends on all license applications for oceanic fisheries. Since the
internal reform, there is a transparent licensing procedure and the fleet has been
rationalised to levels considered to meet sustainability requirements (FFA 2007b).
MAFF interacts with the Office of the Solicitor General, Navy, Police, Foreign Affairs
and External Trade, and Environment.
Stakeholder engagement. According to Barclay and Cartwright (2006) the level of
industry participation in governance was higher than for other PICs covered by their
study. Fiji's fishery managers were aware of the importance of consultation with
industry and had developed the Tuna Management and Development Plan (with FFA and
SPC input) with a schedule of consultations with tuna company managers. Women's
groups were some of the stakeholders consulted in generating the Plan. Not all players
consider they own the plan. Industry-government consultation has been very active in the
last few years with a Tuna Association and local associations. Since 2002 industry
players have been consulted through meetings more than once a year in order to set up
management measures from available options under the legislative framework for the
following licensing period. However, one comment (FFA 2007b) considers the ability of
lower-level-government fisheries institutions to participate is not developed because they
are excluded from institutional planning. Wider institutional strengthening benefits are
required to engage these institutions that interact with communities.
33
4.8 Tonga
In 2006 the Ministry of Fisheries was subsumed as the Department of Fisheries (DoF)
into the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Forestry and Fisheries as part of the
Government reform programme. Restructuring of the new Department of Fisheries is on-
going, but it will continue to be mandated by the Fisheries Management Act 2002 and
Aquaculture Management Act 2003. The Department will continue to provide policy
advice and planning, fisheries management, applied research, extension services,
compliance and enforcement; less certain are services such as boat repair, market
management and ice making (FFA 2007a, b).
Stakeholder engagement. Defence and Police collaborate with Fisheries in compliance
and enforcement activities. The Fisheries Management Act (FMA) has strong provisions
for the involvement of stakeholders with a particular interest in the fishery being
managed. The Fisheries Management Advisory Committee (FMAC) has a broader
stakeholder representation but its advisory role is rather poorly defined. The FMA makes
it mandatory for the Minister to refer any consideration of the designation of a Coastal
Community to the FMAC, likewise any allocation of fishing rights need to be first
considered by the FMAC. Interestingly there is no requirement for Fisheries
Management Plans or licensing to be considered by the FMAC. Given the name of the
FMAC this would appear to be an oversight. Unlike the FMA the Aquaculture
Management Act (AMA) requires the Aquaculture Management Plan to be considered by
the Aquaculture Advisory Committee (AAC) and to make recommendations to the
Minister. The AMA prescribes that two Farmer Association members be appointed to the
AAC whereas the FMAC composition specifies the sectorally narrower representation by
the Tongan Export Fishing Association (TEFA). TEFA represents the interests of tuna
longline fishers, deep bottom fishers and aquarium exporters. The Secretary of Fisheries
chairs the national Tuna Management Committee that includes representatives of TEFA,
the snapper fishery, Game Fishing Association and a range of government departments
and NGO representatives. Fisheries Management Committees have been formed for
Tuna and Seaweed Fisheries to monitor the effectiveness of the management plans.
Small scale and artisanal fishers are poorly organised, though the DoF has assisted the
establishment of fishers groups in the islands, and coastal communities are beginning to
organise Special Management Areas with DoF help.
The Tonga Commercial Fisheries Conference (DoF 2007) was successful in bringing
DoF and stakeholders together and allowing an accounting of DoF performance (FFA
2007a, b).
4.9 Samoa
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Meteorology was recently
restructured to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. The Fisheries Division (under
MAFFM) is mandated under the Fisheries Act 1988 to conserve, manage and develop
Samoa's fisheries and drives policy in consultation with stakeholders. Some elements of
fisheries administration are funded through cost recovery. The Division has partitioned
fisheries into two main management systems: village based and commercial. Other
34
involved agencies are Maritime Police, Foreign Affairs, Office of Attorney General, and
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment.
Stakeholder engagement. Stakeholder representation is through the Commercial
Fisheries Management Advisory Council that includes the Samoa Fish Exporters
Association, other private sector, environment groups and relevant government
departments. Associations for artisanal fishers are less active. There are plans for an
association to represent Alia (type of long line vessel) fishers. At the community level,
many villages have Fisheries Management Committees.
4.10 Vanuatu
The Department of Fisheries was reformed by the Fisheries Act 55 2004 that required
greater stakeholder participation and sustainable resource development. The Department
is under the Ministry of Agriculture, Quarantine, Forestry and Fisheries and has four
Divisions: Aquaculture and Research; Policy and Finance; Capture and Development;
and Compliance. Enforcement is done by the Police Maritime Unit; prosecution by the
Department. The government's Comprehensive Reform Program considered an
Authority model but the Department model was retained since this would allow rural
fishers to be serviced without meeting onerous charges for cost recovery. The reform
process cut staff numbers by 50% and introduced full cost recovery for the commercial
sector. Non-core functions were divested and extension services moved to a fisheries
development program. The Director, rather than the Minister, is empowered under the
Act to issue licenses with oversight by a Tuna Management Plan Advisory Committee
(TMPAC) that includes government legal and enforcement representatives and private
sector for accountability (FFA 2007b).
Stakeholder engagement. Besides the TMPAC, there are fishers associations at
provincial and island level. These engage with the Department through programs
developed at community and provincial level. The Maritime Training College vessel is
used by development officers to advise on program implementation.
5.
EXAMINATION OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY
COMPARED TO DEPARTMENTAL MODEL
In the Pacific region the outcome is important, not the way it is delivered. Either the
authority or departmental model may be appropriate (FFA 2007a).
Much has been written and said about the statutory model versus the Departmental model
in relation to fisheries resource management. This section provides an overview of the
experiences in a number of mostly Australian jurisdictions and to glean the advantages
and disadvantages of each approach. The discussion draws mainly upon the review by
the West Australian Department of Fisheries (DoFWA 2003).
5.1 Design principles in model selection
New Zealand's State Service Commission employed the following design principles
when undertaking machinery of government reviews (cited in DoFWA 2003):
35
Effectiveness and efficiency organisational design choices should be made to best
achieve government's desired outcomes (that is, effectiveness) and the lowest cost
production of outputs (that is, efficiency). In this regard:
· commercial activities should be assigned to organisations with commercial
objectives;
· non-commercial activities should be assigned to a commercial organisation only if the
net cost of these activities is explicitly funded by the Crown;
· there is a presumption in favour of making contestable the activities of commercial
organisations and non-commercial service delivery activities that do involve the
exercise of significant statutory powers;
· functions which conflict for constitutional or commercial reasons should be assigned
to separate organization. In other cases, the costs and benefits of functional
separation should be considered, and a decision to co-locate or separate the functions
made on the specifics of each case; and
· where an agency is to be asked to undertake potentially conflicting functions, there is
a presumption in favour of the departmental form.
Risk management organisational design choices should be made to best manage the
risks posed for government by the activities to be undertaken by a public sector
organisation:
· if an activity represents a high level of strategic risk, then the departmental form may
be preferred;
· if an activity poses significant risks associated with poor contestability, there is a
presumption in favour of the departmental form;
· if the choice between a departmental form and a non-departmental form is not clear
cut, there is a presumption in favour of the departmental form.
Constitutional conventions organisational design choices should be made to best
protect established constitutional arrangement and conventions:
· where constitutional considerations indicate a need for close Ministerial oversight, or
for direct Ministerial responsibility, there is a presumption in favour of the
departmental form; and
· if an activity must be, and must be seen to be, undertaken free of political
interference, and there are no compelling reasons for close Ministerial oversight, the
non-departmental form may be preferred.
Western Australia review of Departmental versus non-departmental institutional forms
In June 2001, the Machinery of Government Taskforce reported on a review of Western
Australia's machinery of government. The Taskforce addressed in some detail the
structure of the public sector in Western Australia and departmental versus non-
departmental institutional forms. General findings showed:
36
The case for non-departmental models
The case for departmental models
Non-departmental institutions (eg.
Departmental status tends to be the
statutory authorities) tend to be favoured
preferred option when a high level of
when:
Ministerial responsibility is deemed
· there is less need (or political pressure) appropriate.
for frequent ministerial involvement
The departmental form is better suited to
because activities must be, and must be
organisations undertaking activities that:
seen to be, undertaken independently of · are not readily contestable due to
Ministers. This may be because the
problems either in specifying the nature
government itself may be bound by
of the outputs required or in assessing
decisions or because it is important to
performance on the delivery of the
signal publicly that an activity is
outputs, or where it is likely that the
carried out free from political
outputs required will need to be re-
interference;
specified frequently;
· the government has a more limited
· are "material" because they are of high
purchase interest (because the activities
strategic relevance to government or
undertaken are not sufficiently risky);
society, and the risks associated with
or
them would be managed more
· there are fewer problems in specifying
effectively if the provider were subject
and measuring organisation outputs.
to direct and close Ministerial
oversight; or
· involve the use of significant coercive
power (for example, policing or tax
collection), so the principle of political
accountability requires Ministers to
have direct oversight and responsibility.
The Taskforce therefore recommended that a statutory authority should be established
only if its proposed functions could not be performed by a department or it would be
inappropriate for them to be performed by a department.
5.2 Country reviews of fisheries statutory and departmental
models
Australia
There has been much institutional reform and institutional strengthening in Australia in
the last 15 years. The basis for much of the reform was ecologically sustainable
development the using, conserving and enhancing of the community's resources to
maintain ecological processes and resources. The desired outcomes were:
· Enhancement of individual and community wellbeing and welfare; and
· Intergenerational equity (FFA 2007a).
Commonwealth fisheries
Commonwealth fisheries were managed by the Australian Fisheries Service (AFS), a
Division of the Department of Primary Industry and Energy (DPIE). Following a review
37
of the advantages and disadvantages of alternative models for fisheries administration, in
1989 the C
ommonwealth released a comprehensive Commonwealth fisheries policy
statement which, among other things, addressed in some detail the most appropriate
structure for Commonwealth fisheries administration, and established the Australian
Fisheries Management Authority a statutory authority responsible for day-to-day
Commonwealth fisheries management. The discussions and ultimate decisions were
taken within the context of
(1) Commonwealth fisheries management having historically being placed within a
(broader) Department of Primary Industry and Energy and
(2) Commonwealth fisheries management being limited largely to commercial fisheries
without specific broader responsibilities in relation to recreational fishing, aquaculture
and fish habitat protection.
The review reported highlighted a number of difficulties of the AFS being placed within
DPIE. Those of particular relevance include:
The case for an Authority model
The case for a Department model
Conflicts of purpose
· The responsibilities of the Department
· In a national context, a Department
in servicing the Government of the day
would undertake broader fisheries
had detracted from the primary function
policy, international negotiations and
of natural resource management.
strategic issues.
· Two organisational units were required
to achieve the two separate goals one
being a traditional public service arm of
the Department and one being either a
Bureau or Statutory Authority (but not a
Division of the Department) to achieve
the one clear goal of fisheries
management.
Priorities, Practices and Procedures
· The priorities, practices and procedures
of the Department often did not
coincide with those of AFS and may
have adversely affected AFS.
· A statutory authority would have
responsibility and accountability to
achieve a clear and unitary goal
Accountability
· It was considered that the then
Government policies on statutory
authorities would result in enhanced
accountability.
Culture
· A stand-alone authority would achieve a
culture of commitment to excellence
38
with a single focus on fisheries
management.
· This culture would be the drive to
"internalise" the benefits and costs of
management within the organisation
and result in a more commercially
oriented focus.
The review concluded that `a statutory authority would have advantages arising from its
public accountability requirements, the clear identification of Ministerial and authority
responsibilities in the enabling legislation, more opportunity for industry involvement in
decision making, and increased pressures for cost efficiency.' Some risks were also
highlighted in relation to `duplication and additional levels of bureaucracy resulting from
the split of functions between a statutory authority and DPIE....' (DoFWA 2003).
Tasmania
Marine fisheries
In 1977 the responsibility for marine fisheries management in Tasmania was transferred
from the then Department of Agriculture's Sea Fisheries Division to a new body the
Tasmanian Fisheries Development Authority.
A review in 1984 recommended on the desirability or otherwise of effecting changes to
the administrative structures and procedures, including consideration of reconstituting the
present Authority as a Department. The review report also gave consideration to aspects
of the Rep ort of the Review of Tasmanian Government Administration ("the Cartland
Review") which dealt with general problems and principles relating to organisation and
structure, administration and performance, and relationships involving responsibility and
accountability
The case for an Authority model (1977)
The case for a Department model (1984)
· Better develop the potential of the sea
Problems with the Authority include:
fishing industry given the over
· the ambiguous nature of its original
dependence of the industry at that time
structure,
on established fisheries;
· a lack of clear corporate planning and
· A statutory agency with overall
policy formulation
responsibility for the development of
· inadequate internal organisation and
Tasmania's commercial sea fisheries
communication.
would be the most appropriate
A Department is most appropriate for
organisation to undertake this work
implementing policy and sea fisheries
considering the specialised nature of
management.
the fishing industry.
The review concluded that a separate Government Department would be the most
appropriate structure for implementing future government policy for the fishing industry
and that this should replace the Fisheries Development Authority. The responsibility for
39
marine fisheries in Tasmania subsequently reverted to a new Department of Sea Fisheries
in 1985. A Departmental structure has been retained for sea fisheries management; now
the responsibility of the Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment
Inland Fisheries
A review in 1996 of the Inland Fisheries Commission highlighted a number of issues:
including the Commission's inadequate funding base and lack of integration or formal
relationships with other natural resource management and environmental agencies.
The case for an Authority model
The case for a Department model
The Commission had an inadequate funding
base, a Department would be funded from
consolidated revenue. The lack of financial
resources resulted in senior management
having to be continually focused on financial
viability;
The Commission lacked integration or
formal relationships with other natural
resource management and environmental
agencies, resulting in
· a growing complexity in, and overlap of
agency responsibility for, natural
resource management;
· being left out, bypassed or overridden by
larger management agencies;
· little sharing of information with other
Government agencies; and
· limited ability to access specialist
resources such as information
technology, communications and legal
advice (DoFWA 2003).
Since early 2000, inland fisheries has been the responsibility of the Inland Fisheries
Service, a stand alone part of the Department of Primary Industries, Water and
Environment, that is, the Service is not part of the Department but reports to the same
Minister.
Western Australia
Fisheries management in Western Australia has always rested within a Department,
although there have been a number of structural changes over the years. Since 1985,
fisheries management is done by a stand-alone Department of Fisheries.
In 1994, a review of the fisheries portfolio considered options for the structure of the
Department including replacement of the Department by a statutory authority directed by
40
a representative board. Particular cognisance was taken of the issues of public
accountability as espoused by the Commission on Accountability.
The case for an Authority model
The case for a Department model
· Increased discretion and flexibility for
· Retention of Departmental
the agency
independence from sectional interests
· Stronger partnerships with industry.
· Retention of a direct reporting
· Clarity of purpose and a more business-
relationship between the chief
like approach.
executive and the Minister
· Greater accountability.
· Ministerial accountability is maintained
· A more accountable, focused and
· The need for Ministerial control and
skilful management of fisheries under
access to information was stressed by
the guidance of an expertise based
the Commission on Accountability.
Board.
· The strictest level of accountability
· A stronger and better defined policy
would stem from an entity which has a
framework for fisheries management
departmental structure reporting to the
(which includes conservation values
Minister.
and equitable access to resources)
· The broader public interests and a
through the separation of Government
whole of Government perspective
policy setting from policy
could be brought to all the functions
implementation.
included within the role of a
· Greater industry involvement in
Government agency
fisheries at both the management and
· Problems associated with the potential
operational levels and greater
transfer of control of fisheries
incentives for industry to participate as
management from the Minister to a
partners in achieving effective and
Board of Directors and the potential
efficient fisheries management.
imbalance in power between the
· The establishment of a management
broader public interest on the one hand
culture and operational environment
and sectoral interests on the other.
which is responsive to the expectations
· The Fielding Review of the Public
of industry as a major funder of
Sector Management Act in 1996 stated
services.
that statutory authorities "should only
· Smoother transition to full cost
be created or retained where there is a
recovery and more cost-effective
clear requirement for independence
management on behalf of Government
from government with specified powers
to be exercised independently". The
view was that departments are to be
preferred because they give more
flexibility and greater scope for
government direction.
· The specific issue in Western
Australian fisheries of having to
maintain a balance of operations and
activities across a diverse stakeholder
group (as opposed to the Australian
Fisheries Management Authority where
41
the focus is substantially on the
management of large commercial
fisheries).
· The need for final accountability to rest
with the Minister rather than a transfer
of responsibility to a board or public
official.
The WA Fishing Industry Council's submission noted risks of a move to a statutory
authority if the authority was not given a comprehensive mandate to manage fisheries in
the State. The need for the authority to have sufficient scope and responsibility for all
major management functions, the appointment of an expertise-based Board, a skilful
executive and appropriate supporting legislation was highlighted. Given the potential
benefits and risks, a thorough review of the benefits, risks and costs of establishing a
statutory authority was required prior to any decision being made to change the current
arrangements.
Ultimately, the Departmental model was retained, although the Department was
restructured on a program basis coupled with a stronger focus on regionalisation.
Queensland
In May 1999, the Queensland Minister for Primary Industries noted that there was
ongoing confusion over who does what when it comes to the responsibilities of the
QFMA and the Fisheries Section of QDPI. In May 2000, the Primary Industries Minister
announced new arrangements for fisheries management in Queensland, including:
· disbanding the QFMA and QDPI Fisheries from 1 July 2000.
· amalgamating the staff and functions of the QFMA and QDPI Fisheries.
· forming a new, single body for fisheries management in Queensland the
Queensland Fisheries Service.
· appointing a non-statutory "expertise"-based board to advise the Minister and
Department on fisheries management.
· creating a direct link between the three areas of management, research and
enforcement.
The then head of QDPI Fisheries and QFMA board member, commented:
"Fisheries now has a clear mandate to create a new unified organisation that integrates all
of our functions that make up good fisheries management and development."
Victoria
A recent Victorian inquiry into fisheries management reviewed current and past statutory
fisheries authorities in Australasia. The committee received a number of submissions
providing opinions about the statutory authority model for Victorian Fisheries.
The case for an Authority model
The case against an Authority model
· improvement in relationships between
· the need to get an expertise based board
42
Government, commercial and
driven without domination by sectoral
recreational fishers and environmental
interests;
organizations;
· loss of flexibility by Government in
· may lessen lobbying by interest groups
allocation of resources as well as a loss
of the Minister;
of control of decision making;
· transparency of processes and
· possible requirement for a significant
procedures and accountability to the
capital contribution by Government
community;
towards the authority;
· improved industry focus on
· possible tax implications for the State;
development and sustainability issues;
· possible increased cost to industry if the
· stakeholders encouraged to become
structure is not well designed and
more involved in fisheries
mandate clear;
management;
· Government may lose contact with its
· increased accountability to the various
constituency;
stakeholders, the community and the
· accountability and transparency may be
Parliament; and
reduced;
· improved ability to achieve legislative
· staffing and industrial impacts;
reform.
· potential for client capture;
· difficulties in dealing with cross-
sectoral conflict and balancing
competing interests;
· inability to reconcile competing
demands of various client groups;
· little incentive to consider the broader
`public interest'; and
· possible research and development
issues with respect to priority setting.
Ultimately, the Victorian inquiry found, among other things, that:
1. Statutory fisheries management authorities appear to have been most successful where
their responsibility is for single-sector fisheries and where there is a clear client group
that can be targeted for cost recovery.
2. Statutory fisheries management authorities appear to have been least successful where
required to manage State waters subject to multi-sector fisheries and of high value for
non-fishing uses.
3. That a single statutory authority not be established to manage Victoria's fisheries.
South Australia
The authority model was reportedly discarded by South Australia on findings that
included:
· the government lost control of community assets to the commercial sector; and
· authorities were only concerned with extraction and did not apply the eco-system
approach (FFA 2007a).
43
Key Points from the Australian experiences
The Commonwealth experience points to management of Commonwealth fisheries being
more efficient and effective if delivered by a statutory authority rather than a division
of a larger Government Department. The Department formulates policy.
Tasmania has in the past managed both its inland fisheries and sea fisheries through
statutory authorities, but has now reverted to Departmental models for both.
Past Governments in Western Australia have not supported a statutory model principally
given accountability issues.
Queensland has recently reverted from a statutory to a Departmental model given issues
around lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities, accountability and
communication.
A recent Victorian inquiry concluded that statutory authorities appear to have been most
successful where their responsibility is for single-sector fisheries and where there is a
clear client group that can be targeted for cost recovery and least successful where
required to manage State waters subject to multi-sector fisheries and of high value
for non-fishing uses (DoFWA 2003).
Papua New Guinea
The Authority model (NFA) was adopted in PNG fisheries as a reformed alternative to an
ineffective Department of Fisheries and Marine Resources and to:
· create a more conducive investment climate for the private sector,
· provide financial accountability and autonomy,
· maximise benefits from access, and
· focus on impact areas (ADB 2004).
NFA at establishment was self-funding and self-governing. Before institutional reform
and restructuring of the NFA by an Institutional Reform Project funded under an ADB
loan in 1998, several technical assistance (TA) capacity-building projects had been
implemented, eg, higher fees were secured from the DWFNs, and the concept of fisheries
plans had been established. None contributed greatly to improvement of the performance
or project implementation capacity of NFA, or of DFMR, its predecessor organization
(ADB 2004). At IR project commencement NFA was an overstaffed, inefficient
bureaucracy with poor management, low morale, and a reputation for corruption and
nepotism. Revenue from licenses was being lost. NFA offices were on four floors of a
decrepit building with poor communication among staff (ADB 2004; FFA 2007a).
ADB's Country Operations and the Government's Medium-Term Development
Strategies emphasised a commitment to downsizing and improving the efficiency of
government agencies, economic growth, and promoting greater domestic benefits from
exploitation of natural resources, and decentralising commercial activities for the
provinces (ADB 2004).
By project completion, NFA had been transformed into a small, focused agency that
could concentrate on and perform its core functions with great efficiency and
professionalism. NFA occupied new, productive office facilities. Communication
among staff was better. A computer local area network facilitated effective information
sharing. In financial performance, NFA's annual operating account changed from a net
44
loss of K2.5 million in 1999 to a surplus of K35 million in 2002. The PNG fishing
industry has positively supported the changes (ADB 2004; FFA 2007a).
The institutional reform process introduced a number of new concepts, practices, and
systems into NFA, many of which differed radically from PNG public service practices at
the time. With the loss of the champion of reform through the political process, some
innovations that characterized the reformed NFA slowed but never reverted to levels at
the start of reform. So far the systems have been resilient.
Key points
An Authority model was considered most suitable for reform of the predecessor
department that was ineffective and unreliable. Because of poor governance, reform did
not eventuate despite adopting the Authority model until the Government championed
and demanded improvement in governance and the enabling environment.
The Authority model was retained in the reform process because of its flexibility and
selective independence from public service regulations and control that allowed
substantial right sizing and restructure so as to better focus on management of fisheries
and facilitate private sector development by greater accountability and transparency.
6.
ISSUES FOR GOVERNMENT IN CREATION OF A
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The following text is taken from DoFWA (2003) in advising the Western Australian
government on various models for management of state fisheries. The issues apply to
any government considering reform of fisheries.
a) Role and Function of a Statutory Authority
If a fisheries statutory authority is to be established, careful consideration must be given
to its role and function and relationships with, for example, the Minister and broader
Government policy functions.
Under a fisheries statutory authority model, the authority's level of delegated power over
the management and regulation of the State's fisheries could be at any point along a
continuum between the pure departmental form and the statutory authority form. For
example, the Minister could have various levels of control over matters such as:
· size and composition of the Board including appointments.
· size and detail of the annual budget.
· level of reporting and accountability requirements.
· approval of fisheries management plans.
These powers would be defined in legislation.
The degree of Ministerial direction to the Board would also have to be determined as well
as its transparency. Under the AFMA model, for example, all such directions are
published in its Annual Report.
45
Decisions would also have to be made about how areas of disagreement between the
Board and the Minister are dealt with. This is of particular importance should the Board
have a degree of independent regulation making power.
It has also been common practice in the establishment of fisheries statutory authorities in
Australia (eg., AFMA and QFMA) to separate the day-to-day operational role from the
broader policy role, although experience in these same jurisdictions point to the lines
often being blurred. This relationship would need to be considered as part of the
determination of role and function of any fisheries statutory authority.
b) Structure of a Statutory Authority
Section 3 has considered various Authority structures.
The main structural differences between Departments and statutory authorities are:
· Departments essentially exist to support a Minister in pursuing Government
objectives and delivering services. They are typically responsible for a range of
activities, including policy development, coordination, implementation and
regulation. Any commercial activities are normally incidental to the Department's
primary function.
· There is a direct reporting relationship between the head of the Department and the
responsible Minister. Departments are generally responsible to only one Minister, but
may provide support or advice to other Ministers.
· Departments usually have minimal financial autonomy and a re normally dependent
on the Consolidated Fund for their operation and viability. This enables the
Government to closely control the priorities of and resources allocated to
organisations.
· Often, departments of State are normally characterised by a need or desire for their
staff to be employed principally under a public sector management act.
Statutory authorities are established by statute and have the following general features:
· Usually constituted as a body corporate.
· Have a responsible Minister (note FSM is an exception).
· Usually have a board of management.
· Have functions and powers defined by its statute.
The fundamental difference is a Department is usually created under a public sector
management act, while the Statutory Authority has a specific piece of legislation setting
out its functions and powers (DoFWA 2003).
If a statutory authority is to be created and if it is to have a Board, careful consideration
must be given to the structure of the Board. Options include a representative and/or
expertise based structure. The Auditor General (1998 cited in DofWA 2003) found that
governing Boards or committees with members appointed as representatives of external
stakeholders are exposed to potential conflicts of interest. Accordingly, the preferred
model is for Board membership to be expert based.
46
AFMA has an expert based Board, established under the Commonwealth Fisheries
Administration Act 1991. The Board consists of eight members including a Chairperson,
Government Director, Managing Director and five nominated directors. Importantly, no
more than two directors can be currently engaged in fishing or fish processing. Directors,
other than the Managing Director, are appointed by the Minister. The five nominated
directors are recommended by a selection committee established under the Act on the
basis of expertise in areas such as natural resource management, the fishing industry,
finance, conservation and research. The Board is assisted by a Finance and Audit
Committee, a Research Committee and an Environment Committee. Despite an expertise
base, there is a need to ensure that mechanisms are in place to ensure that particular
interest groups do not dominate the authority.
Boards of fisheries authorities in the Pacific are generally representative based (FFA
2007a, b).
c) Enabling legislation and powers
Any change in the institutional arrangements governing fisheries management generally
requires legislation. A number of existing and past legislative models in the Pacific could
be used to assist in the framing of appropriate legislation for a statutory authority. Unless
given high priority, Pacific experience is that Parliamentary and implementation
processes for any new primary legislation (for fisheries or other sectors) are likely to take
years (eg, ADB 2003).
d) Accountability
Under a statutory model, the authority would have considerable delegated powers over
the management and regulation of national fisheries. Therefore appropriate
accountability processes should exist to facilitate public scrutiny of decision-making.
The Pacific statutory authorities provide examples of accountability processes.
Accountability measures include:
· Accountability to the Minister (and Parliament). For example, reporting to the
Minister, oversight of authority strategies by the Minister, or scrutiny by public
audits office;
· Accountability to the Public (and fishing industry sectors) by annual reports and
public meetings.
e) Funding arrangements
For many Pacific countries, there are gaps in funding for inshore or inland fisheries since
users have little capacity to pay for services or access licenses. Often this is a criterion
for retention of the Departmental model (eg, Vanuatu), though PNG NFA for example,
applies revenue from oceanic fisheries rents to support services to coastal and inland
fishers (FFA 2007b). There are also funding issues around development of the
aquaculture sector and fish and fish habitat protection including the creation and
management of fish habitat protection areas and marine reserves.
These funding issues will exist under either a Departmental or statutory model. The
establishment of an authority will also generate funding requirements in relation to the
47
establishment of the Board and associated support structures and processes. The funding
principles and options under an authority model need careful consideration, particularly
in light of the growing fisheries management pressures and a tightening of Government
financial support in most Pacific countries.
Key Point
Specific issues for Government in the creation of a Statutory Management Authority
include:
- determining the role, function and structure of the authority;
- determining the role of, and relationship with, the Minister;
- legislative arrangements;
- Board structure and membership;
- funding arrangements; and
- accountability processes. ·
7.
EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNT FROM
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND INSTITUTIONAL
STRENGTHENING ACTIVITIES IN THE PACIFIC
7.1 General findings
Marriott (1997) considered institutional reform is best achieved through autonomous or
semi-autonomous agencies carrying out the main functions of the fisheries ministry,
including fishery management. The ministry should concentrate on policy and
development and develop a knowledge based organisation that makes information
productive and profitable. The examples of reform and strengthening activities presented
below show that this separation of functions does not necessarily hold in the Pacific. For
one thing, having an authority and a Ministry or department is beyond resources of
smaller island nations.
DFID (2003) experience with organisational development in general (but applicable to
fisheries institutions) suggests that with many Government departments the rules of the
game will have to be changed for there to be a meaningful shift in the way they fulfill
their mandates. This basically means a set of policy shifts and the development and
deployment of an integrated range of policy instruments to give this effect.
Institutional development (institutional reform) is a complex process which needs to draw
from and build on local realities. The institutional environment is a living, changing one:
both the problems and the opportunities to address them can change over time.
Institutional development is not a simple linear process. This presents a challenge to the
traditional concept of the project cycle with its essentially linear approach of
identification, design, appraisal, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. With
institutional development, interventions have to be informed by experience and
developed as they go along. In addition, institutional development is often long term,
requiring a willingness to maintain involvement over a decade or more. It thus lends
itself to a process approach where, within agreed overall objectives for institutional
48
change, outputs and the activities and inputs required to achieve them are defined more
clearly as development proceeds. This requires particular attention to monitoring, to
provide a framework for adapting interventions to take account of progress and of
changing conditions (DFID 2003, FFA 2007a).
Technical interventions that leave unsatisfactory institutions intact will probably achieve
nothing. Successful institutional development is very dependent on real commitment
from stakeholders, especially those at senior levels. It is usually not worth proceeding if
this commitment is not there (DFID 2003, FFA 2007a).
The achievement of broader development objectives may hinge on institutional
development. If there is for the moment no prospect of bringing that development about,
these objectives will have to be put on hold (DFID 2003).
7.2 Key principles underlying Institutional Reform and
Organisational Development (Institutional Strengthening)
Outcome focus "What are we trying to do and why?" Change must be driven by a focus
on desired outcomes. Often this will be improved service delivery, and/or more equitable
access to services.
Timeframe "How long should it take?" Changing the "rules of the game (reform)" -
familial, communal, social, or collective - takes time. Unrealistic change processes and
timeframes will fail. Getting real participation is vital, and especially time-consuming.
Context "Where do we start?" Institutional development must start from and be
constantly informed by current social, political and cultural realities. This involves
understanding different groups' incentives, whether for change or for retaining the status
quo. Changing incentives of powerful groups may be the most effective mechanism of
institutional change. The precise entry point will need to take into account the
overlapping nature of institutions at different levels (local, national and international).
Participation "Who do we work with?" Changing the "rules of the game" will meet
opposition from vested interests and from those who do not understand the rationale.
Widespread stakeholder participation should develop a shared understanding of what
needs to be changed and why, how to bring change about, and acceptance of new "rules",
which need to be widely disseminated and well understood. The process should be
inclusive and enabling to ensure long-term sustainability.
Accountability "When will we know we have accomplished the task?" There is a need
to ensure that the reform process is meeting its objectives. Is institutional change
facilitating achievement of desired outcomes? Are poor people getting the intended
benefits? Accountability will be heavily dependent on a regular flow of information.
Monitoring and evaluation is important (DFID 2003; FFA 2007a).
7.3 Marshall Islands experience
Government systems in the Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI) at independence were
ineffective. In 1988 there was a whole of government effort to restructure administrative
agencies under an ADB loan.
49
Before undertaking reform, the Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authority (MIMRA)
with assistance from external consultants, looked at where the opportunities were and
what was the Marshall Islands' comparative advantage. MIMRA recognised that RMI
did not have a significant fishery but RMI was centrally located to productive fishing
zones. There was good anchorage, wharfing and significant fuel storage facilities. The
decision was taken to develop the service function, rather than a fisheries function for the
Marshall Islands. There was a whole of government approach to fisheries sector reform
and to creating an enabling environment. Legislation was reviewed and revised,
incentives were provided to local fishers to develop a purse seine fleet (that later failed),
fuel taxes were reduced (now reinstated), and entry procedures for foreign crew were
streamlined after risks assessed. This led to increased sales of fuel that are a major
contributor to GDP, increased revenue from visiting crews, and greater airline capacity
for export and passengers. RMI now services much of the Pacific fleets and improved
economic conditions led to investment in a loining plant by private sector (FFA 2007a;
FFA 2007b).
Usual implementation processes were conducted: legislative review and revision;
development of corporate and strategic plans after intensive analysis of options;
organisational restructure of MIMRA with reduction in staff numbers compensated for by
capacity development of remaining staff. MIMRA has a continuing HRD program and
includes 10 graduates on staff. Staff numbers have since increased from 20 to 50 to
accommodate development aspirations, and will increase further. MIMRA assists
capacity development of local government to provide extension services.
ADB rated the technical assistance to MIMRA a success (FFA 2007b).
The Marshall Islands is now developing a domestic fleet to counter increasing demand
for access from other nations. A clam hatchery is in the process of being privatised.
Lesson learned
· Comprehensive analysis of country context and examination of comparative
advantage allowed formulation of a successful development strategy that was closely
followed.
· A quality lead adviser contributed greatly to the success of the restructure, and the
advisory team was effective.
· There was whole of government support for institutional reform and development.
Stakeholders were mobilised by a campaign of information and awareness raising, a
regulatory framework and economic or financial initiatives that provided an enabling
environment for industry investment and institutional reform. The sector reform was
accompanied by support and capacity development of MIMRA. The improved
MIMRA was able to attract better people on its staff.
· Revenues increased and economic development was facilitated through changes to
the enabling environment that favoured investment and development of transshipment
facilities.
50
· Disadvantages of the reform process were mainly social. The influx of foreign
fishing crews led to an increase in prostitution and the incidence of STDs that had to
be mitigated by awareness and health programs (FFA 2007a, b).
7.4 Federated States of Micronesia
Change in the FSM fisheries authority since independence was a consequence of a large
public sector reform program. The former Micronesian Fisheries Authority was
restructured as the National Ocean Resource Management Authority (NORMA).
NORMA was reviewed under an ADB Technical Assistance but few of the
recommendations have been implemented. Those that were implemented were done
without external assistance. NORMA has only 10 staff and given the new responsibilities
under WCPFC and other agreements there is need for a review of functions since a staff
increase is unlikely. Current positions need to be audited and responsibilities re-aligned
(FFA 2007b).
7.5 Papua New Guinea
PNG had a large fishery and a large Authority (National Fisheries Authority) that was
dysfunctional and returned little in license fees to the government. The policy and
governance environment discouraged investment and these were issues also for the
Madang cannery. A reforming PNG Government initiated reform in the sector and in
NFA (through an ADB loan in 1998) so as to improve policy and the environment for
investment. A master plan was developed for PNG fisheries that covered all resources
including the least exploited. The plan has been revisited and further developed (FFA
2007a).
NFA reform involved restructuring and retrenchment of staff, improvement to the
working environment, review of legislation and development of a new Act, and capacity
development. The powers of the Minister were diluted, particularly for issuing licenses.
These powers passed to the Board. A Licensing Committee appraises applications. Prior
to reform the NFA had a staff establishment of 330 of which 220 were filled; this was cut
to 40 through retrenchment, and has since increased to 94 (FFA 2007a, b). New
headquarters and improved terms and conditions for personnel lifted morale and work
attitudes (FFA 2007a, b).
NFA's focus became the commercial marine fisheries. Research functions were dropped
and extension services were cut to a small Provincial Liaison Unit to advise and assist
provinces manage coastal and inland fisheries and develop capacity. Provinces provide
extension services, observers and enforcement under an MOU. Aquaculture research is
to recommence in NFA with the commissioning of a new research facility (FFA 2007b).
Industry representatives considered the NFA administrative reforms had a positive
influence on tuna business development in that policies became more transparent and
therefore reliable. For example, the introduction of transparent licensing procedures
encouraged their investment. Gillett (2003 cited in Barclay and Cartwright 2006) also
found that improved fisheries governance in PNG over this period was one of the factors
causing the growth in domestic tuna industries.
51
Change in government by political process weakened the reform environment. Barclay
and Cartwright (2006) mention that some managers from tuna industries cited corruption
as one of the constraints on development of their industry. Decline in governance since
2002 added to uncertainty about costs and reliability of government services, uncertainty
about resource sustainability and distorted the domestication policy that saw such
dramatic improvements in the GDP generated from PNG's tuna resources from the mid
1990s to 2002. NFA's governance problems included:
· Licenses came to be approved `in principle' without going through the recently
established transparent NFA licensing procedure;
· Politicians pressured NFA to issue licenses for foreign purse seine vessels in
contravention of NFA's rationale for licensing taking into consideration regional
efforts to limit purse seine effort;
· The NFA Board, which governed the operations of NFA, including license approvals,
and was supposed to be a safeguard for governance reforms, was `dysfunctional' by
the end of 2003;
· The stakeholder meetings that had helped keep NFA in tune with various stakeholder
perceptions as well as disseminate information from NFA became infrequent and
irregular; and
· Concerns about fisheries governance at the most senior level of the NFA and cabinet
led the major donor in the sector, the ADB, to withhold funds in 2003 and 2004
(Barclay and Cartwright 2006).
Nevertheless, fisheries administration at the national level in PNG was still much better
resourced and organized than in some other PICs. The National Tuna Management Plan
has been used extensively as a guide to tuna industries development and management,
and revised and amended to suit changing opportunities and conditions.
Lessons learned
· The reform was considered successful. It was rapid, with the bulk of changes
occurring in the first 12 months before vested interests could slow or disrupt change.
Project implementation was flexible (FFA 2007a).
· Institutional strengthening is a process, and should be reinforced periodically.
· The most important factor in the implementation of reform was high-level political
support, but it is difficult to secure. This type of backing was extremely valuable, and
probably protected the Project from the interferences and obstructions that face other
projects (FFA 2007a, b).
· Support from politicians and senior government officials continued because the
reform program communicated options that informed decision makers. Sister
agencies (especially central agencies) needed to be supportive of reform and were
involved and informed through interagency working groups (FFA 2007a).
· The reform could progress because funds were available to pay for the retrenchment
program. Incorporation of funds to cover retrenchment costs is crucial in the
successful implementation of institutional strengthening (ADB 2003).
· Improved working conditions helped retain a competent nucleus of staff and attract
quality people. Changing the structure and funding mechanisms of the department
meant the department could offer better pay incentives and provide adequate
52
equipment (such as computers) for employees, both of which boosted fisheries
administration greatly (FFA 2007a, b).
· The ability for NFA staff to access external advisers and mentors was important (FFA
2007a, b).
· Changes have endured with some petering off due to political processes rather than
lack of capacity within NFA (FFA 2007a, b).
· One factor contributing to the weakened governance may have been a lack of
consistency in leadership over a period of major change. Since the late 1990s the
NFA had no less than seven different managing directors, each with a distinct
management style that altered the way the organization functioned. There was a need
to develop and maintain a consistently strong senior management team within NFA to
ensure stability and well-developed policies for sustainable management and
development of the fisheries sector (Barclay and Cartwright 2006).
· Some of the managing directors were non-nationals and were effective in sustaining
positive reform and organizational change when political and other processes were
less favourable. Imported executives should not be discriminated against if
equivalent local leadership and managerial capacity is not available (FFA 2007a).
Ideally, non-nationals should develop local capacity to succeed them.
· Administrative improvements in one sector may be limited if governance as a whole
remains problematic. Improved profitability in the fisheries sector and NFA's
revenue raising capacity unfortunately meant that political interference became
visible in tuna fisheries soon after the change of government in 2002.
From ADB (2003) comes the following evaluation of experiences and lessons on
implementation of the PNG fisheries development project. Positive changes at NFA
involved numerous delays because of unexpected obstacles and changes of course and
made the restructuring of NFA a far larger job than anticipated in the final project design.
Issues were:
(i) Politics. A change in the PNG government just as the Project began. The minister
for fisheries changed twice, and the MD of NFA, three times in the following 6
months. Although all individuals involved supported the Project, their differing
views, priorities, and management styles made project implementation challenging in
the first few months, and led to changes in focus of some project activities.
(ii) Organizational status. Changing the status of NFA from a government
department to the autonomous, self-financing organization envisaged in the project
design was administratively complex. Change in NFA status required the approval or
agreement of several government departments, including the Department of Personnel
Management (DPM), Department of Treasury, Department of Finance, Office of the
Attorney General, Salaries and Conditions Monitoring Committee, and Central
Agencies Coordinating Committee. Before securing such approval, it was necessary
to demonstrate that NFA had in place satisfactory internal systems of financial
control, personnel management, and a budget management procedure. Development
of those conditions took time. None of the main agencies wanted to be first to agree
to the change. As a result, although the project design envisaged NFA autonomy by
about mid-2000 autonomy was not achieved until early 2002.
53
(iii) Retrenchment. The new organizational structure proposed a staff of 65, down
from 220, which was sufficient to undertake the tasks identified. The loan included
funds for retrenchment, so the retrenching of existing staff and then recruiting or
rehiring to fill the 65 new positions should have been straightforward. But delays
were significant, mainly because of DPM's apparent inability or unwillingness to
reconcile the retrenchment entitlements of NFA staff, to communicate this
information to NFA, and to arrange financial compensation for retrenched staff.
(iv) Financial management. The Project discovered that NFA's financial affairs
were in a confused state only after engagement of the expatriate senior adviser.
Expenditures were made with little or no formal procurement procedures or record-
keeping. The accounts had not been reconciled for years. NFA's financial disorder
offered many opportunities for unauthorised and fraudulent use of funds. The Project
found it necessary to commission a forensic audit of NFA's financial management
system before being able to rectify its deficiencies.
Key points of Pacific fisheries authority models
Of the four PICs with fisheries statutory authorities discussed in this report, two (FSM
and RMI) had the Authority model at independence and two (PNG and Nauru)
subsequently adopted it as a reform measure to improve agency effectiveness. All
have representative members of various kinds on the Board rather than an expert-
based Board, possibly because of lack of expert capacity in country.
The FSM NORMA is the one Authority solely focused on management and conservation
of commercial oceanic fisheries; the other authorities have a much wider fisheries
management mandate under the relevant Acts, similar to the rationale for the
departmental model. They provide non-core services, support other service providers
or outsource to deliver their mandate. MIMRA and NFMRA have commercial arms.
The PNG NFA is the only authority with financial autonomy, able to fund its budget and
set staff terms and conditions of employment. The other authorities have ceded all or
part of financial autonomy and have budgets allocated by Government because of
fiscal constraints in the economy that require fisheries revenues to be allocated
according to government priorities. They now adopt public sector management
regulations for staff and financial management, though they retain the right to hire
and fire.
Early PNG NFA experience indicates the need for careful crafting of legislation to
ensure accountability of the Authority to Parliament and stakeholders, whatever the
level of Ministerial or Board control. This does not protect the Authority if
governance as a whole becomes a problem.
MIMRA and NFA have had externally supported institutional reform and strengthening
projects since becoming authorities; with recognised improvement in strategic
management and economic development. All four authorities have either provided
training opportunities for staff development or had short term capability development
from various providers.
PNG experience shows that unforeseen externalities affect implementation of institutional
reform. These externalities include political change, coordinating and reaching
agreement with central agencies for autonomy in financial and personnel
management, and timely release of funds.
54
PNG is best placed in terms of human capital to meet treaty and WCPFC obligations.
Capacity development is seen as a need by the other authorities.
7.6 Vanuatu
Reform within the Department of Fisheries (in 1997) was part of the larger government
Comprehensive Reform Program. The organisation was restructured, staff numbers were
reduced from 45 to 30 positions, with a further 50% cut in 1999 through redundancy,
non-core functions were dropped, subsidies to rural fishers were stopped, stakeholder
engagement was increased and their participation in development of the fisheries sector
introduced. Performance based management was introduced. Extension services were
reformed from facilitating fishing to fisheries development working with provincial
programs, and fisheries development officers were put on higher pay (FFA 2007b).
The new Act allowed foreign flagged vessels to operate alongside the domestic
commercial fishery of joint venture local and foreign interests. Formulation of the Tuna
Management Plan led to changes in policy and organisation (by setting up a tuna
management unit) that resulted in improved performance and benefits from the Vanuatu
flag fleet and from licensing vessels.
Since the reform, departmental effectiveness has improved, revenue and investment by
private sector has increased. Revenue flows to government; the Department's budget is
usually constrained but has increased significantly, budgeting is based on programs and
allocations can vary accordingly, rather than a lump sum allocation as in the past.
Current staff numbers have increased to 52 and can be justified from new initiatives
following increased revenues. Officers receive increased pay while still under Public
Service rules (FFA 2007a, b).
Lessons learned
· Reform and restructure was driven as part of a wider whole of government reform
and therefore had government and Ministerial support.
· Department of Fisheries leadership was committed to the reform process.
· The departmental model was retained rather than adopting an authority model.
Services to communities were to be continued and could be done better with a
departmental model. Under an authority model rural fishers would be charged for
services as a cost recovery measure but their ability to pay, and therefore access to
services, would have been low.
· Restructure and right-sizing was possible because funds were available to pay out
redundant staff.
· The enabling environment for investment was improved. Legislation was reviewed,
and together with strategic policy and institutional development, offshore fisheries
activity expanded and revenues increased.
7.7 Fiji
Change in the Fiji Department of Fisheries is undertaken through an in-house reform
program that commenced with preparation of a Tuna Management Plan in 2002 (Aldous
2002) and is continuing and involves structural change and capacity development. The
55
Department contracts trainers or uses FFA and SPC facilities on an ad hoc basis as needs
are identified or arise. Management of Fiji's offshore fisheries has gone through a
process of institutional and policy reform and strengthening. A major change was a more
transparent licensing process.
An Authority model was considered but rejected. With a national fisheries authority the
whole of license fees would be managed by the authority instead of going into
consolidated revenue. It would thus be important to have systems in place to ensure
transparency and accountability. In addition, revisions to the Fisheries Act and the
Marine Spaces Act would be needed to enable the creation of a Fiji National Fisheries
Authority (Government of Fiji 2002 cited in Barclay and Cartwright 2006).
Lessons learned
· Change in an institution can be more easily managed in-house if the change is
incremental or gradual.
· Ministerial and other government agency support facilitate Fisheries' reform and
strengthening activities and are as important for gradual change as a transitional or
radical change strategy.
7.8 Cook Islands
The Cook Islands Marine Resources Institutional Strengthening Project is a consequence
of a national public sector reform and right-sizing program supported by the IMF. The
Project purpose is mainly capacity building; it does not have a strong reform agenda
(FFA. 2007a, b). The Cook Islands Public Service introduced a Planning Action and
Reporting Cycle (PARC) to assist ministries to prepare business plans, annual plans,
budgets, and to report on the implementation of programs and activities. The Project is
supported by New Zealand.
Lessons learned
Experiences and lessons of the ISP from a donor perspective are summarised in section
7.11. Some lessons are common to donor and partner perspectives.
· A long lead time from commencement of scoping to implementation required
flexibility by partners to update and vary the design.
· The ISP has an initial three year term with a review built in but absorptive capacity
within the MMR is being challenged in the current time frame.
· There was a need to consider country context and take into account cultural
processes, eg., community based resource management was excluded from the new
Act since traditional management would continue.
· Introduction of reforms such as performance based management and measurement is
hindered if tangible rewards are not part of the process or are withheld by central
agencies.
· The presence of a Project within the Ministry caused other capacity development
providers to consider charging for technical assistance previously given without cost.
· Industry capacity development is part of the larger sector approach by the ISP (FFA
2007a, b).
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7.9 Tonga
The Tonga Fisheries Project (TFP) commenced January 2002 to assist the Ministry of
Fisheries (MoF, now the Department of Fisheries, DoF) develop capacity for sustainable
management and development of marine resources. It had a four-year duration, was
extended one year and has one component further extended to 2008. TFP had its
progress and effectiveness affected by a number of unforeseen externalities:
· Temporary withdrawal of some donor funds that required deferment of the
community fisheries development activity and subsequent need to extend the Project
to ensure a level of sustainability in community based coastal fisheries resource
management within the Department and in the pilot communities (FFA 2007a, b);
· Interrupted leadership in the then Ministry of Fisheries. There were three Secretaries
in the time of the Project and intervening periods without a Secretary were as long as
one year. This was at a time when the Government of Tonga was initiating a whole
of government reform program and strong leadership was needed to drive the reforms
within the Ministry against opposing voices and to maximise the advantage of an
ongoing institutional strengthening project that could assist in introducing and
institutionalizing the reforms. Certain reforms such as performance based
management have yet to be institutionalised (FFA 2007b);
· There was also weak implementation of the reform program by government.
Objectives were never clearly communicated to public service workers leading to
confusion and resistance to change. The extended Public Sector strike that resulted
affected progress of the Tonga Fisheries Project from loss of counterparts and
Ministry operating funds that were diverted to pay increased salaries. This required
the Project to fund some Ministry operations that were Project priorities (FFA
2007b);
· The recent restructuring that subsumed the Ministry to a Department resulted in a
30% loss of staffs through voluntary redundancy and consequent loss of capacity that
had been developed with Project help. Compliance capability was worst affected.
The Ministry has moved to multi-skilling of remaining staff until replacements are
recruited. The voluntary redundancy programme went through a prolonged gestation
period and as a result was very disruptive to the functioning of the Ministry due to a
high degree of uncertainty and a normal depression in morale to such gross changes
(FFA 2007a, b).
· The slow progress through government processes in passing legislative changes and
new subordinate legislation was a real problem to the implementation of many needed
reforms including fees to support DoF activities (FFA 2007b).
Despite setbacks in the project's operating environment, capacity in MoF was developed
at institutional level; some will now have to be rebuilt because of staff losses from
redundancy. A major project achievement is the assistance to MoF in introducing
community based resource management. The new DoF provides an opportunity for the
Project to assist the establishment of a smaller more targeted fisheries agency (FFA
2007b).
Lessons learned
57
· Change in the external environment (delayed funds, missing counterparts,
prolonged absences of Secretaries and leadership, a weakly implemented
government reform program, a prolonged public sector strike) affected efficiency
and effectiveness of implementation. These problems were managed by flexibility
on the part of government, agency, donor and contractor.
· The comment was made that some decision makers in government saw the whole
of government reforms as a threat to their positions or agenda and actively
hindered the process. Contrast this with the supportive reform environment in
PNG that allowed the NFA institutional reform process to proceed rapidly before
any opposition was organised (FFA 2007a).
· Strong supportive leadership is critical for change.
· Capacity building at both individual and organisational level takes many years.
· Reinforcement of learning is essential for all aspects of capacity building.
· Unavailability of some senior counterparts on extended leave or overseas training
reduced effectiveness of adviser inputs. This was inadequately addressed at project
inception.
· Tongan fisheries officials are given considerable access to training funded by
donors. This often results in long term absences for training that may not always be
directly relevant to a person's job or career. Training courses should be directly
relevant to a person's job and be able to be applied to have any real value.
· Major public sector changes will, if prolonged, affect the work of a project even
when capacity building efforts appear to have been institutionalised.
· Projects can provide some stability during a period of lack of leadership or
immense change but there are risks for the project. Project staff and advisers have
to tread a fine line between providing a source of guidance, consistent high-quality
policy advice and proactive engagement in emerging issues, and at the same time
avoid becoming regarded as taking over the functions and responsibilities of senior
counterparts in the partner agency. It is important that the project and its advisers
are not seen to be doing the work of counterparts.
· Informal, ongoing coaching and encouragement by advisers was effective in
building capacity and progressing organisational changes.
· The development of capacity for community-based management of coastal
resources requires sustained support and can take a very long time, particularly in
communities where traditional associations and community responsibilities for
management measures for local marine areas have been lost or are attenuated. For
the TFP this was compounded by the need to develop NGOs as service providers to
supplement the limited number of MoF field staff and operational resources.
· Incentives play a key role in encouraging the adoption of community based
approaches (eg. fish aggregating devices, ice making facilities, Special Initiative
Funds for small community and business projects) (FFA 2007a, b).
Not all stakeholders were pleased with the restructure of the Ministry to a Department of
Fisheries. According to industry, Tonga's tuna industry now has potentially less
representation due to Tonga's MoF becoming a department in a `super' agency. Industry
expressed concern at the amalgamation of the former MoF into a new Ministry of
Agriculture & Food, Forest and Fisheries. Government had thereby downgraded the
58
importance of the sector and compounded the problem of getting an efficient and
responsive fisheries administration in Tonga. Industry commented that the current state
of the industry indicated an urgent need for greater accountability and action, not less,
and asked that the government give serious consideration to the establishment of a
Fisheries Authority with governance through a Board with strong stakeholder
representation. This had been the successful approach adopted in PNG and other
countries where their fishing industries were stagnating through maladministration (DOF
2007).
7.10 Samoa
Fisheries administration is a Division within the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
(MAF, formerly Ministry of Agriculture, Forests, Fisheries and Meteorology, MAFFM).
The Fisheries Division has had two ISP activities in the last decade: the Samoa Fisheries
Project from 1999 to 2002 and the MAFFM (now MAF) Institutional Strengthening
Project (2001-2005). As well, staff of the Division was involved in biosecurity/ border
control/ export quality training under the Samoa Quarantine Improvement Project (2001-
2004).
The MAFFM ISP was carried out in the context of a wider whole of government reform
programme that involved ISPs in most government Ministries. The Departments of
Forests and of Meteorology were not transferred to the Ministry of Natural Resources,
Environment and Meteorology until the MAFFM ISP had been completed. The transfer
was part of the general restructuring of the public service.
The Fisheries Project key outputs were the establishment of well managed, efficient and
productive fisheries in both the commercial and subsistence (village) sectors. A well-
resourced and goal-orientated Fisheries Division was an integral part of achieving these
aims.
Lessons learned (Fishery Project)
· The key to the significant development and management of the tuna fishery that
occurred was the involvement of fishery industry stakeholders. This was achieved by
the formation of a Commercial Fisheries Management Advisory Committee (CF-
MAC). CFMAC meetings continue to be held regularly. Economic benefits (mostly
from industry initiatives rather than the project) were substantial but have varied over
the years.
· At project end, the Community-Based Fisheries Management (CBFM) programme
included 64 villages with Village Fisheries Management Plans; of these, 52 had
community owned Fish Reserves (Marine Protected Areas). CBFM has proved
sustainable and has provided environmental, financial and social benefits in many
participating communities.
· High levels of stakeholder and community involvement should be included in the
design of all projects involving the exploitation and management of natural resources.
Regardless of legislation or enforcement, the responsible management of marine
resources will be achieved only when fishing communities and fishers themselves
accept it as their responsibility rather than that of the government. Community and
59
fishing industry involvement and eventual ownership of fisheries management actions
and regulations have resulted in higher levels of compliance and sustainability.
· A corollary to the above is that it is unreasonable to expect communities of
subsistence fishers to adopt conservation measures, which will (in the short term)
reduce present catches of seafood even further, without offering alternatives. Any
measures taken by communities (or governments) to reduce the use of destructive
fishing methods, set minimum size limits on fish, and declare no fishing areas, will
cause immediate reductions in fish catches before the situation improves.
· Alternative sources of seafood for rural communities engaging in conservation
actions can include the development of village-level aquaculture and the targeting of
under-exploited species beyond the reefs. A programme of community-based
fisheries management which excludes the promotion of such alternative sources of
seafood is likely to fail.
· Extension services require considerable operating funds to be effective service
providers. Funds may not always be available (FFA 2007b).
The MAFFM ISP worked with all divisions. Its contribution to the Fisheries Division
(and other divisions) was in the areas of leadership, strategic management,
administration, policy and planning, outputs and outcomes work planning and
performance measurement, and involvement of stakeholders in planning (though
Fisheries was already ahead in this area from the earlier project). The Fisheries Act was
revised by Fisheries and stakeholders. Financial systems, budgets and personnel
management had uniform and interrelated systems throughout the Ministry. Capacity of
senior and middle management was built in these areas. Most importantly, it integrated
senior management so that divisional planning and resource allocations followed the
objectives of the Samoa Development Strategy by adhering to the MAFFM Corporate
Plan and MAFFM Strategic Plan.
The Division of Fisheries consultations indicated that the changes introduced by the ISP
have made MAFFM more efficient and effective, a view supported by stakeholder
analysis and an independent project completion review. However, Fisheries would have
liked to have had capacity developed further in technical areas, and is seeking such
assistance. FFA and SPC have provided training or capability in certain areas, but the
needs that Samoa fisheries outlined to GEF-OFMP coordinators are still relevant. A full
ISP follow-up is unlikely to be required, but selective capacity development mainly in
technical skills is a need expressed by Fisheries (FFA 2007b).
Key points of reformed or strengthened Pacific departmental models
Reform and restructuring in the Pacific fisheries departments reported in this section
came about in various ways:
· Tonga, Samoa and the Cook Islands fisheries administrations had externally
supported interventions by donor grants;
· Samoa, Cook Islands and Vanuatu fisheries administrations change interventions
were part of a larger government reform and rightsizing program; the
Government of Tonga commenced a whole of government reform program during
the term of the Ministry of Fisheries ISP; the Tonga Ministry of Fisheries has
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recently merged with other economic ministries as a department in a super
ministry.
· Fiji's Department of Fisheries had internally driven gradual change that is
continuing.
The authority model was considered by most administrations but the departmental
models were retained (though restructured) in all cases to better deliver their
mandate to service and manage subsistence, artisanal and semi-commercial coastal
and inland fisheries as well as the commercial sector.
There has been rationalization of services towards core functions in strengthened and
restructured departments to varying degrees, depending on availability of alternative
service providers.
Co-management of fisheries resources is an accepted strategy for all fishers and
fisheries; cost recovery is applied to varying degree by departments, and usually
according to ability to pay. Regardless of administrative model, increased
stakeholder input into management and development of fisheries is a prime
consideration.
7.11 Some Donor Perspectives
DFID experience with Institutional Reform (DFID 2004)
The DFID experience of institutional reform covers a range of activities in its rural
livelihoods programme, and projects often had a poverty alleviation agenda. A number
of activities involved fisheries administrations.
In general, the more autonomous the organisation, the easier it is to reform. The most
difficult organisation in which to initiate significant reform is a government department
because so many of its rules are set at a higher level and cannot be changed unilaterally.
The semi-autonomous agency/institute has relatively more freedom. The autonomous
public sector organisation (eg university) has a great degree of self government. A self-
governing body (eg NGO) has greatest degree of organisational autonomy.
Key lesson for `better practice'
· Aligning a project with an apex international organisation and engaging as a national
consultant an influential and highly respected `champion' to promote new
institutional values and concepts within national organisations (eg Ministry of
Fisheries) which is supported by a concurrent communications strategy integrated
into the programme represents the best opportunity to ensure sustained institutional
reform and organisational change using the project approach. This must be linked to
a higher level public service reform process.
Lessons learnt
· The above better practice lesson is unique to an organisation such as a national
research institute that has obvious links with other national or international research
institute(s) and may not be relevant for wider institutional reform of other government
sectors. This type of link strengthens the potential to reform by having access to an
institutional reservoir of knowledge and experience.
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· The appraised projects endorsed the well known fact that decades of development
through projects principally concerned with infrastructure development and capacity
building (mostly formal training) cannot be transformed into vehicles of change to the
`rules of the game' without support at higher levels of government and macro level
policy reformation.
· Incremental change has its value and has delivered benefits, but if more substantial
institutional change is required then the transitional change approach is appropriate.
· High level exposure is important by setting communications as a project output and
integral part of project activities, but it does not necessarily lead to sustained macro
level policy reform.
· More thought has to be given to the means of communicating findings to policy
makers, eg, very short 2 page briefs in local language aimed at busy decision makers.
High level policy makers normally have an informal advisory group and it is
important to create linkages to them.
· It is advantageous to engage strategic research and development institutions for
specific guidance on influencing policy processes in primary theme areas. The role of
these institutions and how best they might be supported to bring about change needs
to be part of the design process.
· Given the sensitive issues surrounding questions of national sovereignty it is essential
to be clear by what is meant by `policy influence'. Policy analysis, communicating
the findings of this analysis and encouraging policy dialogue may all be legitimate
objectives of a project, but a requirement to sway national policy formulation is not.
This is related to openness with the strategic planning agenda.
· Opportunities may suddenly open for initiatives to be adopted (a policy window).
Such windows occur due to changes in the political stream but can close quickly. It is
crucial that a project (i) can identify such a policy window and (ii) have ideas and
proposals in place to solve the problem well in advance of the window's opening.
Projects and programmes must have inbuilt flexibility to respond to these windows.
· Although the validity of many policy narratives is questionable, they persist because
they simplify complex development processes, and thus often form the basis of policy
decisions. Projects should all have good stories to tell. Good strategic
communication of these stories is essential.
· Policy networks can be useful to participants to build alliances, share discourses and
construct consensual knowledge from which policy change advocates can work. Care
must be taken to engage a wide range of stakeholders, encourage more openness in
the dialogue process, provide easy exit routes for participants and establish early an
institutional home for a network or forum if sustainability is intended.
Way Forward (applying the lessons)
· If projects located within government departments are to be effective in bringing
about institutional reform and organisational change then a national level committee
headed by the Minister should be established as a minimum requirement to provide
guidelines for strategic reform and reorganization, eg, a National Fisheries Committee
headed by Minister of Fisheries. For projects that have a policy and strategy
development agenda clear links must be made to this committee and the key role of a
`champion' is to build links between the two.
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· Internal policy analysis units within government departments must be established to
implement National Committee directives for policy change and institutional reform.
These units may draw on the best of internal staff, national policy think tank units and
top grade external implants. Greater involvement of strategy research and
development institutes may supplement the activities of these units.
· New and novel ways of working at the departmental level must be sought. Projects or
defined program elements operating at the department level can only be effective if
critical elements are in place, eg, government ownership of the process, donor
coordination, capacity enhanced, institutional accountability and a clear coherent
strategic plan endorsed by all major stakeholders. For example projects coordinated
through multi-donor and government liaison located at the department level could
function as a program element supporting an integrated macro level reforming
initiative.
· If a more holistic approach were to be taken, whether through programmes, SWAP
(sector wide approach) or the IDP (integrated development programmes) this should
lead to more attention being given to the processes that have made the greatest
differences over the past 25 years: (a) improvements in the regulatory environment
(b) access to inputs, equipment and credit for beneficiaries and (c) improved
functioning of the market system.
· The reform agenda can only be driven by key individuals that understand the need for
reform, articulate a strategic vision and are able to implement the reform process.
The intellectual capital building process is essential at all key levels of public
administration linked to the creation of new positions for institutional and human
resource development specialists.
· Empowerment of grass roots organisations and local government for community
development through a decentralisation process should start with small incremental
changes to ensure the capacity building process for skills, knowledge, attitudes and
resources maintains pace with change and expectations of outcomes.
· Gearing up for organisational development and institutional reform takes time. The
best short to mid term project approach is through a program of empowering clients
or the poor to demand better services but this must be structured around activities that
raise returns to labour.
· A radical overhaul of monitoring systems must complement the institutional reform
and organisational development process. A more standardized and uniform process
and participatory monitoring approach would generate improved feedback on
stakeholder outcomes and can become empowering for beneficiaries rather than
extractive.
· Interagency collaboration improves service delivery but this needs to have ways to
develop win-win or pull relationships rather than push ones cemented with money.
· Donors need to integrate their funding cycles and policy priorities to provide the
necessary momentum for change, optimise policy window opportunities and
coordinate programs across the wider policy stakeholder matrix targeting all tiers of
government.
· Although support to local government should be a focus, the benefits delivered to the
poor will only be sustained if their natural resources are effectively sustained and
managed. In a country where inland and marine resources are facing threats, the
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oversight roles of coordination, planning, monitoring, regulation, research and
management cannot be addressed piecemeal through the patchwork of local
government. There are differing institutional roles to be allocated and support
provided (especially through strategic planning mechanisms) must be carefully
targeted vertically and horizontally across the sector and minimize capacity
imbalances within institutional frameworks.
NZAID support for Institutional Strengthening
The New Zealand International Aid and Development Agency (NZAID) has not funded
institutional reform programs but may assist in associated activities at partner request.
Reform programs are big and complex and need to be led by national forces. A donor
cannot demand change in say, the legislative framework. Institutional reform has to face
vested interests in the status quo.
Institutional strengthening activities are being supported in the Cook Islands and the
Solomon Islands fisheries administrations. Earlier interventions in fisheries by the
Agency were based on ad hoc technical assistance that was evaluated as only partly
successful for fisheries management. NZAID is now moving to the project form of
assistance using managing contractors to implement the ISP. The preference on
effectiveness grounds is for the recipient government to implement projects where
capacity exists.
Emerging issues and lessons learned from the Cook Islands Ministry of Marine
Resources Strengthening Project and the Solomon Islands Fisheries Strengthening Project
include:
· The Pacific context is challenging and realistic objectives and a long term
commitment are necessary.
· Customary systems and legal systems should interact. Where a customary system
provides the community with better representation, even if less democratic, then the
legal system should not over-ride it.
· A tendency to drift from the ISP model to the TA model is noted: (i) there is a
problem with advisers becoming in-line when in country. This develops relationships
but hinders capacity development. The ISP should support the partner to have local
capacity in place; and (ii) the Cook Island IS Project provides opportunities for
training and engagement with Environment and Health agencies but this extends the
Project mandate.
· Twinning arrangements with a sister agency in New Zealand are being considered as
a means of sustaining institutional strengthening achievements and capacity
development after project completion. Twinning is new to the Cook Islands and will
need to be owned and driven by the partner agency, not NZAID or the NZ twinning
partner. It is expected that NZAID will contribute to the in-country support of
advisers in a twinning arrangement, avoiding having MMR or DoFMR allocate scarce
funds for adviser maintenance.
· Capacity development through a twinning arrangement needs to be carefully
structured to ensure that it is appropriate to the Cook Islands or Solomon Islands
64
context, and that technologies, procedures and processes are not simply imported
from the partner country.
· The NZ Ministry of Fisheries is providing technical expertise to the managing
contractor for MMR ISP. There were early problems regarding the communication
on rationale for advisers and scheduling of advisers.
· Short term advisory inputs deliver capability building and long term inputs capacity
development. There is a need to distinguish between the two. Short term advisers are
useful for maintaining or providing carry-on capacity.
· Training of trainers is appropriate if there is capacity and willingness to act as
trainers. Often people within an organisation are focused on their core activity. The
alternative is a local training provider if required skills are available.
· The Solomon Islands country context has external drivers of change (RAMSI) as well
as local champions, and it is necessary to assess what interventions are feasible and
have a chance of success and what to avoid. The Department of Fisheries has weak
capability and capacity with some sections without staff; recurrent funding for human
resource development is an issue.
· There are already indications that the Solomon Island ISP has contributed to an
increase in license revenues. The external partner (ISP) may raise the perception of
transparency that had been weakened by earlier events.
· A project presence may result in lost development opportunities. The Solomon Island
Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries has strengthened ability to coordinate
and source funds from donors, but the DoFMR can miss out on funds for
development activities because of the NZAID presence. The perception in the
Ministry is that DoFMR has resources from NZAID.
· There is competition for counterparts from other donors and regional bodies that
affects ISP implementation and needs to be managed.
· Experience is that strengthening of fisheries associations is generally unsuccessful
when demand driven; it needs to be top down. Associations in many developing
countries have not yet developed a strong voice.
· In areas such as compliance and enforcement stakeholders need to be aware of
regulations and systems if they are to be implemented.
· Civil society is a key factor in creating demand for good governance by an institution
and they should be developed as part of the ISP strategy. Commercial operators have
a different program.
· NGOs with mature social programs are being encouraged to work with recipient
agencies as service providers.
· Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems based on the partner agency should be
simple and flexible if they are to be useful to agency staff. M&E is generally donor
driven or from senior management and works against a demand driven process.
Important determinants of a successful and sustainable ISP activity are considered to be:
· Proper analysis during design. This includes a full appreciation of the
institutional context in which the institution operates. An ISP will fail if there is
no enabling environment. Analysis needs to consider what makes the system
work to achieve outcomes;
· Participatory planning in formulating the intervention strategy;
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· Strong executive leadership and strong heads of sections to support the leadership
and introduced change; and
· Succession planning and multi-skilling of lesser skilled people is required in
Pacific departments because of high staff turnover and absences for training or
attendance at fora (FFA 2007a, b).
Key points on experiences with fisheries institutional models in the Pacific
Any model can be satisfactory. Considerations are national priorities in fisheries,
funding and how best to resource the institution.
Pacific fisheries statutory authorities and fisheries departments cover a continuum in
terms of governance, functions, fisheries managed, structure and stakeholders. The
distinction between an Authority and a Department in Pacific fisheries is often
blurred since there is similarity and overlap in stakeholders and service delivery. In
a number of authorities there is no longer autonomy of financial and personnel
resources that was a feature of the Authority model. In some departments with
performance based management remuneration may be above the public service scale.
In some PICs the institutions extend to state or province fisheries administration. Both
models service these institutions to varying degrees.
An Authority model in the Pacific Island context provides greater flexibility and may
facilitate securing funds, decision making, focusing on core business and accessing
services. Conversely, examples show that the Authority model can lose financial
autonomy, and lose its focus on core business in attempting to service multiple
stakeholders and government development priorities.
Scale and complexities of governance arrangements will differ according to the model
selected.
Management mode can vary. Organisations may be structured according to functions
(resource management, compliance etc) or to fisheries (oceanic, coastal etc) or
elements of each. Where one fishery is involved, a functional management mode is
suited. Management mode may be determined by priorities or mandate set when
developing strategic and corporate plans.
Institutions should include all fisheries in their mandate. If capacity is limited, the focus
should be on the fisheries with highest economic returns (or social return if that is the
priority).
Core functions for either model should include compliance and enforcement based on
ESD principles, policy and planning, research and monitoring capability. Access to
legal expertise is required and an industry development section for assessing viability
of and facilitating new initiatives is desirable.
Service delivery can be done by private sector including NGOs if capacity exists in
country. The determinant for whether services are delivered by public or private
sector should be cost effectiveness (FFA 2007a, b).
Accountability is a major consideration:
· The relevant Act setting up the institution should delegate power for effective
decision making and include engagement of stakeholders in decision making on
fisheries management and development.
· The regulatory framework should consider which entity should have the power to
issue licenses. A public register of license holders is recommended.
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· Regional and national norms for transparency and providing information are
necessary, eg, annual reports.
Good institutional reform requires good legislation. Some desired characteristics of
good legislation are:
· Should be based on ESD principles;
· Must identify consultative structures and processes to support co-management;
· Must provide a strong framework for issues of or refusal of licenses;
· Must provide prescribed penalties;
· Must provide for flexible delegation of fisheries management arrangements;
· Must provide power to enter into institutional arrangements.
Drafting good legislation does not necessarily resolve problems; legislation and
regulations have to be implemented. The need is to get all sector institutions to
implement regulations.
Projects or defined program elements operating at the authority or department level can
only be effective if critical elements are in place, eg, government ownership of the
process, donor coordination, capacity enhanced, institutional accountability and a
clear coherent strategic plan endorsed by all major stakeholders.
CONCLUSIONS
Rationale for institutional reform or strengthening
Fisheries administrations have been reformed or strengthened to meet international
obligations and the need for more effective and efficient fisheries that return greater
revenue. In the last decade, the obligations in moving from development and production
to management and conservation have required more resources for monitoring, analysis
and stakeholder involvement.
PNG NFA was targeted by the government for reform. Reform of MIMRA and the
Marshall Island's fisheries sector involved a major alteration to national fisheries
strategic direction as the sector moved to a service function for foreign flags. Most other
reform and strengthening activities reviewed were to improve management and
administration of resources on a sustainable basis and to increase revenue. The Vanuatu
and Cook Islands Departments' strengthening was part of a whole-of-government reform
process. Tonga MoF strengthening activities were donor funded on a bilateral basis,
though Tonga was later caught up in a whole of government reform process.
There is continuing interest in institutional reform or strengthening in Pacific fisheries as
countries face up to management and conservation priorities under treaty obligations such
as WCPFC membership.
Authority or Ministry/Department?
The review indicates that there is no preferred model in the Pacific region. Any model
can be satisfactory. Considerations in model choice are national priorities in fisheries,
funding and how best to resource the institution. Model choice should best achieve
government's desired outcomes (effectiveness) at lowest cost of outputs (efficiency) to
best manage risks posed for government by the activities to be undertaken by a public
67
sector organisation (risk management) and to best protect established constitutional
arrangements and conventions.
Departments give more flexibility and greater scope for government direction; authorities
increase discretion and flexibility for the agency.
Experience indicates that statutory authorities appear to have been most successful where
their responsibility is for single-sector fisheries and where there is a clear client group
that can be targeted for cost recovery and least successful where required to manage
waters subject to multi-sector fisheries and of high value for non-fishing uses.
Commercial fisheries are therefore suited to management through an authority. The
federal systems of Australia and the FSM have a national authority responsible for
commercial and oceanic fisheries, respectively, and state departments managing various
fisheries under arrangement with the central authority. PNG NFA has a commercial
fisheries focus but is expanding its management or oversight of other fisheries and
provincial fisheries, and re-entering research; areas all covered by its mandate. RMI's
MIMRA and Nauru's NFMRA manage all fisheries. The mandates of NFA, MIMRA
and NFMRA are similar in scope to those of fisheries departments of other PICs.
It could be concluded that a statutory authority should be established only if its proposed
functions could not be performed by a department or it would be inappropriate for them
to be performed by a department. In this case, fisheries administrations in the Pacific
could all adopt the Department model. Many of the stated advantages of authorities such
as greater independence and flexibility, stronger stakeholder input into decision making
and ownership, and greater accountability can be achieved under a department model
with appropriate enabling legislation, as shown for Vanuatu. Only one PIC authority
reviewed, PNG's NFA, has managed to retain its autonomy, the others because of
government fiscal issues have reverted to public sector arrangements for financial and
personnel management, and in that respect operate as a department. Board representation
is often dominated by government representatives, and in one case is chaired by the
Minister, with reduction in independence and flexibility.
In most Pacific countries fisheries administrations are responsible to a range of
stakeholders for management and conservation of all fisheries. Unless countries have a
separate department for policy and coordination (or else have state/provincial
departments responsible for inshore and inland fisheries), Authorities in the Pacific will,
and do, necessarily manage all fisheries and thus lose the focus on one fishery that is one
of their stated attributes.
The rightsizing/downsizing in personnel and focus on core business that accompanied
reform of a number of administrations has weakened under pressures to widen the scope
to better fulfill mandates and service clients, or else to meet treaty obligations. PNG
NFA and Vanuatu Fisheries Department have increased staff numbers since rightsizing to
meet new demands.
Approaches to institutional change
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Specific issues for Government in the creation of a statutory management authority
include:
- determining the role, function and structure of the authority;
- determining the role of, and relationship with, the Minister;
- legislative arrangements;
- Board structure and membership;
- funding arrangements; and
- accountability processes.
The legislation establishing an Authority provides the mandate for the institution. If the
scope encompasses all fisheries within the EEZ, then the Authority will necessarily
perform as a Department/Ministry. If the Board is representative rather than expert
based, then the Authority can be biased by the sector interest on the Board or by
government agendas. While an Authority generally has financial autonomy, this is rare
in the Pacific as fisheries revenues are necessarily applied to national priorities because
of fiscal constraints in government.
Significant rightsizing or downsizing such as done by NFA and Vanuatu Department of
Fisheries requires funds for redundancy payouts. Most governments will need to rely on
loans or grants to achieve efficient administrations through this approach.
Whether authority or ministry/department, engagement of stakeholders in planning and
conservation is increasingly important to gain compliance and cost efficiencies. New or
revised legislation should include the stakeholder aspect of management.
To merge or demerge? The Pacific experience varies with country context. PNG and
Nauru's fisheries authorities were stand alone departments before reform to an authority
model; now the Cook Islands MMR is the only stand alone ministry or department among
the smaller PICs. Australian states' experience is for reversion from Authority to
fisheries department, and if a stand alone department then generally to merge with other
economic or natural resources departments, whereas at the national level the authority
model persists, though policy is formulated through a department. The rationale for
changes to the institutional models is presented in this review report and condenses to
what model is considered most appropriate for the functions required and context. The
most recent institutional change among the PICs is the merging of Tonga's Ministry of
Fisheries into a department within a larger natural resources ministry. The response of
commercial stakeholders to MoF's merger was that the sector had lost representation and
weakened ability to influence decision makers, and that an authority model should have
been considered. Government rationale for merger is usually on grounds of efficiency in
administration and facilitation of integrated management of natural resources.
69
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People Consulted
Ministry of Marine Resources, Cook Islands
Ian Bertram
Secretary
Department of Fisheries, Fiji
Suresh Chandra
A/g Director
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources Development, Kiribati
Takuia Uakeia
Dep Secretary
Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authority, Republic of the Marshall Islands
Glen Joseph
Director
National Fisheries and Marine Resources Authority, Nauru
Charleston Deiye
Chief Executive Officer
Terry Amram
Oceanic Manager
National Ocean Resource Management Authority, Federated States of Micronesia
Bernard Thoulag
Director
NZAID, Wellington
Ms Mandy Whyte
Regional Economic Development Pacific
Matthew Howell
Program Manager Solomon Islands
Tom Lee
Program Officer Samoa and Cook Islands
Cameron Cowan
Institutional Strengthening Adviser
Peter Zwart
Rural Economic Development Adviser
National Fisheries Authority, Papua New Guinea
Nixon Pakop
MCS Manager
Ludwig Kumoru
Tuna Manager
Ms Anlus Iwais
Legal Counsel
David Karis
MCS Officer
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Samoa
Atonio Mulipola
Asst Chief Executive Officer
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Solomon Islands
Ruth Lilogula
Permanent Secretary
Department of Fisheries, Tonga
Dr Sione Vailala Mototu
Secretary
Ms Apisake Soakai
Deputy Secretary
AusAID, Canberra
72
Graham Rady
Programs
Gordon Anderson
Fisheries Development Adviser
Honiara Workshop Participants
Transform Aqorau
Dep Director General, FFA
Moses Amos
Director Fisheries Management, FFA
Len Rodwell
Director Fisheries Department, FFA
Apolosi Turaganivalu
FFA
Mike Batty
FFA
Darren Cameron
Fisheries Management Adviser, FFA
Kaburoro Ruaia
Manager Treaties Administration, FFA
Steve Shacks
VDS, FFA
Samasoni Sauni
FFA
Ms Barabara Hanchard
FFA
Ms Lara Mananrangi-Trott
FFA
Maruia Kamatie
FFA
Shawn Sloan
FF
Garry Preston
GPA and Associates
Gordon Anderson
Fisheries Development Adviser AusAID
Les Clark
Ray Fisheries Research
Tim Adams
SPC
Aliti Vunisea
SPC
Simon Tiller
Consultant
Colin Brown
Consultant
Vilimo Fakalolo
Department of Fisheries, Tonga
Elisala Pita
Tuvalu
Will Zacharin
Executive Director, Fisheries, South Australia
Quentin Hanich
David Marx
Senior International Adviser Ministry of Fisheries, NZ
Audrey Manu
73